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1
i n t r o d u c t i o n
Challenging Ruptures
Testimonial Insurgencies, Spectral Witnesses
To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it “the way 
it really was.” . . . It means to seize hold of a memory as it fl ashes up at a 
moment of danger.
— w a l t e r  b e n j a m i n ,  “Theses on the Philosophy of History”
In this book, I examine how British, Caribbean, and African Anglophone 
writing elaborates an ethics and politics of witnessing events in imperial mo-
dernity that generated crises in historical memory.1 During the second half 
of the nineteenth century and the fi rst half of the twentieth, insurgencies 
erupted in imperial states and colonies around the world, including Britain’s. 
At the time of such confl icts, England was confronting social and politi-
cal unrest within its borders, undergoing cultural and economic shifts ac-
companying the growth and decline of empire, participating in geopolitical 
realignments of Europe and the global “East” and “West,” and fi ghting in 
world wars. Britain relied on legislation, trials, changes in policing, and ex-
traordinary techniques such as indefi nite detention and torture to restore or 
maintain order while also attempting to protect cherished narratives of na-
tional cohesion and imperial benevolence that would secure it from charges 
of totalitarianism and barbarism leveled at other imperial powers. The writ-
ings collected here depict these historical events and their after effects as 
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traumas that compromise such narratives. Such events are traumatic not 
only because they caused great pain, both physical and psychological, to 
individuals but because they brought to crisis representations of collective 
pasts, called into question the conceptual and affective underpinnings of na-
tions, and challenged the legitimacy of empires.
The fi ction and nonfi ction I consider orchestrate testimonies to insur-
gencies, wars, and varied forms of social and political agitation while engag-
ing cultural, state, legal, and literary discourses that sought to control them. 
But these works also orchestrate testimony as insurgent, in the narrow and 
general senses of the word. As such, testimony disrupts established orders, is 
not institutionally recognized, rises up and overfl ows borders, and is diffi cult 
to contain. Insurgent Testimonies draws into constellation works from differ-
ent nations and literary-historical periods to analyze how testimony crosses 
and displaces boundaries between literary, legal, documentary, and autobio-
graphical domains and thereby interrupts the dominant representations of 
colonial history these works also often ratify, indeed reinforce.
My aim is not to offer a comprehensive survey of testimony to trauma in 
twentieth-century Anglophone literature but to construct a particular gene-
alogy of witnessing as it intersects with moments in which the stability of 
nations and empires as economic, cultural, and social formations were per-
ceived to be under heightened threat. The cause of the threat is different in 
each of the works I consider, but in every case it is fundamentally connected 
to anticolonial struggle. These diverse struggles were both “successful” and 
“unsuccessful,” some organized and sustained under the mantle of national 
liberation, others sporadic and unlinked to claims for national sovereignty. 
Each struggle was also coterminous with other intranational and interna-
tional confl icts whose structural relationship to them, these texts indicate, 
was often obscured. Viewed together, the writing of the Ukrainian-born 
Joseph Conrad, the Anglo-Irish Rebecca West, the Jamaicans H. G. de Lis-
ser and V. S. Reid, and the Kenyan Ngũgi wa Thiong’o testify to contested 
events in colonial modernity in ways that question premises underlying ap-
proaches to trauma in modernist studies and trauma and memory studies. 
Their modes of witnessing also invite us to reassess divisions and classifi ca-
tions in literary studies that generate such categories as modernist, colonial, 
postcolonial, national, and world literatures.
Critics working on trauma in modernist studies and those working in 
trauma and memory studies have tended to focus on the effects of what 
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are often considered the greatest ruptures of the twentieth century, the two 
world wars. I depart from tenets of modernist studies, which centralizes the 
impact of World War I on the formation of English modernism, and from 
methods in the fi eld of trauma and memory studies, which long traced the 
impact of World War II and the Shoah on continental European literary 
forms. I contend that acute as well as chronic disruptions to imperial and 
national power and the legal and extralegal responses they inspired shape the 
formal practices of literatures from the modernist, colonial, and postcolo-
nial periods. To do so, I analyze a particular body of work that has generally 
fallen beyond the purview of explorations of trauma, testimony, and law: 
novels, novellas, autobiographical and critical writings, and trial reports pub-
lished in the fi rst seventy years of the twentieth century.2 This writing ap-
pears between the great nineteenth-century novels of the legal profession—
Walter Scott’s Heart of Midlothian, Charles Dickens’s Bleak House, Anthony 
Trollope’s Orley Farm—and the vast body of contemporary literature that 
addresses suspensions of rights under neocolonialism, apartheid, and post-
9/11 U.S. imperialism. Composed outside of continental Europe, this work 
also mostly predates the wealth of post-Holocaust poetry and prose that 
has attracted critical analyses since the 1990s.3 The overlooked itineraries 
of testimony in literatures of this time and from these places challenge the 
dominant defi nition of trauma as rupture. The deployment of this defi nition 
has diverted attention from modernism’s imbrication in colonial histories. 
It has also strengthened periodizing models that separate modernist from 
postcolonial literatures.
The narrative strategies that alternately enact and suppress insurgent tes-
timony in the works of the modernist period analyzed here demonstrate 
that the structural violence of imperialism inhabiting everyday life in both 
colonies and metropoles is often forgotten in the midst of the spectacular 
violence of world war. Criticism’s articulation of the First World War as 
the exemplary rupture of modernity perpetuates this amnesia. Concentra-
tion on the Great War’s role in defi ning modernist and countermodernist 
articulations of memory, consciousness, and culture began with Paul Fus-
sell’s landmark study The Great War and Modern Memory and was followed 
by the important scholarship of Modris Ecksteins, Samuel Hynes, Vincent 
Sherry, and feminist revisions of the period by Sandra Gilbert and Susan 
Gubar, Bonnie Kime Scott, Trudi Tate, Margaret Higonnet, and others.4 
Arguing that the war was the rupture that made modernism possible, Fus-
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sell writes, “The Great War was perhaps the last to be conceived as taking 
place within a seamless, purposeful ‘history’ involving a coherent stream of 
time running from past through present to future,” maintaining that it “took 
place in what was, compared with ours, a static world, where the values ap-
peared stable and where the meanings of abstractions seemed permanent 
and reliable.” Before the war “there was no Waste Land . . . no Ulysses, no 
Mauberly, no Cantos, no Kafka, no Proust, no Waugh, no Auden, no Hux-
ley, no Cummings, no Women in Love or Lady Chatterly’s Lover.”5 This line 
of argument is reconfi gured in the decades succeeding the publication of 
Fussell’s study. Most recently, the textual effects of the experience of the 
battlefi eld have been paralleled to those of the experience of the European 
metropolis, the Georgian strategies of the war poets connected to the strate-
gies of modernist civilian writers such as D. H. Lawrence.6 Whether used 
to distinguish modernism from realist war testimonials or to read modernist 
fragmentation as refl ective of the real, the foregrounding of war eclipses the 
effects of colonial life and history on modernist form.7 Depicting the war 
as rupture explicitly or implicitly characterizes the prewar past, the time of 
colonial conquest, consolidation, and resistances to these, as “static” rather 
than dynamic or violent.
Such arguments express a temporal imaginary that takes modernism at its 
word when it claims to “make it new” and a spatial imaginary that posits a 
gap between metropole and colonies. Others, however, have dispelled these 
mythic visions. Jay Winter argues that “the view that there was a ‘modernist’ 
moment in literary history, beginning in the 1860s, maturing before 1914, 
but coming of age after the Great War” is a dream of order; “to array the 
past in such a way is to invite distortion by losing a sense of its messiness, its 
non-linearity, its vigorous and stubbornly visible incompatibilities.”8 Mod-
ernist and Great War culture and literature did not exclusively perform a 
radical break with the past or abide by Ezra Pound’s commandment to make 
it new. In mourning and rememoration, writers often availed themselves of 
earlier aesthetic techniques and practices, Winter asserts. The performance 
of testimony in Conrad’s and West’s works composed during the war il-
lustrate that both authors do so. This performance also questions the ideol-
ogy that situates modernism, and modernity, as rupture, an ideology that 
Fredric Jameson critiques and attributes to modernism’s commentators and 
periodizers. Jameson contends that a dialectic of rupture and periodization 
F6635.indb   4 9/23/15   9:24:46 AM
Introduction   5
recurs throughout modernity and comes to defi ne it: “the foregrounding 
of continuities, the insistent and unwavering focus on the seamless passage 
from past to present, slowly turns into a consciousness of a radical break, 
while at the same time the enforced attention to a break gradually turns 
the latter into a period in its own right.”9 Jameson was also one of the fi rst 
critics to expose how a perceived rupture between the spaces of the metro-
pole and colonies organizes modernist literature, demonstrating that British 
modernism reveals its reliance upon colonialism and its inability to raise 
this reliance to the level of textual consciousness.10 The last decades have 
seen an increasing number of studies explore how British modernism alter-
nately registers and obscures the imperial formations that enable it.11 None, 
however, has focused on how testimony labors to raise histories of colonial 
trauma, violence, and law to the level of textual consciousness. Attending to 
this labor clarifi es the Eurocentric perspective underwriting the theory of 
modernism, and modernity, as rupture.
That the conceptualization of trauma as rupture is thoroughly entrenched, 
and that modernity is often confl ated with trauma, is suggested by the fact 
that even the critic of the ideology of modernity-as-rupture promulgates 
it while using the language of trauma. On the one hand, Jameson proposes 
that “modernity” is a trope of rewriting, a “rhetorical effect” that returns 
throughout history.12 On the other hand, he insists that this trope possesses 
a singular referent. Instead of World War I, this referent is what he describes 
as the traumatic break that initiates the capitalist world system, which sub-
sumes all differences under the standardization of a universal market order.13 
In a passage whose signifi cance he minimizes by calling it a “parenthesis” 
and whose language of trace, ghostliness, and abstraction appears to convey 
modernity as irreducibly tropological, Jameson negates this argument. He 
claims that we can
restore the social and historical meaning of the rewriting operation by position-
ing it as a trace and an abstraction from a real historical event and trauma, one 
which can be said to amount to a rewriting and a surcharging of the social itself 
in its most concrete form. This is the moment of the overcoming of feudalism 
by capitalism, and of the aristocratic social order of castes and blood by the new 
bourgeois order which at least promised social and juridical equality and politi-
cal democracy. This is to locate the referent of “modernity” in a new way, via 
the ancient ghostly forms of experience itself rather than in some one-to-one 
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correspondence between the alleged concept and its equally alleged object. . . . 
In any case—and this is the deeper justifi cation for tracing the formal opera-
tions of the trope of modernity back to its traumatic historical emergence— our 
situation at the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century has nothing to do with this 
any longer.14
Abiding by his own premise that “we cannot not periodize,”15 Jameson ad-
duces modernity as the consequence of a “real” new beginning, “experience 
itself.” His term for the rupture in history, the moment of the overcoming 
of feudalism by capitalism, is trauma.
Analyzing the speech act of testimony makes clear the problems with 
conceptualizing trauma in terms of rupture. As psychoanalysis tells us, tes-
timony does not re-present events as “real, historical traumas”; rather, it 
fi gures traumas as sites of struggle over representation and over what con-
stitutes reality and history. Freud never wrote a single or unifi ed theory of 
trauma, but he elaborated the concept through discussions of different top-
ics: dreams, accident neuroses, castration anxiety, and exile under fascism 
and religious persecution.16 His discussion of Nachträglichkeit, translated as 
“aftereffect,” theorizes that trauma is relayed through (re)telling and, there-
fore, is always spread across multiple times. In the process of secondary 
revision, trauma is fi gured through contingencies of enunciation and subject 
to the pressures that initiate that enunciation. Trauma is the effect of testi-
mony, of which it is also a cause. Every trauma is internally split, haunted 
by another time, that of a potential testimony to it in the messianic formu-
lations of the future anterior in which trauma “will have been,” will have 
happened. Every testimony is haunted by the time of the historically specifi c 
event outside the present of its enunciation, which it fi gures. The psycho-
analytic theorization of trauma thus elucidates the problem with viewing a 
past as either entirely continuous or discontinuous with a present that acti-
vates testimony. This theorization can function as a reminder for the work 
of literary criticism that periods are not self-enclosed. Testimony in the 
writings I examine discloses how ruptures claimed to constitute periods dis-
simulate relations between pasts and presents.
Employing as one critical apparatus the morphology of testimony psy-
choanalysis elaborates helps restore the importance of imperial trauma to 
the formal procedures of modernist and Anglophone literatures. It is worth 
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pointing out, however, that the institution of psychoanalysis also consoli-
dated patriarchal, colonialist, and heteronormative narratives of subjectivity 
and historical development. As feminist, postcolonial, and queer theorists 
have taught us, using psychoanalytic models to counter such narratives also 
means setting psychoanalysis against itself in key ways. In recent years, oth-
ers have questioned the value of trauma theory for reading postcolonial and 
contemporary literature and culture.17 I maintain that the psychoanalytic 
theory of trauma provides a critique of temporality useful for broadly de-
scribing the structure of historicity formally articulated in the writings I 
examine. My specifi c readings of texts, however, while informed by trauma 
theory’s critiques of temporality and experience, are not solely framed by 
them. To address the singular enactments of testimony in the works I con-
sider, it is necessary to turn to other critical methodologies. For example, in 
an idiom distinct from the psychoanalytic, Walter Benjamin, too, questions 
modes of temporalizing that render a past either entirely continuous or 
discontinuous with a present. This questioning is undertaken not with the 
clinical goals of healing or working through trauma but rather to articulate a 
critical method aimed at fomenting social and political justice.
Instead of as breaks, totalities, or periods, testimony in fi ction and non-
fi ction written during particular moments of imperial decline codes earlier 
scenes of colonial confl ict as something like what Benjamin calls dialectical 
images, that is, pasts of oppression that issue forth in a “moment of dan-
ger.” These literary works do not “recover” such pasts. Staged through tes-
timony, these pasts resist the apprehension of homogenous time that guides 
historicist projects of recovery. Benjamin directs his philosophical critiques 
of positivism and historicism toward political ends: the resistance to fascism 
and the control of “ruling classes.” While his famous call to blast open the 
continuum of history prescribes the critical method through a language of 
violent disruption, what is blasted out of this continuum is not a totality or 
bounded period but, rather, a monad in which “is crystallized all the ten-
sions of past, present, future together, at a standstill [Stillstellung]”18 and that 
therefore offers “a revolutionary chance in the fi ght for the oppressed past.” 
Giving a chance to a past described not, in Freudian terms, as “repressed” 
but “oppressed” (unterdruckt—the word Benjamin uses to depict, in Marxist 
terms, classes in struggle) requires that one encounter the monad as dialecti-
cal image. He defi nes the pedagogical aim of the Arcades Project, therefore, 
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as training the “image-making medium within us.”19 The potential critical 
force of every image is that it is suffused by the now-time, Jetzeit, which is 
not the present but rather undoes phenomenologies of presence: “What dis-
tinguishes images from the ‘essences’ of phenomenology is their historical 
index. . . . Image is dialectics at a standstill.” The dialectical image is activated 
in a contingent moment that forms a constellation with this what-has-been; 
thus, “to articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it ‘the 
way it really was’ (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it fl ashes 
up at a moment of danger. Historical materialism wishes to retain that im-
age of the past which unexpectedly appears to man singled out by history at 
a moment of danger. The danger affects both the content of the tradition 
and its receivers.”20 Benjamin announces the critical gesture of wresting the 
memory from “the conformism of tradition” in terms of class struggle, but 
de Lisser, Conrad, West, Reid, and Ngũgi demonstrate how class struggle 
is necessarily crosshatched by gender, sexual, race, and ethnic struggles as 
well. Each work’s compositional context—the Russian Revolution of 1905 
and coincident anticolonial revolt in Russian peripheries, including Poland; 
World Wars I and II; uprisings against Crown colony rule in Jamaica; and 
the emerging neocolonial state in Kenya—is a moment of danger that spurs 
other, earlier moments to fl ash up or surge forth as dialectical images.
Because the form of testimony and the events it fi gures are incompat-
ible with the logic of rupture used to characterize the aesthetic practices 
of modernism and the historical situations said to condition them—a logic 
that has been used in both similar and different ways to characterize Holo-
caust writings and the Shoah21—examining texts that stage traumatic testi-
mony encourages, if not demands, a transnational approach with a dilated 
temporal perspective. Conrad, West, de Lisser, Reid, and Ngũgi reimagine 
revolutions, insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, treason, and war as tears in 
the fabric of the nation and empire, but the formal practices that constitute 
testimony relate that each of these events is enmeshed within historical pro-
cesses that predate them and is the product of contemporaneous forces that 
extend beyond the particular region, nation, or continent in which they are 
shown to occur. Drawing together Conrad’s autobiographical and political 
“Polish” writings and novel of the Russian revolution of 1905, Under Western 
Eyes; West’s World War I novel, The Return of the Soldier, and post–World 
War II trial reports collected in The Meaning of Treason; de Lisser’s historical 
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romance Revenge: A Tale of Old Jamaica and Reid’s epic novel New Day and 
young-adult novel Sixty-Five, all of which recount the Morant Bay rebellion 
of 1865 in Jamaica; and Ngũgi’s novel about the Kenya Emergency, A Grain 
of Wheat, which I situate in the context of his critical writings on African lit-
erature and his prison writing, Detained, allows us to put into practice what 
Michael Rothberg calls “multidirectional memory.” As Rothberg persua-
sively argues, the study of trauma is enriched by an approach that seeks out 
connections across time and space while preserving differences. This critical 
practice “posits collective memory as partially disengaged from exclusive 
versions of cultural identity and acknowledges how remembrance both cuts 
across and binds together diverse spatial, temporal, and cultural sites.”22
The works I analyze use a variety of textual strategies to bear witness to 
these crises in memory, including those typically identifi ed as modernist, 
though only two authors would traditionally be classifi ed as modernists and 
even they are not the most canonical examples of this type. Participating in 
ongoing critical endeavors to rethink what the term “modernism” means 
in the era of the new modernist studies, I turn to West and Conrad be-
cause their writings complicate received ideas about what modernism is or 
does. Among these is that modernism is skeptical of Enlightenment narra-
tives that uphold nationalism as a spiritual ideal, and that it refl ects a secular 
alienated and atomistic subjectivity produced by capitalist modernity. Each 
author’s interest in testimony as both literary and legal acts is coupled with 
ambivalent attitudes toward nationalism as a basis for community. This am-
bivalence betrays contradictory responses to imperialism and demonstrates 
how a boundary between secular and religious discourse is rendered precari-
ous by testimony.
West’s works are written across high and late modernist, as well as post-
modernist periods, but do not fi t neatly into any of these periodizing cat-
egories. As Bernard Schweizer asserts, “West’s modernist work places less 
emphasis on the concept of artistic crisis than it does on notions of political, 
cultural, and spiritual crisis,” and he proposes that this “makes her work less 
susceptible to traditional readings of modernism as a movement driven by 
aesthetic and formal imperatives.”23 West’s vocations as journalist and travel 
writer, who documented journeys through 1930s Yugoslavia and 1960s Mex-
ico, and as a reporter of many important trials in the United States, Britain, 
and postwar Germany, infl uenced her approach to literary form and shaped 
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her views on nationalism, imperialism, and anti-imperialism. West’s politi-
cal views shifted across her career. Although she was never a member of the 
Bloomsbury group, her earlier writing shares some of the perspectives of its 
fi gures. The Return of the Soldier criticizes nationalist discourses for ratifying 
uneven social and class structures within England and ties these structures 
to imperial interests and the suppression of labor movements abroad. Over 
the next two decades, West’s perspectives moved away from those of mod-
ernist vanguards. She became critical of communism and other forms of 
leftist internationalism including the cosmopolitanist ethos of Bloomsbury. 
She interpreted this ethos as antinationalist and the result of unexamined 
privilege. Witnessing the repression and destruction of nationalities in the 
Balkans made her sympathetic to nationalism as an affective mode and led 
her to see it as a form of resistance to imperial domination.24 But her ac-
culturation as an Anglo-Irish subject, combined with anxieties about the 
consequences of accelerating imperial contraction in the postwar period, 
seems to have made her less than sympathetic to other nationalisms—those 
targeting British rather than Eastern European powers. In her reports on 
the treason trials in England, West derides the anticolonial nationalism of 
the Irish, whom she treats as subhuman and therefore lacking the right to 
national independence.
Conrad’s experiences traveling throughout the colonial world and his 
status as a colonial subject helped mold his writing, too, which, like West’s, 
departs in certain ways from modernist practices and politics. Conrad was 
the son of a leading Polish revolutionary of the most radical faction of anti-
colonialists, which notably did not articulate their program in ethnonation-
alist terms. Apollo Korzienowski was exiled by the Russian state and died 
while Conrad was very young, and, consequently, Conrad was raised by a 
maternal uncle who was highly critical of his father’s revolutionary agenda. 
Conrad left Poland and became a citizen and supporter of the British em-
pire and a critic of incipient globalization and emerging cosmopolitical alli-
ances. Divided attitudes toward imperial nationalism drive his fi ctional and 
autobiographical responses to revolution in Russia and anticolonial revolt 
in Poland. These attitudes are crystallized in the enactment of confession 
in Under Western Eyes and the 1915 essay “Poland Revisited.” Those works’ 
employment of literary impressionism and other techniques read as mod-
ernist, but their use of confession positions them within a tradition of secu-
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lar and religious expression that precedes the modernist period, is largely 
absent from modernist practice, and then returns in the postwar West in a 
multitude of discursive forms.
West’s and Conrad’s writings’ concerns with law, testimony, and jus-
tice during struggles against imperial power connects them to the works 
of de Lisser, Reid, and Ngũgi. These are more forgotten than canonical 
texts of colonial and postcolonial literature. This fact might be attributed 
to their subjects and their treatments of them. These novels lack the plots 
and thematics often found in highly anthologized and popular Anglophone 
fi ction: narratives of migration and diaspora detailing the diffi culties of ne-
gotiating identity and existence among foreign communities, for example, 
or representations of encounters between global and minority cultures in 
a “modernity at large.” By contrast, Revenge, New Day, Sixty-Five, and A 
Grain of Wheat center on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies that take 
place within the space of a colony and that were rooted in economic factors 
as much as, if not more so than, contestations over culture. Moreover, their 
range of responses to these events defi es what we have come to expect from 
postcolonial literature.
Revenge (1919) and New Day (1949) were published decades prior to in-
dependence in Jamaica, and Sixty-Five (1960) two years before it. It is not 
only that they make insurgency their topic but also how they address it that 
distinguishes these texts from canonical postcolonial fi ction, understood as 
literature written after as well as during the colonial era that takes a critical 
stance toward colonialism. Reid’s works are highly ambivalent toward the 
ends of empire, and de Lisser’s is opposed to Jamaican independence. These 
attitudes are conveyed through narrative strategies that attempt to vindicate 
English law. According to the Jamaica Royal Commission and the Victo-
rian writers and jurists whose arguments, I contend, Revenge, New Day, and 
Sixty-Five engage, English law has been tarnished by the excessively brutal 
and lengthy suppression of the Morant Bay rebellion under Governor Ed-
ward Eyre’s command. The formal protocols of witnessing in de Lisser’s and 
Reid’s novels dissect the legal concept of necessity that was at the founda-
tion of British emergency law and at the heart of the debates about whether 
the counterinsurgency was justifi able. These debates occurred during what 
became known as the Governor Eyre controversy in England. This slip-
pery legal concept has reemerged as the site of controversy again in the 
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twenty-fi rst century, having become the focus of criticisms of the practices 
of policing and detention in the ongoing U.S. war on terror. The question 
the Morant Bay rebellion raised, which has been raised again, is whether the 
concept of necessity should be based on imminent threat or on deterrence.25 
That all three novels have fallen out of print and have garnered little to no 
critical attention in decades evinces they are incompatible with the Anglo-
phone/World Literature market today and illegible within the discipline of 
postcolonial literary studies. But this fi ction should be revisited, I maintain, 
because it ruminates on how justifi cations for legal violence intersect with 
uneven class and race formations. It permits us to see, then, that contempo-
rary questions about the use of legitimate versus illegitimate force possess a 
history and a buried literary history.
Unlike de Lisser and Reid, Ngũgi is a world-renowned author today; 
nevertheless, his novel A Grain of Wheat had only recently come back into 
print in the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century. This reprinting of a work 
about the years of the Emergency, during which the screening and detention 
in concentration camps and villages of tens of thousands of Kikuyu occurred, 
is timely. Details of the brutality and scope of the counterinsurgency were 
buried in British archives for decades and fi rst unearthed in the early 2000s 
by historians whose studies have since punctured the British “counterin-
surgency myth”: that the empire was engaged in a campaign to win hearts 
and minds with the goal of rehabilitating insurgents. Not until 2011, under 
pressure from the Kenyan government, had England begun to address in 
legal form its crimes under the Emergency. Ngũgi’s novel has returned to 
print in its revised version, which was fi rst published in 1986. The original 
work, which appeared in 1967, has not. That text, which I examine here, 
portrays the violence of the counterinsurgency as well as that of the Kenya 
Land and Freedom fi ghters in graphic terms. The rhetoric through which 
violence is justifi ed creates discomfi ting overlaps and complicities among 
colonial, neocolonial, and even anticolonial formations. Ngũgi exposes the 
violence of British law in its enactment of a state of exception. This enact-
ment normalizes indefi nite detention and compelled confession, techniques 
of governance the Kenyan leaders will use after independence. The novel’s 
strategic management of silence and speech critiques these techniques and 
signals Ngũgi’s attempts to end a cycle of traumatic repetitions of betrayal 
that plague Kenyan colonial and postcolonial history. At times, however, the 
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text delivers its critique of violence and betrayal by justifying national inde-
pendence in a language of natural rights, rights based on biological or bare 
life. Use of this language risks perpetuating the legacy of colonial thought 
the work sets out to destroy.
The connections that emerge among these modernist, colonial, and 
postcolonial writings are not produced by the plotting of transcultural en-
counters in colonial spaces or “contact zones,” therefore. Rather, these con-
nections are produced by formal enactments of testimony to “missed en-
counters,” or traumas, in colonial history.26 These enactments refute claims 
by scholars that a particular style proffers a more ethical response to trauma 
than another, for instance, modernist or postmodernist experimentation 
or, conversely, documentary and “conventional” narrative forms associated 
with traditions such as realism and naturalism.27 Moreover, these authors’ 
deployments of diverse styles and various discourses challenge monolithic 
notions of an engaged literature of the postcolonial period that would con-
trast with a metropolitan modernism thought to be defi ned by diffi culty, 
self- refl ection, and experimentalism. West and Conrad eschew markers of 
innovation such as stream of consciousness and fragmented narratives and 
use techniques found in literary, journalistic, and popular genres whose 
grammars stress continuity more than discontinuity and convey a sense of 
coherence rather than disorientation. Instead of aspiring toward aesthetic 
autonomy and self-refl ection, these works are directed outward: through 
testimony, they broach actual historical events. Ngũgi’s and Reid’s novels 
appear during eras in which fi ction often portrayed the material conditions 
of everyday life through vernacular modes in the hopes of galvanizing a 
people toward independence and nation building. But New Day and A Grain 
of Wheat also employ tactics identifi ed with cosmopolitan high modernism: 
nonlinear narratives, shifts in perspective, and epic forms. Raymond Wil-
liams argued that such features express modernism’s “metropolitan percep-
tion” and were a consequence of upheavals in traditional social structures ac-
companying deracination and migration to the European metropolis in the 
beginning of the twentieth century.28 The settings of Reid’s and Ngũgi’s texts 
are not the European or even the colonial metropolis, however, but the rural 
estates, towns, and detention villages of the colony. What impels their for-
mal tactics is not migration and deracination but upheavals within the colony 
or nation that are the effects of transnational, cultural, and legal forces on it.
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Although Ngũgi and Reid use what could be described as modernist tac-
tics, their works also require that we defi ne the term “modernism” differ-
ently from the ways critical models have defi ned it in the past: as a recog-
nizable category of texts associated with a specifi c set of aesthetic practices 
thought to originate in Europe and diffuse outward to colonies and former 
colonies, where they are copied or recycled.29 Jessica Berman offers an al-
ternative to this reading of modernism in her study of ethics, politics, and 
transnational modernism. She argues that “modernism . . . stands for a dy-
namic set of relationships, practices, problematics, and cultural engagements 
with modernity rather than a static canon of works, a given set of formal 
devices, or a specifi c range of beliefs,” and she proposes that “modernist nar-
rative might best be seen as a constellation of rhetorical actions, attitudes, 
or aesthetic occasions, motivated by the particular and varied situations of 
economic, social, and cultural modernity worldwide, and shaped by the 
ethical and political demands of those situations.”30 This understanding of 
modernist narrative is capacious enough to describe the strategies of works 
that stand outside traditionally defi ned high modernist and late modernist 
periods as well as canons. It has the added value of disputing entrenched 
ideas about modernism understood as works that feature a particular set of 
formal devices—namely that modernism is inherently colonialist or Euro-
centric or, contrarily, that it inherently challenges colonial ideologies and 
Eurocentricisms.31 Envisioning modernist narrative forms as fl exible, plu-
ral, and emerging in response to national and transnational forces that both 
foreclose and aim toward justice enables us to draw connections between 
literatures of different periods. These connections emerge otherwise than 
on the basis of empirically verifi able information, for instance, that Ngũgi 
wa Thiong’o read and revised Conrad’s works throughout his fi ction and, 
specifi cally, rewrote Under Western Eyes as A Grain of Wheat. As Nicholas 
Brown reminds us in his study of modernism and African literature, a frame-
work that seeks to analyze relationships among modernist and postcolonial 
literatures cannot be based on “infl uence.”32 This category has functioned 
to position colonial and postcolonial writing as secondary and belated re-
sponses to European literature. I would add, moreover, that it assumes we 
know what modernism and postcolonial literature are—an assumption my 
analyses of these colonial and postcolonial novels also questions by treating 
them not as copies but as works whose own historical pressures induce their 
formal portrayals of these events.
F6635.indb   14 9/23/15   9:24:46 AM
Introduction   15
It is not my aim to relabel and reperiodize these novels of coloniality and 
postcoloniality as modernism, however, that is, to subject them to classifi ca-
tory schemas of new modernist studies. It is true that compelling arguments 
have been made for a “weak theory” of modernism that would enable a 
broadening of critical approaches and promote attention to literary and cul-
tural works that are not typically included in this category.33 But I decline to 
reclassify the Jamaican and Kenyan texts I consider as modernism because 
today the term modernism does not register the oppositional stance that the 
terms colonial and postcolonial literature still do. Retaining these terms, 
which evoke histories of marginalization and assimilation, encourages us to 
question why certain texts resist or fall outside institutionally and culturally 
dominant circuits of criticism and publication. Retaining these terms also 
encourages us to notice when the infl uence model returns to literary studies 
in other guises. Reid’s, de Lisser’s, and Ngũgi’s works cannot easily enter 
these circuits because they express the force of the nation and nationalism 
linguistically, rhetorically, and ideologically and because their orchestrations 
of globality are not articulated in the culturalist terms of an expansive world-
liness but rather in economic terms of constrictive depredation. “Modern-
ism” in its most recent manifestations—appended to the word “global” and 
also occupying a central position in studies of world literature—has enabled 
the model of infl uence to regain ground while also establishing divisions 
and hierarchies between world literature and national literature and be-
tween cosmopolitanism and nationalism. According to Pascale Casanova’s 
infl uential theory of world literature, Anglo-European modernism serves 
as the example that writers from the colonies attempt to reproduce when 
they seek to break out of local, national, or regional constraints and enter 
the “world republic of letters.”34 This argument reduces colonial and post-
colonial literature to instances of mimicry of metropolitan modernism and 
reduces world literature to literature that dominates the global market and 
has somehow divested itself of the specifi cities of the “local” through which 
it has been constituted and also resists. While studies of global modern-
ism do not necessarily frame their inquiries in terms of a work’s position in 
the world republic of letters, attention is increasingly paid to texts that are 
thought to enact a global perspective, to articulate modes of identifi cation 
and belonging and an ethics and politics that reach beyond the nation.35
A transnational approach to literatures of imperial modernity enables us 
to see how testimony troubles the privileging of the global over the national 
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and illuminates how a world increasingly structured by transnational and 
cosmopolitical forces also provokes the emergence of nationalisms in differ-
ent forms. 36 This approach allows us to examine how, for Ngũgi and Reid, 
the nation-state is an aspirational form and nationalism an affective mode 
with which to challenge the legitimacy of the colonial and neocolonial state 
and expose the violence inhabiting dispensations of sovereign power. It also 
permits us to explore how for de Lisser, Conrad, and West an era marked 
by world wars, shifting geopolitical alliances, declining nation-states, im-
perial retrenchment, and incipient globalization can awaken or reawaken 
imperial nationalisms and ethnonationalism as reaction-formations. In their 
writings, such reaction-formations disavow the violence of imperial law as 
it struggles to legitimate its power while delegitimating the claims of those 
who challenge it.
Examining works written from the metropole as well as the colony and 
postcolony at moments in which a nation’s borders are particularly porous, 
or are not yet formed, or are under assault allows for both a broader and a 
more nuanced view of the processes through which literature responds to 
trauma. The effort to transnationalize trauma studies and facilitate critical 
encounters between trauma theory and postcolonial histories and literatures 
has gained momentum in recent years through the scholarship of Victoria 
Burrows, Sam Durrant, Anne Whitehead, Stef Craps, and Michael Roth-
berg.37 Gabriele Schwab both adds to and modifi es Rothberg’s transnational 
theory and practice of multidirectional memory, which posits memory as 
generous rather than competitive and as generative of connections among 
rather than confl icts between traumatic histories. Schwab analyzes “haunt-
ing legacies,” confl icting representations of collective memory that come 
into view by comparing victims’ and perpetrators’ responses to historical 
trauma.38 As they testify to the nation as an ongoing project under constant 
revision as it hyphenates with the state and is reshaped through various eco-
nomic and cultural modes of transnationalism, these writings both enact 
instances of multidirectional memory and also illustrate how haunting lega-
cies engender clashes between antagonistic and uneven forces—dominant 
and subaltern, perpetrator and victim. Neither the modernist nor the colo-
nial and postcolonial texts neatly align with, or stage, categories of dominant 
and subaltern or perpetrator and victim, however. Insurgent testimony con-
jures specters that displace these categories as it elaborates and negotiates 
impasses between ethics and politics.
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In his second sustained response to Levinasian ethics,39 Jacques Derrida 
writes of the aporetic and dissymmetrical relation without relation between 
ethics and politics and justice and law as a mode of spectral witnessing. Em-
manuel Levinas asserts that ethics, as “fi rst philosophy,” precedes ontology. 
In glossing Levinas’s theory of ethics as an underived responsibility to oth-
ers that both comes before and also exceeds the prescriptions of the socius, 
law, or the state and that Levinas articulates as the unique encounter with 
the unique in the face to face, Derrida fi gures this encounter as testimony.
If the face to face with the unique engages the infi nite ethics of my responsibil-
ity for the other in a sort of oath before the letter, an unconditional respect or fi -
delity, then the ineluctable emergence of the third, and with it, of justice, would 
signal an initial perjury. . . . such perjury is not accidental and secondary, but is 
as originary as the experience of the face. Justice would begin with this perjury. 
(Or at least, justice as law; even if justice remains transcendent or heterogeneous 
to law, these two concepts must not be dissociated: justice demands law, and law 
does not wait).40
Levinas maintains that the ethical is the singular and incalculable respon-
sibility to another, which cannot be mediated by law or the state. Derrida 
agrees with Levinas that there can be no dialectical synthesis of or media-
tion between the infi nite and incalculable responsibility to others and the 
calculus of the state, between the ethical and political, or between justice 
and law. The fi rst term of each of these couples exceeds the economy of 
mediation and synthesis. No political or legal action can be verifi ed as just 
or ethical; the effects of actions cannot be entirely controlled or calculated. 
Yet, Derrida insists, every ethical encounter is haunted by the demands of 
the calculus from the very beginning. If the ethical is an oath, a promise that 
binds one to and makes one responsible to and for others, a promise that 
precedes consciousness or choice, the political is the perjury that necessarily 
haunts this originary scene as specter and interrupts, simultaneously, this 
supposedly “prior” ethical relation that nonetheless remains discontinuous 
with the political. Derrida also challenges Levinas’s privileging of the ethi-
cal over the political by arguing that without law and the calculus, without 
perjury, there is no possibility of anything like justice or ethics taking place, 
even though these institutions also enable the spectral “pervertibility” of 
ethics and justice: hence the aporetic relation between ethics and politics, 
justice and law. “This spectral ‘possibility’ is the impossibility of controlling, 
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deciding, or determining a limit, the impossibility of situating, by means of 
criteria, norms or rules, a tenable threshold separating pervertibility from 
perversion,” Derrida asserts. He relates that “this possible hospitality to the 
worst” that testimony as perjury enables “is necessary so that good hospital-
ity can have a chance, the chance of letting the other come.” In betraying, 
by responding to, an other, testimony conjures specters that occasion other 
responses and responsibilities.
In each of the writings I examine, the insurgent staging of testimony con-
jures spectral witnesses, events and subjects that are focal points of negotia-
tions between ethics and politics. And at times, it is the very institutions 
that seek to contain testimony, as well as insurgency, that enable or facilitate 
these conjurations: the courtroom, the confessional, the police ministry, the 
detention center. These works relate, also, that “just as the law is not simply 
a reactive institution that codifi es existing social relations,” as Joseph Slaugh-
ter reminds us, “literature is not simply a medium for re-presenting those 
formations.”41 Literature and testimony are both irreducible to institutions 
that organize and deploy them, and they can break the frames that appear 
to contain them. Shoshana Felman’s insight in her and Dori Laub’s classic 
study of testimony is borne out in different ways in Conrad’s, West’s, de Lis-
ser’s, Reid’s, and Ngũgi’s writings: “As a performative speech act, testimony 
in effect addresses what in history is action that exceeds any substantialized 
signifi cance, and . . . dynamically explodes any conceptual reifi cations and 
any constative delimitations.”42 Though enlisted in the service of providing 
evidence, testimony cannot be reduced to evidentiary report and exceeds 
such “constative de-limitations.”
When I say that testimony in these works conjures specters, I do so with 
the various meanings of “conjure” in mind. These meanings signal that tes-
timony convokes communities whose members are not “naturally” affi liated, 
as communities of race, blood, or nation are often imputed to be, nor are 
they gathered together by rational choice or consensus. These communities 
emerge as an effect of speech acts of law and the state as well as an effect of 
acts not decreed, indeed even forbidden, by law and state. The OED relates 
that conjure is derived from the
Middle English, < Old French conjurer (conjurer) = Provençal conjurar, Spanish 
conjurar, Italian congiurare < Latin conjũrāre to swear together, to band, com-
bine, or make a compact by oath, to conspire, etc., < con- tog ether + iũrāre to 
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swear, make oath. The stress-mutation in Old French conju’rer, con’jure, gave two 
corresponding forms ’conjure, con’jure in Middle English, of which the former 
was by far the more usual, and has come down in senses.
The defi nitions are broken into three main categories: “I. To swear together; 
to conspire. II. To constrain by oath, to charge or appeal to solemnly. III. To 
invoke by supernatural power, to effect by magic or jugglery.” These defi -
nitions summarize the ways testimony convokes communities throughout 
the texts I address. The fi rst defi nition relates that conjuring endeavors to 
interrupt administrative, state, or legal domains; the second situates con-
juring within such domains; and the third denotes that conjuring breaks 
with codes of reason, operates outside the limits of the rational and secular, 
when it summons community. The communities that testimony convokes 
are those of the nation, empire, and people as “imagined” and “imaginary” 
social formations (although no less material in their effects) as well as the 
subaltern-on-the-way to the people that have been thrown into crisis by co-
lonial and neocolonial trauma and war, insurgency and counterinsurgency.43 
It is to these amorphous and shifting communities that testimony, as acts 
launched within the forums of law and the state, as well as those that break 
out of those forums, also responds.
Having sketched in some detail the outline of the book, I end this introduc-
tory chapter by turning to a work whose staging of testimony exemplifi es 
that in the works that follow: E. M. Forster’s 1924 novel, A Passage to India. 
This text serves as an example because it is both similar to and different 
from those I address in the next four chapters. It is similar because although 
it is composed only a few years after World War I, the trauma to which it 
attests is not the effects of that war alone but also those of an imperial rule 
whose claims to legitimacy have become increasingly vulnerable as the con-
sequence of state violence and a strengthening anticolonial movement. It is 
different because unlike the fi ction and nonfi ction I discuss in the next chap-
ters, its examination of how colonial law attempts to manage an occluded 
event has received a fair amount of critical attention. 44
The novel depicts a struggle between colonial law and insurgent testi-
mony that dramatizes the irreducibility of ethics to politics yet confuses 
clear limits between them. A Passage to India convokes spectral witnesses in 
the midst of growing unrest in colonial India. An imputed but occluded act 
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of violence generates a trial that sets the struggle in motion: an Indian man 
is accused of raping an English woman in the Marabar Caves. In the novel, 
the caves metonymize India. The formal articulation of the alleged rape and 
its adjudication in the court indicate British anxieties about colonial mas-
culinities in the midst of ever more vocal anticolonial resistance. This ar-
ticulation and adjudication also point to an increased anxiety about Britain’s 
(self-)image as a benevolent empire. This image has become threatened by 
Britain’s recent efforts to implement a state of exception in the colony.
The transformation of the state of exception from a phenomenon of war-
time to a condition of peacetime constitutes a historical shift in moder-
nity, and it is one backdrop against which A Passage to India is composed. 
Giorgio Agamben describes this shift in which the state of exception be-
comes a “technique of government rather than an exceptional measure,”45 
transforming liberal democracies and exposing their tendencies toward the 
“ ‘liquidation of democracy.’ ”46 Agamben asserts that during World War I 
and the years immediately after it, “one of the essential characteristics of the 
state of exception—the provisional abolition of the distinction among leg-
islative, executive, and judicial powers—here shows its tendency to become 
a lasting practice of government.”47 The philosopher discusses England in 
this context but does not consider how Britain’s deployments of states of 
exception in its colonies in response to anticolonial resistance play a role in 
this transformation of modern biopower and sovereignty.48
Forster writes the novel in the immediate aftermath of a brutal show of 
force in the colony, the Amritsar Massacre of 1919. British soldiers fi red 
into a crowd of ten thousand unarmed demonstrators, killing 379 people 
and wounding over one thousand others. This violence, though excessive, 
was not exceptional in the juridical sense of the term. That is, it was not, 
but could have been, authorized by the very legislation of a state of exception 
against which the protestors were demonstrating: the Rowlatt Acts. These 
acts extended World War I emergency powers into the colonies during 
peacetime to combat “subversive activities,” allowing trials without juries 
and detention without trial in certain political cases. The acts were never 
implemented. Martial law was declared following the massacre, and other 
acts of state violence including beatings and fl oggings followed, but the mas-
sacre also gave rise to Gandhi’s movement of noncooperation, which suc-
cessfully thwarted the implementation of the acts.
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A Passage to India makes no mention of the Rowlatt Acts, the mass dem-
onstration, or the massacre, but its handling of colonial law and portrayal 
of an India that baffl es that law’s attempts to get hold of it can be read as a 
meditation on Britain’s waning power and changing reputation from benev-
olent to malevolent imperial power. Forster’s elaboration of testimony as a 
mode contained within institutions such as the trial, and also uncontainable 
by them, tells a story about how literature responds to historical trauma that 
will recur in singular ways throughout this book.
Through its treatment of the Marabar Caves, the novel relates English 
characters’ desires to comprehend and get hold of India, a place that seems 
destined always to elude their grasp. Eventually the caves become a site of 
failed comprehension that compels the intervention of colonial law. The 
English woman Adela Quested, who is in India visiting her fi ancé with her 
future mother-in-law, Mrs. Moore, accuses the Indian Aziz of raping her 
when they travel together to the caves. Before they visit them, Adela eagerly 
demands information about the caves from Aziz and others. Her demand sets 
off a vertiginous process that ends in failure. The stakes of comprehending 
the caves are great, for by accessing them, according to Adela, she will fi nally 
discover the “real India.”49 She implores the Hindu Professor Godbole and 
Muslim Aziz to describe these Jain caves: “Tell me everything you will, or I 
shall never understand India” (79). Aziz, failing to present them, encourages 
Godbole, “do describe them” (79). Godbole more than acquiesces to fi lling 
the role of native informant, it seems, insisting, “it will be a great honor” 
(79). But Adela’s desire to “understand India” is left unsatisfi ed.
“There is an entrance in the rock in which you enter, and through the entrance 
is the cave.”
“Something like the caves at Elephanta?”
“Oh no, not at all; at Elephanta there are sculptures of Siva and Parvati. 
There are no sculptures at Marabar.”
“They are immensely holy, no doubt,” said Aziz, to help on the narrative.
“Oh no, oh no.”
“Still, they are ornamented in some way.”
“Oh no.”
“Well, why are they so famous? We all talk of the famous Marabar Caves. 
Perhaps that is our empty brag.”
“No, I should not quite say that.”
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“Describe them to this lady, then.”
“It will be a great pleasure.” He forewent the pleasure, and Aziz realized he 
was keeping back something about the caves.
(80)
It is unclear whether the novel’s dramatization of Adela’s desire and Godbole’s 
refusal to satisfy it criticizes or consolidates colonialist vision. Although Aziz 
labors to “help on the narrative,” Godbole, who masquerades as an infor-
mant, stymies it at every point. The power of silence and withholding is 
harnessed by the Hindu colonial subject against both Adela and the Muslim 
character, whom the novel presents throughout as more proximate to the 
English. Signifi cantly, the passage does not relate that Godbole cannot repre-
sent the caves but that he chooses not to, perhaps even at his own expense; he 
“forewent the pleasure.” One might of course read that claim as ironic, but 
one might just as well read it as the desire to interrupt desire. That the novel 
declines to represent the caves not only through Godbole’s perspective but 
also the narrator’s suggests that one point of this exchange might be to make 
readers aware that their own desires can coincide with colonial desires to 
objectify, to freeze a complex place into an image and insert it into a body 
of knowledge in order to master it. But this scene might, on the contrary, 
support scholars’ contentions, most notably Edward Said’s and Sara Suleri’s, 
that Forster’s depiction of India as exorbitant to representation codes this 
place as irrational, a “muddle,” as the narrative frequently derides.50
As muddle, I would argue, India also appears exorbitant to modernity and 
justice, a place that requires colonial knowledge and legal systems to provide 
both. The performative contradiction the scene cited above rehearses by 
declaring the caves immediately representable while refusing to represent 
them is repeated in reverse later in the novel. Here, the narrator’s ethno-
graphic voice and focalization render the caves overdetermined:
There is something unspeakable in these outposts. They are like nothing else 
in the world, and a glimpse of them makes the breath catch. They rise abruptly, 
insanely, without the proportion that is kept by the wildest hills elsewhere, they 
bear no relation to anything dreamt or seen. To call them “uncanny” suggests 
ghosts, and they are older than all spirit. . . . 
The caves are readily described. A tunnel eight feet long, fi ve feet high, three 
feet wide, leads to a circular chamber about twenty feet in diameter. This ar-
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rangement occurs again and again throughout the group of hills, and this is all, 
this is a Marabar Cave. Having seen one such cave, having seen two, having seen 
three, four, fourteen, twenty-four, the visitor returns to Chandrapore uncertain 
whether he has had an interesting experience or a dull one or any experience at 
all. He fi nds it diffi cult to discuss the caves, or to keep them apart in his mind, 
for the pattern never varies. . . . Nothing, nothing attaches to them, and their 
reputation—for they have one—does not depend upon human speech.
(136–137)
“Unspeakable” and “readily described,” all too ordinary and completely ex-
traordinary, purely symbolic and marking the failure of the symbolic, the 
caves embody an interpretive impasse in the novel. The interpretive impasse 
described here and registered in the previous scene’s formal treatment of 
the caves prefi gures the interpretative impasse that occurs during Adela and 
Aziz’s visit to the caves. Whether a rape happens during that visit is left 
indeterminate. The allegation calls forth the law in the form of a trial. The 
trial’s response to this indeterminate event has in turn obstructed scholars’ 
efforts to determine whether this work supports or challenges the ideals of 
imperial law and its distribution of justice.51
The scene in the caves that treats the inability to grasp India as an inability 
to witness an alleged transgression perpetrated by an Indian man against an 
English woman generates legal action whose presentation collocates formal 
practices of witnessing with historical problems of witnessing anticolonial 
resistance. Although this alleged transgression seems an act unconnected 
to the political sphere of national protest, as Jenny Sharpe has argued, it 
references the colonial discourse surrounding an earlier anticolonial revolt, 
the Indian Mutiny of 1857.52 But Forster’s text is arguably also haunted by 
the recent protest at Amritsar and the emergence of an anticolonial move-
ment more sustained and organized than that during the mutiny. In light of 
these recent developments, the motivations for grasping an unknown, in-
comprehensible India extend beyond that of the apparently innocuous colo-
nial curiosity parodied through Adela’s “quest.” Indeterminacy in India has 
become more threatening in the postwar years because it is now associated 
with the possible presence of subversives and because to manage such inde-
terminacy Britain must compromise what Conrad’s Marlowe calls empire’s 
“noble cause.”53 The protest at Amritsar revealed the brutality of British 
colonialism in its effort to control indeterminacies in order to prevent sub-
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version. The extension of emergency powers during peacetime in the colony 
is part of a wider series of tactics through which English law compromises 
its claims to operate as a vehicle of universal justice. By choreographing a 
trial, the novel provides an occasion to redeem English law and reassert the 
colonizer’s supposed imperial benevolence. Rather than do so, however, A 
Passage to India shows that law includes within itself the capacity to subvert 
itself as well as the capacity to generate further subversions by those it seeks 
to control when it endeavors to maintain a political status quo. The novel 
relates that law does so because it relies upon testimony.
The trial is enlisted to provide justice and knowledge of what transpired 
in the caves, but the orchestration of time and space in that scene famously 
prohibits both characters and readers from determining whether or not a 
rape occurs.54 It is impossible to pinpoint where different characters are lo-
cated in relation to each other at each moment in the caves. The trial, by 
contrast, appears to be a distinct episode with a beginning, middle, and end. 
It is set in a space that organizes its various participants and audience into 
specifi c compartments that refl ect their roles during the proceedings. Like 
the contested event it attempts to capture and adjudicate, however, the trial’s 
temporal and spatial boundaries are not so neatly defi ned. An “uncanny” 
force is summoned that disrupts the time and space of the trial, disturbing 
chronology and eroding the walls of the courtroom and the lines that divide 
witnesses on the basis of gender, race, class, caste, and national and colonial 
identifi cations. As the trial commences, witness for the prosecution Adela 
summons her prospective mother-in-law, Mrs. Moore, through an apostro-
phe: “In virtue of what had she collected this roomful of people together? . . . 
by what right did they claim so much importance in the world, and assume 
the title of civilization? Mrs. Moore—she looked round, but Mrs. Moore 
was far away on the sea” (242). Just as the episode in the caves confuses 
time and clear signifi cations of what has and what has not been experienced, 
of characters’ presences and absences, the trial scene does, too. The novel 
relates that “while thinking of Mrs. Moore she heard sounds, which gradu-
ally grew more distinct. The epoch-making trial had started” (242). The 
summoning of Mrs. Moore obscures the beginning of the trial, which “had 
started” by the time we read this passage and by the time Adela turns her 
attention to the proceedings. The apostrophe to Mrs. Moore minimally 
muddles the beginning, but a different summoning of her by others disrupts 
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the middle spectacularly. Despite the fact that the elder English woman has 
already departed India for England, and despite her insistence before she left 
that she would remain fi rmly outside of the institutions of colonial law—“ ‘I 
have nothing to do with your ludicrous law courts,’ she said, angry. ‘I will 
not be dragged in at all’ ” (222)—she is brought within the system only to 
disrupt it again.
This second summoning of Mrs. Moore causes the law’s delegates to lose 
control at the hands, or voices, of witnesses situated both within and outside 
the institutional space of the trial. When the prosecutor makes reference to, 
without naming, Mrs. Moore, his words “brought on another storm, and 
suddenly a new name, Mrs. Moore, burst on the court like a whirlwind” 
(248–249). The court becomes disordered, the defense storms out, “the tu-
mult increased, the invocation of Mrs. Moore continued, and people who 
did not know what the syllables meant repeated them like a charm. They 
became Indianized into Esmiss Esmoor, they were taken up in the street 
outside. In vain the Magistrate threatened and expelled. Until the magic ex-
hausted itself, he was powerless” (250). It so happens that while this occurs, 
as we later learn, Mrs. Moore dies en route to England. No one is aware of 
this at the time, however. The depiction of this central character’s death is 
both strikingly laconic and uninterested in attaining conclusiveness: “ ‘She 
died at sea.’ ‘The heat, I suppose.’ ‘Presumably’ ” (274). This depiction of her 
death, coupled with the temporal logic that coordinates her death with the 
Indians’ calling of her name, invites an interpretation that seems outrageous 
when we consider that the novel, and the modernist novel in particular, is 
a secular narrative form.55 This interpretation is that the Indians’ apostro-
phe conjures a specter. It is around the time that she dies that Mrs. Moore 
returns as a liminal fi gure in the courtroom, situated between the poles of 
material and immaterial. (By having her die between India and England, the 
novel fi gures her liminality in cultural and national terms also.) The effects 
of the Indians’ testimony during the trial, its “magic” (250), therefore inter-
rupts legal reason as well as modernist secular reason in the novel.
Conjured through apostrophe, Mrs. Moore returns as a specter because 
she does not return as herself but as one disappropriated from her body 
and proper name. At the moment Mrs. Moore’s proper name is called, it 
is stripped of property and, her son will maintain, of propriety. It is trans-
lated from the colonizer’s English into the colonized’s English as “Esmiss 
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Esmoor.” The incantation spectralizes her because it materializes her in the 
courtroom, but as a “Hindu goddess” rather than in her own material form. 
The chant thus gives face to the dead woman while de-facing or giving her a 
different face at the same time.56 The spectralization of Mrs. Moore tempo-
rarily dissolves the law’s potency and dismantles the boundaries between the 
inside of the institution and its outside as the chant carries into the street. 
Those excluded from the legal machinery, neither judge, jury, nor witnesses 
for defense or prosecution, become unauthorized participants in the trial 
by summoning and insisting, against the proscription of the court, that the 
specter bears witness. “ ‘An extraneous element is being introduced into the 
case,’ said the Magistrate. ‘I must repeat that as a witness Mrs. Moore does 
not exist. . . . She is not here, and consequently she can say nothing’ ” (252), 
he warns the defense and prosecution.
The conjuring of the specter in the voices of those subject to the Brit-
ish legal system but without power to determine how it dispenses justice 
rehearses an aberrant sexuality and an errant witnessing that clarifi es that 
the goal of the trial is tied to broader interests of the colonial state. That 
goal is to police the relations between and desires of colonized and coloniz-
ers and thereby to maintain separations between Indians of various castes 
and classes and English and Anglo-Indian subjects. The apostrophic transla-
tion that conjures the excluded witness as specter, rendering her “sensuous-
nonsensuous,”57 is an act of subversion as well as perversion. It subverts 
the authority of the court but also perverts the lines of racial and sexual 
identifi cation and desire the court enforces. The possibility of perversion of 
colonially regulated desires and identifi cations, which reaches its apotheosis 
in “Esmiss Esmoor,” is signaled in the opening of the trial scene through 
Adela’s focalization of the only subaltern in the room mentioned, the punkah 
wallah, whom the narrative connects to Mrs. Moore.
Almost naked, and splendidly formed, he sat on a raised platform near the back, 
in the middle of the central gangway, and he caught her attention as she came in, 
and he seemed to control the proceedings. He had the strength and beauty that 
sometimes come to fl ower in Indians of low birth. When that strange race nears 
the dust and is condemned as untouchable, then nature remembers the physical 
perfection that she accomplished elsewhere, and throws out a god—not many, 
but one here and there, to prove to society how little its categories impress 
her. . . . Opposite him, also on a platform, sat the little assistant magistrate, 
F6635.indb   26 9/23/15   9:24:47 AM
Introduction   27
cultivated, self-conscious, and conscientious. The punkah wallah was none 
of these things: he scarcely knew that he existed and did not understand why 
the Court was fuller than usual, indeed he did not know that it was fuller than 
usual, didn’t even know he worked a fan, though he thought he pulled a rope. 
Something in his aloofness impressed the girl from middle-class England, and 
rebuked the narrowness of her sufferings.
(241–242)
This consideration of the subaltern leads Adela to summon Mrs. Moore, for 
how the English justify assuming the “title of civilization . . . was the kind 
of question they might have discussed on the voyage out before the old lady 
had turned disagreeable and queer” (242). Structural links emerge between 
the two fi gures of different genders, national, colonial, and class and caste 
status. The “queer,” spectral Mrs. Moore and the untouchable are both out-
side and inside the proceedings simultaneously and are bestowed with an 
agency that exposes the limits of juridical power. The subaltern “seemed 
to control the proceedings” without consciousness, as does the specter who 
suspends the Magistrate’s power without intention, and not as her proper 
self; however, both witnesses possess no institutional agency. The punkah-
wallah “had no bearing offi cially upon the trial” (241)—indeed, is presented 
as unconscious of its meaning as a political, “epoch-making” event entirely. 
This remark underlines that he fi gures a subalternity that is not yet in crisis 
or on the way to institutional resistance. Mrs. Moore, the court has ruled, 
“as a witness cannot exist.” Both characters are also eroticized by others 
whose social, economic, and political standing is dissymmetrical with their 
own. Adela’s gaze eroticizes the subaltern “god,” and the translation of the 
English woman into “goddess” reads as another instance of eroticism con-
demned by Mrs. Moore’s son as a sexual violation: “It was revolting to hear 
his mother travestied into Esmiss Esmoor, a Hindu goddess” (250).
When Adela asks “Isn’t it all queer” (251) after the courtroom and street 
erupt in chants, “queer” reads in at least two ways. First, summoning the 
specter through translation is an act of illicit love. The summons highlights 
the etymology of the word translation, a carrying over and across, and lit-
eralizes it in both narrow and broad senses. In the narrow sense, the sum-
mons crosses linguistic codes (from Anglo-English into Indian English), 
and in the broader sense the summons carries the witness from death into 
an after-life or sur-vival. This double-crossing queers colonial law’s polic-
F6635.indb   27 9/23/15   9:24:47 AM
28   Introduction
ing of heteronormative desire as a prohibition on crossing national, racial, 
and colonially circumscribed limits of desire. Second, the summons queers 
a legal and institution-bound understanding of witnessing based on the cat-
egories of the evidentiary and the verifi able and on ontologies of presence 
and absence. Testimony here does not provide evidence. Rather, it connects 
subjects that the trial endeavors to divide.
The summons subverts because it illustrates that testimony cannot be 
entirely contained by institutions in which it emerges; by subverting con-
tainment, it insubordinately generates a proscribed, unstable cross-cultural 
alliance, a strange, catachrestic friendship between colonizer and colonized. 
While the novel relates that institutions cannot fully control the agency of 
testimony, its treatment of friendship also rejects the notion that legal fo-
rums are simply mechanisms of repression and silencing: it is the trial that 
occasions this friendship. By occasioning the perverting of law through the 
misdirections of testimony, the trial enacts a futurity in the here and now 
that controverts the novel’s last words on friendship. The work’s concluding 
paragraphs deny the capacity for friendship between Indians and English in 
the present and disavow its possibility in the future by dismissing the stated 
necessary condition for this friendship: India as sovereign nation. In the 
exchange between Aziz and Fielding, characters whose gender, religion, and 
class identifi cations the novel has established—the novel, by contrast, does 
not establish those of the Indians who summon the English woman during 
the trial—the possibility of friendship is foreclosed.
India a nation! What an apotheosis! Last comer to the drab nineteenth-century 
sisterhood! . . . Fielding mocked again. And Aziz in an awful rage danced this 
way and that, not knowing what to do, and cried: “Down with the English 
anyhow. . . . Clear out, you fellows. . . . We may hate one another, but we hate 
you most. . . . we shall drive every blasted English to the sea . . . and then,” he 
concluded, half kissing him, “you and I shall be friends.”
“Why can’t we be friends now?” said the other, holding him affectionately. 
“It’s what I want. It’s what you want.”
But the horses didn’t want it—they swerved apart; the earth didn’t want it, 
sending up rocks through which riders must pass single fi le; the temples, the 
tank, the jail, the palace, the birds, the carrion, the Guest House, that came into 
view as they issued from the gap and saw Mau beneath: they didn’t want it, they 
said in their hundred voices, “No, not yet,” and the sky said, “No, not there.”
(361–362)
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The trial operates as a forum for law’s interruption through an act of wit-
nessing that also interrupts the narrative’s closure and defi es laws of na-
ture (the horses, the earth, the birds, the carrion, the sky) and culture, both 
Indian and British (the temples, the tanks, the jail, the palace, the Guest 
House). Testimony dispatched during the trial does not describe the status 
quo and solidify its divisions of class, caste, religion, gender, and colonial 
status under the dominant structuring, “in other words, literary and cultural 
forms (like legal forms) do not simply refl ect the social world.”58 It calls 
forth a transcultural, -class, and -caste friendship among men and women 
that cannot exist in the novel’s present. This alliance that perverts and sub-
verts the law, however, is not plotted as one that either party intentionally 
enters into. Mrs. Moore is summoned, it seems, while she dies and enters 
into the alliance as a specter. The Indians do not know who it is they sum-
mon, “did not know what the syllables meant” (250) with which they call 
her. “Alliance” and “friendship” are therefore catachreses when used to de-
scribe the relationships the summons engenders. We would have to ques-
tion Kieran Dolin’s contention that while “the trial may be conducted along 
‘imperial’ lines . . . the result affi rms Mrs. Moore’s faith in and sympathetic 
understanding of her friend.”59
For although the defense insists that the prosecution has smuggled 
Mrs. Moore out of the country because she would “have proved his [Aziz’s] 
innocence . . . she was poor Indians’ friend” (249), there is no guarantee 
here or elsewhere that this determinate type of friendship either existed or 
exists. The defense calculates that by claiming Mrs. Moore as Indians’ friend 
it could claim her as Aziz’s alibi. The friendship testimony invokes does not 
operate according to calculation, however. It does not provide evidence or 
help prove Aziz’s “innocence.” We know why the defense would summon 
Mrs. Moore, but we never discover why the Indians summon her; it is not 
even clear that they know why since they are presented as not knowing the 
meaning or referent of the words they chant. Because the novel never verifi es 
whether this summons occurs with the hopes of exonerating Aziz—whether 
the Indians rally around Aziz in a show of support of a fellow national—it 
leaves uncertain whether this summoning serves political ends. The text 
suggests that this testimony might stage friendship instead as an ethical en-
counter, a relation between others that is not motivated by calculation.
We might read as an historical index the fact that the trial is what oc-
casions this subversive, perverting, nonidentitarian friendship emerging 
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through a translation that creates an excess, an “extraneous element,” as the 
Magistrate refers to the spectral Mrs. Moore. By articulating that colonial 
legal institutions can facilitate the eruption of alliances they would police 
but cannot entirely control, the novel registers threats to imperial power in 
its time. By convoking the strange friendship it does between members of 
different races, classes, sexes, castes, and nations, insurgent testimony indi-
cates that the novel also imagines a future in which social structures imposed 
under imperialism have eroded. The trial scene intimates that colonial rule 
will eventually end, therefore; however, it does not do so by acknowledging 
that an anticolonial nationalist movement exists in the colony at the time. 
Said argued that Forster’s text is restricted by the imagination of the En-
gland of his time because it cannot take seriously the coherence of such a 
movement in India, except, the critic maintains, for a brief moment. That 
moment is the eruption of the chant during the trial in which “the Indians 
[are] roused momentarily to a sort of nationalist coherence.”60 The “sort 
of” is signifi cant. Only by ignoring a host of details in the choreography of 
this insurgent testimony—the aberrant sexuality and errant witnessing; the 
structural suturing of Mrs. Moore to the subaltern, who, as such, is neces-
sarily not captured by a popular nationalist movement;61and the translation 
that generates a “community” whose members are not shown to be con-
sciously resisting imperial power or even conscious of the meaning of their 
speech—can this chant be termed nationalist or coherent. Instead, this in-
surgent testimony and the alliance it convokes operate below the level of the 
national and cross national (and cultural-linguistic) borders.
The trial scene confi gures a mode of anticolonial subversion distinct 
from, and both less and more threatening than, the organized nationalist 
movement coincident with the novel’s composition and publication. The 
disordered, spontaneous subversion, queer and unconscious, is less threat-
ening than the nationalist movement that consciously and systematically 
resists because the latter proved strong enough to articulate a program that 
made explicit the implicit suspension of democratic principles of British law 
during the Amritsar Massacre and successfully prevented the implementa-
tion of a permanent state of exception in the form of the Rowlatt Acts. By 
contrast, the novel’s alliance suspends the trial only briefl y. The proceedings 
continue until Adela withdraws her charge. Insurgent testimony also does 
not recover the “truth” of the occluded event at the trial’s center and does 
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not resolve questions about culpability and innocence. The novel will not 
verify that justice has been served with the acquittal of Aziz. However, this 
mode of witnessing is more threatening than the extant nationalist move-
ment because it discloses what cannot be represented in any direct way: the 
threat of a state of exception to the colonial government that will norm it 
as a governmental tactic. Insurgent testimony lays bare law’s capacity to 
produce subversions that reveal law’s internal interruptions. Moreover, the 
agents of subversion are no longer immediately recognizable by race, gen-
der, class, or caste or identifi able by the logic of presence and the present or 
by the conditions of status quo the novel’s conclusion countersigns. As we 
have seen, the courtroom draws together subjects the law hopes to separate 
and unintentionally creates the possibility of uncontrolled desire and collec-
tivities that cross borders. Finally, because the alliance is disorganized and 
spontaneous, it is more diffi cult to anticipate or control, and it carries the 
possibility that the exposure of English law’s suspension of liberal principles 
and claims to provide universal justice can occur at any time.
A Passage to India gestures toward a more just future through the insurgent 
conjuring of spectral witnesses, but without detaching itself entirely from 
the limits of its own present. The future testimony imagines is certainly not 
one defi ned by normative selves who transcend differences and historicities, 
the “utopia” articulated by R. Radhakrishnan in his examination of Forster’s 
novel. Considering the depiction of fl ames that approach in the Marabar 
Caves, Radhakrishnan regrets that the novel forecloses the “ideal world”62 
it provokes, one structured by reciprocity rather than asymmetry: “Why 
can’t each fl ame perform both as mirror and as window to the other so that 
transcendence into the utopian Real may be effected in radical transgression 
of the colonialist mode of recognition?”63 The rearrangement of community 
testimony conjures does not resemble this “ideal world” in which uneven-
ness and alterity have disappeared. Both more realistic and less teleologi-
cal and problematically humanist than Radhakrishnan’s formulation of the 
future, the collectivity insurgent testimony enacts through linguistic and 
cultural translation is not as divided as that of 1924, but it remains shaped by 
the unevenness of that time. For the trial’s mise-en-scène reveals what must 
be given up in order for Forster to imagine a new community. After all, the 
alliance emerges through a disappropriation of its subjects, the divestment 
of selfhood and volition, as well as the erasure of markers of historicity and 
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embodiment. Each “friend” is not a “normative Self . . . willing to be ren-
dered vulnerable by the gaze of the ‘Other’ within the coordinates of a level 
playing fi eld.”64 Testimony ensures that to become “poor Indians’ friend,” 
Mrs. Moore must die and be translated into an Indian deity, prosopoetically 
detached from a face, voice, and body produced by the contingencies of his-
tory. The Indians cannot even be rendered conscious that they might be en-
gaging in an act of friendship. The novel cannot create a situation in which 
English women and Indian men and women become friends “in themselves” 
or as selves during the colonial era.
Thus, while the friendship that emerges during the trial inclines toward 
the ethical because it is not subject centered and is discontinuous with calcu-
lation, this friendship remains parabolic to the ethical that such theorists as 
Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot, and Jean-Luc Nancy articulate because 
it demands the effacement of all historical differences and perhaps even 
demands the transcendence of fi nitude, the transformation of friends into 
“gods” or “goddesses.”65 We thus cannot verify whether an “ethics” of wit-
nessing has occurred. The alliance testimony conjures is already a perjury of 
the ethical because it is constituted out of the political-historical situations 
of modernity that structure the novel.
Radhakrishnan’s reading of A Passage to India prompts Laura Winkiel to 
raise signifi cant questions about modernism, utopia, and historicity as she 
refl ects on how comparative methodologies might access global modern-
isms’ varied relationships to modernity. “Modernism is rife with failed uto-
pias,” she reports, “but,” she asks,
is there a possibility for comparative modernisms that might allow us a glimpse 
of that utopian and potentially transformative space? I’m concerned most with 
keeping in play both colonial historicity and the utopian realm of transcendent 
temporality. . . . How does the novel as a global form signify modernity and en-
act that modernity by negotiating with other forms at the state and local levels? 
How does the novel negotiate those disparate spaces and temporalities, cultural 
otherness and sameness, especially at the level of literary genre?66
Insurgent Testimonies endeavors to respond to some of these questions. The 
book understands modernity as “by defi nition uneven, divided as it is be-
tween capital and labor, overdevelopment and underdevelopment,”67 yet at 
the same time, as testimony to these particular historical traumas insist, as 
rife with the imaginative potential to disrupt unevenness.
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The events the writings collected here address entailed enormous suf-
fering and loss, but also, as the example of A Passage to India conveys, they 
conditioned possibilities for imagining new social, political, and economic 
arrangements. These works’ testimonies to trauma therefore challenge any 
defi nition of modernity as the ready acquiescence to the singular and deci-
sive triumph of capitalism and imperialism. To explore such imaginations, 
I rely on close reading, an increasingly anachronistic method in an era of 
“distanced reading” and “surface reading.” Close reading, at its best, allows 
one to draw connections in a way that prevents universalizing ahistoricism, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, impedes the tendency to reduce literar-
ity on the basis of preprogrammed historical knowledge. Jane Gallop asserts, 
“It is precisely my opposition to timeless universals that make me value close 
reading,” and she makes a compelling case for the necessity of it in the midst 
of literary studies’ return to historicism and the archive.68 Here, close read-
ing attempts to follow the shifting hyphens between the ethical and politi-
cal, the literary and historical that testimony enacts. At this contemporary 
moment in which techniques of power these works elaborate and scrutinize 
are being restaged in new as well as old ways—from indefi nite detention, to 
capital punishment, to racial profi ling, to arguments for imminent threat and 
deterrence as bases for policy decisions in the ongoing war on terror—these 
writings might become, themselves, dialectical images. They might enable 
us “to seize hold of a memory as it fl ashes up at a moment of danger” so as to 
reexamine oppressive pasts that form a constellation with the present.
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Compelled Confessions and Forced Attachments in Joseph 
Conrad’s Under Western Eyes and “Poland Revisited”
Through the framing narrative of an English witness, Conrad’s 1911 novel, 
Under Western Eyes, depicts the underground dealings of administrators and 
challengers of the Russian state as they travel across various geopolitical, 
cultural, and linguistic terrains of Europe. Suggesting the central role testi-
mony will play in this text, Conrad places readers before the law in the fi rst 
sentence. The novel commences with the fl ourish of a paraph, a confession 
sealed by the novel’s narrator, an English teacher of languages: “To begin 
with I wish to disclaim the possession of those high gifts of imagination and 
expression which would have enabled my pen to create for the reader the 
personality of the man who called himself, after the Russian custom, Cyril 
son of Isidor—Kirylo Sidorovitch—Razumov.”1 By disclaiming possession 
of these gifts, the narrator confesses that he cannot take responsibility for 
the narrative that follows. He cannot claim authority for the events about to 
unfold and therefore cannot guarantee that the story will be a truthful or ac-
curate account of the personality on which it centers or a faithful rendering 
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of the common nouns to which that man’s proper name refers: the Russian 
language, particularly writing (Kirylo, or Cyrillic), and reason (Razumov, or 
son of reason). Confessions of this sort repeat throughout the novel, insist-
ing that the work we are reading is not an original text but a transcription 
of one that already exists. The English work, recites the narrator, “is based 
on a document; all I have brought to it is my knowledge of the Russian 
language” (3). The document that forms the novel’s central embedded nar-
rative is another confession, composed by the Russian student-turned-spy-
turned–double agent, Razumov.
That confession would play such a prominent role in one of the most au-
tobiographically infl ected of Conrad’s novels is intriguing, given the distaste 
Conrad expressed for this act in his actual autobiography, A Personal Record. 
Conrad associates confession with excessive self-exposure and revolution-
ary ideologies, which are embodied in the corpus of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
Conrad worries that confession will overtake his autobiography; “the mat-
ter in hand is to keep these reminiscences from turning into confessions, a 
form of literary activity discredited by Jean-Jacques Rousseau on account 
of the extreme thoroughness he brought to the work of justifying his own 
existence.”2 Rousseau uses this debased form to justify himself because he 
was “not a writer of fi ction” but rather an “artless moralist, as is clearly dem-
onstrated by his anniversaries being celebrated with marked emphasis by 
the heirs of the French Revolution.”3 Despite its association with assaults on 
established authority and literary artfulness— or because of them—confes-
sion drives not one but two of Conrad’s most personal pieces, Under Western 
Eyes and the 1915 essay “Poland Revisited.” It links these later works focused 
on Europe to Conrad’s earlier fi ctions, whose plots are located in colonial 
peripheries and whose topics are the vicissitudes of colonial encounter: the 
crystallization of compelled communities. The emergence of these disturb-
ing and unwilled connections to others is dramatized in narratives of “going 
native.”
Conrad’s later works, however, are typically read in light of his shift 
away from confl icts attending imperial-national and colonial consolidation, 
charted across such fi ctions as Almayer’s Folly, Heart of Darkness, Lord Jim, 
and Nostromo. In 1905, Conrad’s subject turns “from the map of Empire to 
the map of Europe,”4 as his fi ction enters metropolitan spaces populated 
with cosmopolitan characters whose identities are hybrid and who speak a 
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globalized English detached from a national origin: London in the 1890s in 
The Secret Agent, St. Petersburg and Geneva during the Russian revolution 
of 1905 in Under Western Eyes. In recent years, these later “political novels,”5 
and even some earlier ones, have elicited a more generous account of their 
author’s response to imperial modernity than previously. Critical tenets fol-
lowing Chinua Achebe’s famous takedown of Heart of Darkness that identify 
in Conrad’s oeuvre “complicity with (at best) or perpetuation of (at worst) 
racist, sexist, and classist,” nationalist, and imperialist ideologies have been 
revised and even reversed.6 Such readings argue that his works’ rhetorical 
tactics challenge the foundations of categories “East” and “West,”7 that his 
characters’ performances denaturalize the national as the primary mode of 
subjective identifi cation,8 and that his cast of English speakers refl ect a dif-
fused, internally split language that interpellates a global imagined com-
munity of readers while undoing the hierarchy between metropolitan center 
and colonial periphery.9
Confession in Under Western Eyes and “Poland Revisited” complicates 
this critical refashioning of Conrad from an author guided by roman-
tic, organicist principles of political community, whose fi ction rehearses 
 imperial-national epistemologies, into one whose worldly perspective sus-
pends or contests imperial-nationalist determinations of subjects, languages, 
and collectivities. Of course, Under Western Eyes—a “Russian novel” written 
in English by a Polish subject–turned–British citizen, framed as a transla-
tion composed by a multilingual teacher of languages, and addressed to a su-
pranational community of readers, the West—appears to embody just this 
perspective. And indeed, through its handling of confession, the novel regis-
ters the deteriorating boundaries of the nation-state, decline of imperialism, 
and the eruption of revolution by articulating subjectivity, language, and 
“East” and “West” as constructed and contingent rather than grounded. But 
it is precisely because it illuminates these instabilities that the work under-
cuts the critical valence critics impute to their disclosure. Shifting linguis-
tic, geopolitical, and social formations of the fi rst decades of the twentieth 
century are presented as a crisis because they threaten intolerable kinships. 
The confl ict animating the novels of empire does not disappear when Con-
rad’s plots travel from colonial contact zones to revolutionary and pre-War 
Europe, therefore. It is redirected onto the form of confession, which is 
propelled by traumas of anticolonial resistance and revolution.
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Bearing witness to intertwined revolutionary and colonial histories 
in Poland and Russia in which alliances are ambivalent and collectivities 
amorphous and contested, confession in Conrad’s works creates unintended 
binds and commitments to others. It elaborates a structure of responsibility 
that departs from and unsettles not only conservative organicist models of 
community based in race or nation but also a humanist ethic of conviviality 
and cosmopolitanism. This ethic is conceived as a conscious obligation to 
those beyond one’s ethnic, religious, and national affi liations, a “recognition 
of our responsibility for every human being.”10 It constitutes willed efforts 
“to act morally and justly . . . in the face of otherness” by citizen-subjects 
“dissatisfi ed by the prospect of being forcibly attached by patriotism and 
nationalism to cultural and political formations that are wrong, unjust, evil, 
or misguided.”11 The crossing of borders and mixing of cultures that defi nes 
modernity is often thought to encourage cultivation of this pacifi st ethic.12 
In “Poland Revisited” and Under Western Eyes, borders are crossed, cultures 
mixed, and obligations to others made; however, because they are orches-
trated through confession, these commitments are neither the result of con-
sciousness or choice, nor peaceful. As A Personal Record warns, confession 
can operate without witnesses’ consent. Responding to political violence, 
it forces attachments and regulates the formal staging of revolution and re-
sistance, topics connected to personal and collective pasts Conrad has been 
reluctant to address. Under Western Eyes’s story “had long haunted me,” he 
confi des; “now it must come out.” The book aims to “capture the Russian 
soul” but also hopes to “make peace with [his] Polish shades.” Written four 
years after its publication, “Poland Revisited” indicates that the novel has 
failed to exorcise these specters, that its confessional mode cannot bring 
things to an end. The essay serves as a lens through which to view Under 
Western Eyes not only because Conrad “treated the problems of Russia from 
a Polish perspective”13 but because it both employs and enacts an autocri-
tique of the earlier work’s central mode of expression, providing instructions 
for reading the formal predicament of confession the novel relates.
Double Thought in “Poland Revisited”
Launched with a condemnation of revolutionary violence, “Poland Revis-
ited” recounts the author’s return to Poland with his family a year earlier on 
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the eve of the Great War. That it is his fi rst visit to Poland in twenty years 
and Cracow in forty evinces his ambivalence toward his Polish past, itself 
rife with revolutionary confl ict. The son of Polish anticolonial revolutionar-
ies who died when he was very young, Conrad was raised by an uncle who 
was critical of their political views. The divided perspectives on empire and 
resistance that resulted inhabit many of Conrad’s works, including “Poland 
Revisited.”14 While it would seem that the contours of this travel narrative 
are determined by external factors, the journey Conrad undertakes, this is 
not the case. More psychobiography than documentary, it is nevertheless not 
an accurate account of the personal experiences it relates. It mistakes dates 
and chronologies, sentiments and so-called facts about emotional states are 
contradicted by Conrad’s letters, and its management of time dilates certain 
periods and truncates others. These inconsistencies, along with other ele-
ments, suggest that the confessional form, rather than the trip itself, directs 
the narrative’s unfolding. This form is spurred by events that have yet to 
settle into the past, namely, Polish revolutionary struggle and Conrad’s fam-
ily’s participation in it.
The essay, however, repeatedly insists on separating personal from politi-
cal realms and the present conditions of world war from Poland’s long his-
tory of colonization, partitions, and insurrections, which are barely noted. 
When it does acknowledge this history it is in spiritual, nearly Messianic 
nationalist terms, describing a Poland that stubbornly remains despite being 
effaced by geohistorical inscriptions: “Poland then, if erased from the map, 
yet existed in reality; it was not a mere pays du rêve where you can travel 
only in imagination. For no man . . . would push the love of the novelist’s 
art of make-believe to the point of burdening himself with real trunks for a 
voyage au pays du rêve.”15 Condemning the attack on dynastic rule, the as-
sassination of Archduke Ferdinand, and observing the rise of imperial and 
anti-imperial nationalisms throughout Europe and the Balkans, the essay 
takes care to distinguish these political tensions from “private” matters, us-
ing the latter—whether a “conjuncture which, in a most private sense, was 
somewhat trying” (114), or thoughts of Conrad’s imminent Poland trip, “the 
simplest sort of Continental holiday” (119)—to explain neglect of the for-
mer in the days leading up to war. Conrad implies that cries of “race, libera-
tion, justice” (115) of the time are located mainly in “these Eastern nations 
[that] were not far removed from a savage state” (116), and he derides their 
“trivial demonstrations. One could not take today a ticket for Petersburg. 
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‘You mean Petrograd’ would say the booking clerk. Shortly after the fall of 
Adrianople a friend of mine passing through Sophia asked for some ‘café 
turc’ at the end of his lunch. ‘Monsieur veut dire café balkanique,’ the patri-
otic waiter corrected him austerely” (115–116). Until the very end, the es-
say seems to ignore the fervor for national independence that has captured 
contemporary Poland, as it had the Poland of Conrad’s youth. Escaping to a 
Polish health resort on the last train out of Cracow after war is declared, the 
family is surrounded by Poles from all over the country also unable to travel. 
Claiming “it was a wonderful, poignant two months” (135), Conrad im-
mediately writes the contemporaneous crisis and long history of partitions, 
failed uprisings, and repressions out of the text while differentiating himself 
from this “whole people” and “its last illusions” (136) about the possibility 
of an independent Poland:
This is not the time and perhaps not the place, to enlarge upon the tragic 
character of the situation: a whole people seeing the culmination of its misfor-
tune in a fi nal catastrophe. . . . I am glad I have not so many years left to me to 
remember that appalling feeling of inexorable Fate . . . come after so many cruel 
years, a fi gure of dread murmuring with iron lips the fi nal words: Ruin—and 
Extinction.
But enough of this.
(135–136)
Yet the history of Polish insurgency is not so easily expelled from the piece. 
Displaced across the entire work, it troubles the author’s aims by activating 
the confessional mode he wants to avoid and attaches him to this people he 
asserts are without a future.
Confession dissolves the limits between personal and political that Con-
rad attempts to establish, and it fortifi es the fi lial and political bonds it en-
deavors break. Under Western Eyes has not made peace once and for all with 
those “Polish shades.” They haunt “Poland Revisited” too, especially the 
specter of his father, Apollo Korzeniowski. Conrad’s image of his father was 
shaped by his childhood memories but also largely by his maternal uncle 
and guardian, Tadeusz Bobrowski, who represented Korzeniowski in a less 
than fl attering light. Bobrowski painted a picture of a privileged member of 
the szlachta, or ruling class in Ukraine, whose opinions were naïve and in-
coherent. While agreeing that Korzeniowski’s program was not always well 
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defi ned, Zdzislaw Najder has also corrected Bobrowski’s interpretation.16 
After leaving Ukraine for Warsaw in 1861, Korzeniowski became a leading 
member of the Reds, the most radical revolutionary faction of anti-Russian 
Polish nationalists of the time. They pushed for broad social reforms across 
classes and the abolition of serfdom. They advocated liberation from Rus-
sian rule in the Congress Kingdom, Ruthenia, and Lithuania but were not 
chauvinistic or expansionist. They hoped to achieve a formation that could 
accommodate the existence of other nations from the old Polish Common-
wealth within a single state, if necessary. The Korzeniowskis’ home in War-
saw became the headquarters for the movement in 1861, and Korzeniowski 
was eventually imprisoned and then exiled with his wife, Ewalina, and young 
son. Geoffrey Galt Harpham argues that “Conrad registered not just the 
similarity of family and nation, father and Fatherland, but their near identity, 
and he did so at the moment of his father’s funeral.”17 “Poland Revisited” 
leads to the site of his father’s funeral and supports Harpham’s point that the 
subject of Poland produces disruptive effects in his writing. Here, it gener-
ates confessions while interrupting them, inducing the predicament of “dou-
ble thought.” Disrupting the essay’s itinerary and proving, just as A Personal 
Record fears, that confession can overtake reminiscences, the essay’s ironic 
detours disclose a process of witnessing compelled by a confrontation with 
anticolonial revolt concentrated in the fi gure of the unmourned father.
This ironic mode is theorized by J. M. Coetzee in an exploration of the 
confessional discourse of Dostoevsky, a writer whose literary practices and 
politics, like Rousseau’s, Conrad criticized. The essay’s oscillating resistance 
and capitulation to confession enacts what Dostoevsky names and Coetzee 
analyzes as double thought, “a potentially infi nite regression” driven by con-
tradictory desires: “the doubling back of thought that undermines the integ-
rity of the will to confess by detecting behind it a will to deceive, and behind 
the detection of this second motive a third motive (a wish to be admired for 
one’s candor), and so on.”18 This process threatens the project of confession 
in the secular literary tradition, which is to achieve absolution and closure, 
“liberation from the oppression” of a known truth as well as one not known 
to the confessant. Double thought thwarts the confessant’s efforts to reveal 
the unknown truth, which emerges through irony as a discrepancy between 
a confession’s statement and performance. It slips out “in strange associa-
tions, false rationalizations, gaps, contradictions.”19 In “Poland Revisited,” 
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the known truth is that Conrad has entirely separated himself from his early 
life in Poland, and the unknown truth is twofold—that this life has not 
separated itself from him and that instead of enabling him to make peace 
with and disconnect from those Polish shades, confession only binds him to 
them more tightly.
The essay announces itself as a search for a hidden truth sealed away in 
Poland and as an attempt to resolve a discontinuity within the self created 
by a break with the past. Conrad describes the journey, and by extension the 
essay, as an archaeological expedition, a recovery of a moment sedimented 
into an internal archive that has become foreign to him. The instituting and 
sealing of this archive from conscious memory is tied to the life and death 
of the father, for it was in Cracow, he tells us, “where I spent with my father 
the last eighteen months of his life” that “I began to understand things, form 
affections, lay up a store of memories and a fund of sensations with which 
I was to break violently by throwing myself into an unrelated existence. It 
was like the experience of another world” (117). Conrad hopes to discover 
whether imagination is betraying “shadows in my youth” and to test “the 
reality of my past” (117). This truth-seeking mission is more a matter of war 
than peace. The journey is metaphorized as “the invasion of a tribe” (117), 
a phrase that identifi es Conrad with colonizers rather than colonized. The 
ironic metaphor highlights the essay’s ambivalence toward his native land 
and the return to it and signals the challenges confession will face in making 
known the essay’s unknown truths.
A stronger signal that confession struggles to establish knowledge and 
accomplish ethical and narrative closure is registered by the essay’s struc-
ture and sequencing, which imply that, as the narrator of Heart of Darkness 
describes Marlowe’s methods, “the meaning of an episode was not inside 
like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which brought it out only as 
a glow brings out a haze.”20 Divided into four parts, the piece breaks its ti-
tle’s promise; despite the announced subject, it does not revisit Poland until 
part 4. Its circuitous forays into an ever-retreating past through a slow re-
gression in time as readers move forward in narrative space mirrors the voy-
age itself, which “would have something of a migratory character” (“Poland 
Revisited,” 117). This is quite an understatement: The Conrads embark on a 
route that makes the journey thirty-six times longer than necessary. Forego-
ing an expedient passage seems especially odd because Conrad declares his 
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desire to begin this long-awaited journey so intense that it blinds him to 
the danger brewing throughout Europe. He explains the current deferral of 
“this Polish journey which for so many years had been before us in a state of 
a project full of colour and promise but always retreating, elusive, like an en-
ticing mirage” (119) by placing responsibility on his wife, who chooses this 
passage. Conrad agrees to her request because it offers an “air of adventure 
in better keeping with the romantic feeling of this Polish journey” (119).
This rationale of manufacturing narrative tension in the name of ro-
mance notwithstanding, other aspects of the piece hint at why both journey 
and essay possess a migratory character. The sequencing not only betrays 
the expectations the title establishes but mimics the anxieties of betrayal that 
organize this work as well as Under Western Eyes, along with so many others, 
as Ian Watt has demonstrated.21 In part 1, Conrad unwittingly intimates why 
the essay delays reaching its destination by recounting that the journey will 
land him “in a country house in the neighborhood of Cracow, but within 
the Russian frontier” (117). He does not mention that this topos condenses 
the tension structuring his early life, the opposing allegiances of his father 
and uncle to the Russian state. Instead, he inexplicably relates that his ini-
tial reaction to the journey is “dismay” (117). While this dismay would be 
understandable given his confl icted family history, this is not the reason 
Conrad gives. Instead, he explains his dismay in terms of betrayal, a betrayal 
twice displaced: “Since leaving the sea to which I have been faithful for so 
many years, I have discovered that there is in my composition very little stuff 
from which travelers are made,” he confi des. “I confess that my fi rst impulse 
about a projected journey is to leave it alone” (117). Betrayal is indicated via 
its antonym, “faithfulness,” to an entity that signifi es an alternative geneal-
ogy. His faithfulness to the “sea” is a displacement of his fi delity to another 
set of parents, not Polish but British. Britain’s Merchant Shipping Act gives 
birth to his life on the sea; it had been “in a manner of speaking a father and 
mother to me” (123). The essay’s architecture belies what remains unstated, 
a crisis of memory caused by contradictory attitudes toward a different set 
of parents and their role in antistate rebellion.
Although both journey and essay hope to gain possession over Conrad’s 
Polish past, the mission is compromised by double thought, which is initi-
ated by a transposition from confession to excuse. Conrad is detained in Po-
land as a consequence of war, and he is detained in the essay by the confes-
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sional form. In addition to deferring the trip and the projected redemption 
of the past, narrative strategies disrupt the work in another way. The text 
slides continuously from confession, a mode directed toward truth revela-
tion, to excuse, a mode directed toward self-exculpation.22 Indeed, “Poland 
Revisited” originates with an excuse: “I have never believed in political as-
sassination as a means to an end, and least of all in assassination of the dy-
nastic order” (114). The sentence seeks to justify the events the memoir 
recalls, namely, Conrad’s decision to allow himself and his family to travel 
into Eastern Europe on the brink of World War I. Increasing references to 
guilt and innocence code this statement as excuse rather than mere explana-
tion. Echoing sentiments uttered by Under Western Eyes’s English narrator, 
Conrad claims that “it fi tted with my ethical sense that an act cruel and 
absurd should be also useless” (115). He excuses himself by citing ideologi-
cal presuppositions, which prevent him from reading the signs of future dis-
turbances in Europe’s political stability, but only a few sentences later, he 
excuses himself for an entirely unrelated reason. “There was no man capable 
of forming a judgment who attended so little to the march of events as I did 
at that time,” he asserts, because “my mind was fi xed on my own affairs, not 
because they were in a bad posture, but because of their fascinating, holiday-
promising aspect” (115). Leaving aside why he mentions the negative, “bad 
posture” when he hopes to underline the positive aspects of his affairs, the 
need to exculpate himself for leading his family into Poland on the verge 
of war is made clear when soon after this statement Conrad describes his 
desires to revisit Poland as “innocent” redundantly, insisting that “whatever 
sinister passions were heaving under its splendid and complex surface, I was 
too agitated by a simple and innocent desire of my own to notice the signs, 
or interpret them correctly. The most innocent of passions will take the 
edge off one’s judgment” (116).
The piece suggests that summoning confession to take responsibility for 
the past and unify a divided self is a losing game, for it demonstrates the 
failure of the excuses to exculpate the confessant. This failure is disclosed 
through the ironic articulation of the hidden truth as contradictions and 
false rationalizations that are the symptoms of double thought. These occur 
when Conrad protests his innocence excessively. Comparing the past framed 
as excuse to the past represented elsewhere illustrates the weakness of these 
protestations and the memoir’s contradictions. In his excuse, Conrad states 
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he overlooks the violence of the present and future because he turns toward 
a past absent of violence, “the past that one can not suspect and mistrust, 
the shadowy and unquestionable moral possession, the darkest struggles of 
which wear a halo of glory and peace”(116). The depiction of the past Con-
rad goes forth hesitantly and circuitously to encounter in Poland troubles 
this statement. Although the “holiday-promising” aspect of the journey al-
legedly diverts his attention from the imminent geopolitical confl ict, his 
description of the journey’s commencement implies a different cause for 
distraction. His companions were
looking forward to a voyage in space whereas I felt more and more plainly that 
what I had started on was a journey in time, into the past; a fearful enough pros-
pect for the most consistent, but to him who had not known how to preserve 
against his impulses the order and continuity of his life—so that at times it 
presented itself to his conscience as a series of betrayals—still more dreadful.
(120)
The memoir expands and consolidates the evidence that an underlying am-
bivalence slows its pacing by formally negating Conrad’s encomiums to a 
peaceful, hallowed Polish past and anticipation of this “enticing” journey. 
When Conrad fi nally arrives in Poland, the essay orchestrates a shameful 
conscience that prompts him to relive a time marked by revolution led by 
his father, painful memories of witnessing his father’s death, and a homeland 
from which Conrad has violently “thrown” himself. The excuses offered 
throughout therefore paradoxically fold back on themselves, inculpating 
more than exculpating their confessant, indicating double thought.
“Poland Revisited” enacts double thought as an abyssal structure ani-
mated by shame, a crucial element in the choreography of any confession, 
according to Coetzee. The essay, however, also departs from the dominant 
understanding of shame as self-consciousness, which Coetzee also voices. 
Double thought operates through the concealing of truth, which generates 
shame, which generates more confession, which generates shame, which 
generates more confession, ad infi nitum.
Either the confessant was aware of the deeper truth but was concealing it, in 
which case he was deceiving his confessor; or, he was not aware of the deeper 
truth (though now he acknowledges it), in which case his competence as a 
confessant is in question: what was being offered as his secret, the coin of his 
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confession, was not the real secret, was false coin, and a de facto deception has 
occurred, which is fresh cause for confession.23
Coetzee’s explication contains an inconsistency, however, that Conrad’s 
text illuminates. The testimony’s form shows that in question is not simply 
whether the confessant acknowledges the “deeper truth” about his desire to 
return to Poland and endanger his family or conceals it and thereby deceives 
his readers. Rather, in question is whether the confession acknowledges this 
truth without its author’s knowledge.24 “Poland Revisited” indicates that an 
unknown truth can be acknowledged to the confessor— or reader—without 
the confessant’s awareness of this acknowledgment. The distinction between 
truth and lie, acknowledgment and concealment, is undone by what Coetzee 
himself calls the “ironic confession,” the confession that says more than or 
other than what it intends to say, for example, though elisions. An acknowl-
edgment emerges, indirectly, through the narrative production of this other 
truth, or truth of the other within the self, constituted as much by absences 
as by what the confession states.
Shame toward what remains unknown results in a proliferation of confes-
sions that never own up to a “deeper truth” except obliquely, impeding the 
essay’s successful end through narrative evasions and a tropological move-
ment by which Conrad at once refuses to take responsibility for his actions 
while simultaneously taking responsibility for them as an other. He ironi-
cally admits shame without acknowledging the truth of his motives both to 
return to Poland and to confess his desires in this piece. The OED defi nes 
shame as a result of consciousness: “The painful emotion arising from the 
consciousness of something dishonouring, ridiculous, or indecorous in one’s 
own conduct or circumstances (or in those of others whose honour or dis-
grace one regards as one’s own), or of being in a situation which offends one’s 
sense of modesty or decency.” “Shame” in Conrad’s text, therefore, becomes 
a term without a proper referent. It cannot be understood as a reaction to an 
act of the conscious self. Desire to return to Poland to gain absolution and 
respite from ghosts of those he has betrayed might be “selfi sh” because it 
endangers others, but it is also “selfl ess” because it seems to operate outside 
the limits of the conscious self. By separating “thought” from consciousness, 
Conrad’s text offers a new reading of double thoughts. An instance of such 
double thought appears when the text collapses the two moments, revelation 
of truth and suppression of truth, in one sentence in which responsibility 
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is enfolded in its concealment and vice versa. The essay expresses a desire 
while repudiating it through the contradictory meanings of “unconscious.” 
“All unconscious of going towards the very scenes of war,” Conrad confi des, 
“I carried off in my eye this tiny fragment of Great Britain” (119). This pas-
sage supports Paul de Man’s claim that “excuse occurs within an epistemo-
logical twilight zone between knowing and not knowing.”25
This staging of shame through double thought culminates in a frustration 
of the goals of both journey and essay. The fi nal section does not conquer 
the distance between the two Conrads but rather concludes in an act of dou-
bling and expropriation that returns once again to the spectral revolutionary 
father haunting the piece. In terms of narrative plotting, this section proves 
anticlimactic: it spends a total of three pages recounting Conrad’s past in 
Cracow. In those three pages, Conrad discusses witnessing his father’s death 
in terms that transmit a desire for absolution diffi cult to achieve. About to 
enter Poland, he comments, “Each of us is a fascinating spectacle to himself, 
and I had to watch my own personality returning from another world, as it 
were, to revisit the glimpses of old moons” (131). In Cracow, the uncanny 
doubling continues when the writing identifi es Conrad as specter or spec-
tacle by oscillating between fi rst- and third-person narration. Perspectival 
shifts situate him as an other to both the Polish language and national iden-
tity, as when the essay details a police offi cer who “turned his head to look at 
the grizzled foreigner holding forth in a strange tongue” (131).
The memoir’s fi nal attempts to achieve absolution and closure are blocked, 
also, by the simultaneous exposure and denial of shame. In Poland, Conrad 
shamefully reproduces his lack of shame, inducing the need for more ex-
cuses. Discussing his father’s death, he writes,
I looked forward to what was coming with an incredulous terror. I turned my 
eyes from it, sometimes with success; and yet all the time I had an awful sensa-
tion of the inevitable. I had also movements of revolt which stripped off of me 
some of my simple trust in the government of the universe. But when the inevi-
table entered the sick room and the white door was thrown wide open I don’t 
think I found a single tear to shed. I have a suspicion that the Canon’s house-
keeper looked upon me as the most callous little wretch on earth.
(134, my emphasis)
Shame is confessed and not confessed at once; the essay’s assertion that he 
did not feel shame for his lack of tears is at odds with his repeated exposure 
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of reputed shamelessness. After this fi rst exposure, Conrad once again ex-
poses and condemns himself in a mitigated manner by examining himself 
from the point of view of others, presenting his refusal to mourn the father 
in the third person: “The day of the funeral came in due course. And all the 
generous ‘Youth of the Schools,’ the grave Senate of the University, the del-
egations of the Trade-guilds might have obtained (if they cared) de visu evi-
dence of the callousness of the little wretch” (134). The desire to put shame 
on display is made clearer when we consider that he invents this shameful 
scene—he did, in fact, shed tears for his father. The repetition of this fi ction 
suggests that like Rousseau, who spectacularizes his shameful behavior in 
the famous stolen ribbon episode of The Confessions, Conrad fi nds pleasure in 
theatricalizing shame, a pleasure that cannot be directly confessed but only 
displaced.26 This relentless logic of shame and exposure heralds confession’s 
endlessness, its failure to provide absolution.
“Poland Revisited” demonstrates that confession cannot accomplish the 
two goals set forth and that it produces unintended consequences. It neither 
makes known a truth unknown nor does it solve the discontinuity within the 
self; in failing to bring things to an end, it interminably binds one to oth-
ers so that Conrad becomes “the helpless prey of the Shades [he] had called 
up” (135). For the passages cited above also fail to suture the gap between 
the Conrad of the past and present for another reason—not his announced 
conscious refusal but rather an unannounced, unconscious failure to mourn. 
When Conrad depicts his reaction to his father’s death in the language of 
politics, not sentiment, his phrases convey a failed mourning, a melancholic 
identifi cation, the swallowing of an exquisite corpse.27 Rather than separat-
ing him from this specter, his words identify him with the revolutionary. 
Conrad incorporates the father through his metaphors of political resistance: 
The father’s death effects “revolt” and a loss of “trust in the government” 
of the universe. Thus, the piece does not conclude with the coming to con-
sciousness of the loss of the father, who is also a metonym for Polish revo-
lutionary aspirations and hence an avowal of what these losses mean. Rather 
than providing a cure to self-splitting, confession “ends” without ending, 
with a melancholic identifi cation that is at the same time a self-othering, 
an unconscious insertion of the other within the self who can haunt indefi -
nitely. This conclusion supports Harpham’s point, although in a way differ-
ent from his own reading, that the case of Conrad evades psychoanalytic and 
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political-theoretical distinctions; “Conrad’s personal experience seems to be 
graspable by theory but in fact falls on both sides of distinctions—family 
and nation, mourning and melancholia—that theoreticians (Anderson and 
Freud) wish to maintain.”28
Prompted by unrest in Europe that results in the redrawing of national, 
regional, and colonial boundaries, confession pathologically attaches the 
confessant to a “family and nation” whose history of rebellion he criticizes 
while nevertheless championing one aspect of it: its nationalist spirit. Only 
this spirit can redeem revolt against the state. In spite of the wry dismissals 
of those calls for “race, liberation, justice” ringing across Eastern Europe, 
Conrad asserts that spiritual nationalism—not the materialist demands that 
comprised the Reds’ program such as class equality, democratic representa-
tion, and a state that would accommodate ethnic pluralism—is what saves 
Poland’s unsuccessful insurrections. The difference between revolutionaries 
and Polish rebels, specifi cally his father, is that the former work “for the 
subversion of any social or political scheme of existence” while the latter are 
“patriots” who, “believing in the spirituality of a national existence could not 
bear to see that spirit enslaved.”29 Nationalism can even redeem confession 
itself, the essay suggests.
The piece naturalizes national community by remarking on the effects 
of the father’s confession of faith, and it opposes these to the dissolution 
of national community and perverse attachments Conrad’s own confessions 
engender. It insists that both Korzeniowski and the crowd of mourners who 
fl ood the street for his funeral “were victims alike of an unrelenting destiny 
which cut them off from every path of merit and glory. They had come only 
to render homage to the ardent fi delity of the man whose life had been a 
fearless confession in word and deed of a creed which the simplest heart in 
that crowd could feel and understand” (134). Korzeniowski’s confession is 
generative rather than destructive because it is not that of a revolutionary 
like Rousseau but that of a patriot. It is faithful to and constellates a liv-
ing social form, a bond of hearts and minds—an organic, spiritual nation. 
Conrad also shares kinship with Poles, but not through a natural/national 
organic bond. Because he betrays and deserts his birthplace, his confessions 
 crystallize pathological attachments and manifest a death drive, chaining 
him to a horde of specters and a country without a future. His confessions 
transform the collective of mourners from a national community into a mob 
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of ghosts. He fl ees Korzeniowski’s funeral site because the “shades” he sum-
mons are “crowding upon me, enigmatic and insistent, in their own cling-
ing air of the grave that tasted of dust and ashes and the bitter vanity of all 
hopes” (135).
By contrasting confessions of Polish nationalists to those of revolution-
aries and betrayers, Conrad separates the topic of “Poland Revisited” from 
that of Under Western Eyes. Historically, however, there were parallels be-
tween dispositifs of state power, insurgencies, and counterinsurgencies in 
Poland and Russia as well as alliances forged between Polish and Russian 
revolutionaries. Korzeniowski himself argued that the conduct of Polish re-
sistance should serve as a model for Russian revolt against autocracy.30 From 
1893 through 1914, the main political debate in Poland occurred between 
the Polish Socialist Party, whose agenda was defi ned almost solely with the 
aim of national self-determination, and the Social Democratic Party, who 
were Marxist internationalists, including Rosa Luxemburg, who opposed 
the other party’s program and allied themselves with the Russian workers 
when the revolution began in 1905. Moreover, the repressive situation in 
Russia resembled that of the peripheries, including Poland.31 “The bound-
ary between ‘colony’ and ‘metropole’ (as well as between the correspond-
ingly different attitudes and methods of rule) was much less clear” in the 
Russian empire than in the transoceanic empires, and “the 1905 Revolu-
tion had gone some way toward eroding this boundary between a colonial 
realm of militarized ‘extraordinary rule’ and a domestic civil realm.”32 Con-
rad obscures and even denies any connections between Poland and Russian 
insurgencies throughout his writings, implicitly distinguishing his novel of 
Russian revolution from the Polish question.33 But confession is also the 
organizing mode of Under Western Eyes, and the novel shares the problems 
of witnessing that the essay enacts. As “Poland Revisited” demonstrates, 
confession eludes the grasp of those who employ it, and in the novel, too, 
it threatens nationalist and organicist models of community while creating 
unwanted responsibilities and attachments to others.
Contaminating Confessions
The narrative effects of broaching the subject of revolution, and thus re-
turning to divided allegiances, have been discussed by critics who read Un-
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der Western Eyes using a biographical approach34 and by others who examine 
its methods of witnessing from a legal standpoint.35 Largely overlooked, 
however, is the central role confession plays in the novel. Among the few 
critics who have addressed confession at length is Keith Carabine, who ar-
gues that confession, as practiced by Razumov, a double for the author, rep-
resents Conrad’s attempt to manage a traumatic past. Carabine correctly 
maintains that confession in the novel does not “promise conversion” as 
does confession in the Augustinian tradition, can remain “incoherent,” and 
cannot guarantee refuge from Conrad’s Polish shades. 36 His analysis, how-
ever, considers only those moments explicitly circumscribed as confessions 
while focusing tightly on Conrad’s individual past. But in Under Western 
Eyes, confession fragments, multiplies, and takes over the entire novel, driv-
ing the narrative and generating effects that exceed the biographical, which 
have gone unrecognized in criticism on the text.37
The propulsion of confession and its articulation of attachments to oth-
ers are the result of its structure—key aspects of which “Poland Revisited” 
illuminated—as well as the novel’s reaction to wider geopolitical trans-
formations of the time: resistance to imperial and autocratic techniques of 
governance in Russia and beyond and shifting alliances between nations 
and empires across Europe in the fi rst decade of the twentieth century. Re-
sponding to these changes but also subject to internal exigencies of form, 
confession in Under Western Eyes reminds us that confession occurs between 
an addressor and addressee, something “Poland Revisited,” detailing only 
the confessant’s position, does not emphasize. Dwelling on the vexed re-
lation it materializes between confessants and confessors, the novel fore-
grounds that confession not only demands interpretation but also attaches 
one to others beyond one’s national, linguistic, and cultural milieu. In his 
study of confession, Peter Brooks advises that “we need to ask, in all cases, 
what purpose is served by confession, what response it solicits, and what the 
person or persons who receive the confession are supposed to do with it.”38 
Examining the purposes and effects of the novel’s confessions—those of 
the student-revolutionary Victor Victorovich Haldin, then of the English 
language teacher’s translation of Razumov’s diary, and, fi nally, Razumov’s 
confessions described within the diary—indicates that the erosion of bor-
ders occurring during the revolutionary era and incipient globalization, and 
the attendant denaturalizing of categories of race and nation, does not lead 
to a tolerance, much less a welcoming, of others and otherness.39
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Confession is precipitated in the diegetic narrative—the story of Razu-
mov’s betrayal of Haldin—by the student revolutionary’s assassination of 
an authority based on Interior Minister V. K. de Plehve, an act that en-
capsulates what the novel depicts as the irrational and unconscious nature 
of Russian politics. Haldin confesses the assassination to Razumov, setting 
off other confessions reported in Razumov’s diary. The frame narrative is 
also initiated by confession: the language teacher receives Razumov’s confes-
sional text from Haldin’s sister, Natalia, and translates it for Western eyes. 
The minister Haldin kills is a despot “invested with extraordinary powers” 
whose own “mystic acceptance of the principle of autocracy” aims at the 
“destruction of the very hope of liberty itself” (6). That mysticism is innate 
to Russia and infuses every aspect of Russian life is insinuated in fi gura-
tions of the land. In terms similar to A Passage to India, which presents India 
as excess, too immense and muddled to be comprehended, Under Western 
Eyes makes Russia resistant to all manner of cognitive and sociohistorical 
mapping. Referring to the “endless space and countless millions” of which 
Razumov received an “almost physical impression” (my emphasis), the novel 
goes on to describe how “under the sumptuous immensity of the sky, the 
snow covered the endless forests, the frozen rivers, the plains of an immense 
country, obliterating the landmarks, the accidents of the ground, leveling 
everything under its uniform whiteness, like a monstrous blank page await-
ing the record of an inconceivable history” (25). Just as it refuses attempts to 
record impressions of it, as “the land of spectral ideas and disembodied aspi-
rations” (25) revolutionaries endeavor to realize, Russia refuses the imprint 
of material processes of development, or “modernity.”
The purpose of Haldin’s confession is to enlist help from Razumov in 
arranging his escape. Like the “mystic” act of assassination, Haldin’s confes-
sion is mystical: it is delivered by a ghost, an uninvited guest whose entry 
into and exit from Razumov’s rooms are not witnessed. When Razumov 
returns home, he is startled by “a strange fi gure” who “loomed lithe and 
martial” (11). Haldin had entered unnoticed: “Your dvornik was away from 
the gate and talking to a sleigh driver on the other side of the street. I met 
no one on the stairs, not a soul. As I came up to your door I caught sight 
of your landlady coming out of your rooms. But she did not see me. . . . I 
slipped in” (12). The passage notes clock time repeatedly and highlights that 
Haldin’s escape takes place in an interval rather than an instant of a present 
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or presence. Razumov listens to “the faint sounds of some town clock tolling 
the hour. Haldin, already at the door . . . might have posed for the statue of 
a daring youth listening to an inner voice. Razumov mechanically glanced 
down at his watch. When he looked towards the door again Haldin had van-
ished” (47). This anachronous, spectral Haldin, who might return a second 
time, as the revolution itself would, is another metonym for this “land of 
spectral ideas and disembodied aspirations” (25).
As “Poland Revisited” indicates, Conrad uses the language of ghosts and 
specters when addressing revolution as it pertains to his personal past; how-
ever, the novel’s deployment of the rhetoric of mysticism extends beyond 
the personal. This deployment mirrors historiographic approaches to the 
Russian revolution of 1905, which viewed it as mystical explicitly or im-
plicitly, wittingly or unwittingly. One dominant approach argues that the 
revolution was both inevitable or compelled, and prophetic. This teleologi-
cal view, once Marxist orthodoxy, is summarized in V. I. Lenin’s metaphor of 
the revolution as a “dress rehearsal” for the Revolution of 1917. It was also 
long doxa that the Revolution of 1905 was characterized by spontaneous and 
chaotic revolt rather than by conscious, rational, and programmed action. 
Other interpretations, which, as Peter Holquist points out, correspond to a 
strain of Holocaust historiography that sees the Shoah as the effect of a pa-
thology inherent in the German “psycho-social type,” locates the inevitabil-
ity of the revolution in the Russian “character.” This character is a cultural 
backwardness thought to be either the result of years of autocratic rule or an 
innate Russian “special way.”40
In recent decades, historians, sociologists, and political theorists have de-
mystifi ed the revolution by challenging these interpretations. Against the 
teleological understanding, scholars assert that the revolution was shaped 
by contingencies of the revolutionary era, whose years have also been reca-
librated so they begin both earlier than 1905 and later than 1917.41 Rather 
than prophecy or fulfi llment, “an event that made any one path of develop-
ment inevitable,” the revolution was “a critical juncture that opened up sev-
eral alternative paths” of social and political transformation.42 Correcting its 
representation as a chaotic and spontaneous event undertaken by a peasantry 
lacking class consciousness, some have shown that a reciprocal radicalization 
between the rural peasantry and urban proletariat took place so that both 
were further politicized during this time.43 Others refute, as well, the por-
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traits of a revolution with its roots in Russian backwardness and cultural and 
economic stagnation, contending that it actually occurred during a period 
of rapid industrial and social change.44 Theorists have, in addition, disputed 
arguments based on notions of Russian exceptionalism and “character” by 
situating the revolution in the context of global processes of capitalism and 
arguing that it was comparable to other insurgencies. As Theodor Shanin 
writes, “the events in Russia were part of a radical wave which in those years 
swept the world at large. . . . important were the substantive similarities [be-
tween these insurgencies] rooted in the underlying social structures which 
have later come to be known as the ‘developing societies.’ ”45
Under Western Eyes, though, airs the interpretations of its time as well as 
those that would follow in the wake of the October revolution of 1917. Such 
interpretations are often voiced through the narrator’s commentaries on Ra-
zumov’s diary. Readers have argued that the language teacher’s attribution 
of an irrational Russian nature that underlies both the revolutionaries’ use 
of violence and autocracy’s systemic depredations—what Conrad calls in his 
author’s note a shared “moral anarchism”46 that the language teacher op-
poses to the morality of an enlightened West—is subverted by Conrad’s sty-
listic strategies.47 But to treat the rhetoric of Russian mysticism as ironic is 
to detach the novel from contemporaneous debates about the meaning and 
causes of revolution. Conrad himself points to the relationship between text 
and context in the author’s note to the 1920 edition, confi ding that although 
he hoped “to render not so much the political state as the psychology of Rus-
sia itself,” he has been gratifi ed to discover that in many “articles on Russian 
affairs of the present day reference is made to certain sayings and opinions 
uttered in the pages” of the novel.48 Throughout the note he repeats the 
mystical interpretations of events that envision them as mystical. He states 
that inevitability and compelled outcomes defi ned the revolution, and, ho-
mologically, his novel of it: “It was only after I had fi nished writing the fi rst 
part that the whole story revealed itself to me in its tragic character and in 
the march of its events as unavoidable and suffi ciently ample in its outline.”49 
Having already become “a sort of historical novel dealing with the past,” 
Under Western Eyes, like the historical event itself, was prophetic too, the 
current political analyses of Russian affairs “testifying to the clearness of my 
vision and the correctness of my judgment.”50 The note’s fi nal words stress 
the teleological view of the revolution and, by way of a metaphor taken from 
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nature, describe an innate Russian character destined to perpetuate itself: 
“These people are unable to see that all they can effect is merely a change of 
names. The oppressor and the oppressed are all Russians together; and the 
world is brought once more face to face with the truth of the saying that the 
tiger cannot change his stripes nor the leopard his spots.”51
If the author’s note provides extratextual reasons for considering the 
 novel’s rhetoric of mysticism as serious, confession in the novel invites us to 
refi ne and reformulate the thesis that the work subverts the narrator’s natu-
ralizing of differences between the West and Russia on the basis of the latter’s 
“moral corruption” (6) and irrationality. The structural logic of confession 
operates independently from the language teacher’s perspective and chal-
lenges ideals he espouses. Resonating with historical portrayals of the revolu-
tionary period in which it emerges, confession is a mystical force that creates 
outcomes that are not programmed or conscious, and it also disturbs models 
of identity and community the translator insists upon. In doing so, however, 
it engenders a crisis of contamination that the novel endeavors to resolve.
The revolutionary’s confession initiates the confl ict that drives the nar-
rative: Razumov’s reputed betrayal of Haldin and the intolerable haunting 
by the other that propels Razumov’s confessions. Haldin’s confession takes 
Razumov prisoner, making the home unhomely. Harboring the revolution-
ary’s confession is “harboring a pestilential disease . . . a subtle pest that 
would convert earth into a hell” (24). To cure this contamination and fi ght 
against parasitism, incorporation of a foreign body, what is needed is yet 
another confession; “the corpse hanging round his neck would be nearly 
as fatal as the living man. Nothing short of complete annihilation would 
do. And that was impossible” (24). This leads to the question, “What then? 
Must one kill oneself to escape this visitation?”(24). Aside from death, es-
caping the visitation demands that Razumov confess to Haldin’s confession, 
but this is as impossible as it is necessary because “Razumov had not even a 
refuge of confi dence. To whom could he go with this tale—in all this great, 
great land?” (24). Confession is as oppressive as the immense Russian land: 
“Razumov, who amongst eighty millions of his kith and kin, had no heart 
to which he could open himself” (29). Haldin’s confession sets into motion 
Razumov’s encounters with Haldin’s mother and sister, the revolutionaries, 
and state authorities, which form the substance of the confessional work that 
the language teacher translates.
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As in “Poland Revisited,” in the novel, confession induces a self- othering 
and exposes the fragile and vertiginous character of national identity. In 
doing so, it undermines the narrator’s sharp delineations of Russia and the 
West. Ironizing the teacher’s assurance that “it is unthinkable than any 
young Englishman should fi nd himself in Razumov’s situation” (19), the 
confessional scene between Haldin and Razumov identifi es the latter with 
that very fi gure. After confessing, Haldin exclaims, “You say nothing, Kirylo 
Sidorovitch! . . . To be sure, I cannot expect you with your frigid  English 
manner to embrace me” (12), and a short while later he observes: “Ah! You 
are a fellow. Collected—cool as a cucumber. A regular Englishman” (16). 
The effects of Haldin’s confession contradict the narrator’s defi nitions of 
national character as enduring and stable. The confession exposes the fragil-
ity of Russianness by summoning an Englishman in the heart of the Rus-
sian, and the moment it does so, it simultaneously exposes the fragility of 
Englishness. The confession dissolves the rational manner that prompts the 
confessant to describe him as English, making Razumov embark on a frantic 
quest for a confessor to exorcise the haunting “pest” : “It is really a wonder 
he managed to keep going as he did,” the narrator comments; “no rational 
determination had any part in his exertions” (20). The dramatization of con-
fession suggests that if there is no fi rm ground to national identity, it is that 
much easier to become contaminated by, even turned into, an other.
The purpose of Razumov’s diary to the text as a whole, therefore, as han-
dled by the language teacher, is to contain the contaminating effects of this 
confessional work by showing how it proves that an unbridgeable gap exists 
between East and West. The teacher translates it, paradoxically, to prove its 
untranslatability, to demonstrate to the novel’s implied audience—“Western” 
readers—that, like Russian autocracy, revolution, and land, this confession is 
excessive to understanding, even to language itself. Feeling “the diffi culty of 
the task” (49) of translation and intimating that the English language is to-
tally incompatible with the Russian experience, the translator claims he must 
shape the material by using a key term that best approximates these incom-
prehensible details: “cynicism” (50). He warns that “If to the Western reader” 
the details of Razumov’s confession “appear shocking, inappropriate, or even 
improper . . . this is not a story of the West of Europe” (19). The diary al-
legedly remains unreadable to Western readers in part because governments 
and nations determine character, worldview, and the limits of imagination, 
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for “nations it may be have fashioned their governments, but Governments 
have paid them back in the same coin” (19). Insisting that national character 
protects one from being expropriated, prohibits one from occupying empa-
thetically the place of the other in acts of writing, translating, or reading, he 
proclaims, “it is unthinkable that any young Englishman should fi nd himself 
in Razumov’s situation. This being so it would be a vain enterprise to imag-
ine what he would think. The only safe surmise to make is that he would not 
think as Mr. Razumov thought at this crisis of his fate” (19).
Rather than evidence of a critical “cosmopolitan style,”52 then, the ex-
posure of the foreign within the home and destabilization of national and 
racial identities confession performs is coded as a crisis of contamination. 
The anxiety toward contamination elaborated both in Razumov’s response 
to Haldin’s confession and the teacher’s handling of Razumov’s diary also 
organizes the novel’s central intertext, Conrad’s 1905 essay “Autocracy and 
War.” Reading this piece alongside the novel further complicates arguments 
that Conrad’s works enact cosmopolitan critiques of imperialist models of 
national belonging, language, and race.53 It also suggests that substituting an 
exploration of the novel’s relationship to a philosophical tradition of cosmo-
politanism for a culturist approach helps better explain the novel’s depictions 
of identity and community. Under Western Eyes and “Autocracy and War” 
express a legacy of cosmopolitical thought associated with Immanuel Kant’s 
“Toward Perpetual Peace.” This work’s vision of cosmopolitanism does not 
question groundings of race or national belonging or posit a “beyond” or end 
of the nation—and certainly not of nationalism54—as telos. Kant describes 
a federation of nation-states that weigh the rights of each in relation to one 
another and insists that nations must not be fused and that boundaries must 
be maintained. Though he prescribes “universal hospitality” as a duty of all 
nations to one another’s inhabitants, he actually limits the universal to those 
who can claim national citizenship. The stateless are not owed hospitality. 
Although it is written over a century later, “Autocracy and War” echoes 
arguments of Kant’s infl uential work and offers another context with which 
to read the novel’s articulations of national, regional, and linguistic commu-
nity. Discussing the community of postmonarchic  nation-states emerging in 
Europe, it uses the language of mysticism employed throughout the novel 
and laments the dissolving of national borders by war, trade, commerce, and 
journalism during an era of incipient globalization.
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“Autocracy and War” suggests why the porous boundaries between the 
rational and irrational that the narrator aligns with the West and Russia re-
spectively is treated as a crisis in Under Western Eyes. Written after the defeat 
of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, this piece deploys the revolutionary 
period’s interpretive discourse of Russian mysticism, exceptionalism, and 
cultural backwardness. It also reconfi gures nineteenth-century discourses of 
orientalism. Rather than setting the “East” as other to Europe, it poses an 
internalized orientalism within Europe; East and West are aligned through 
their radical heterogeneity to Russia. Conrad modifi es well-known Hegelian 
formulations by treating Russia as the introduction to the Philosophy of His-
tory treats Africa, writing it out of world history: “By no industry of investi-
gation, by no fantastic stretch of benevolence, can it be presented as a phase 
of development through which a society, a state, must pass on the way to 
the full consciousness of its destiny. It lies outside the stream of progress.”55 
He composes Russian autocracy’s epitaph in the fi rst sentence, but by the 
end of the essay he still cannot exorcise this “specter.” Russia is mysticism 
itself, “part Ghoul, part Djinn,” both ana-chrony—“curse” (78), “visitation” 
(82)—and anarchy: it lacks “a law giver with the wisdom of a Lycurgus or a 
Solon” (85). Conrad announces the death of Russian “might” to look toward 
Europe’s future as a “brotherhood” (87) of nation-states but continues to 
disavow that this guest, this “visitation,” still haunts Europe.
The rhetoric of autochthony, heredity, and tellury, which underwrites 
imperial-nationalist models of community, molds Conrad’s criticism of a 
world increasingly defi ned by transnational economic and political relations. 
The cosmopolitan community of postmonarchic democracies, the “brother-
hood likely to be established between the rival nations of this continent, 
which, we are assured . . . is the heritage of democracy” (87), is doomed by 
the scission of democracies from their fathers and heirs. Conrad’s text is 
inscribed within a history of thought in which “brotherhood” among poli-
ties is contingent not on a shared paternity but a sharing of paternity, and 
genealogy.56 “No leader of a democracy without other ancestry but the sud-
den shout of a multitude and debarred by the very condition of power from 
ever thinking of a direct heir, will have any interest in calling brother the 
leader of another democracy—a chief as fatherless and heirless as himself” 
(87), writes Conrad. Russia, however, is the extreme example of an orphan. 
It lacks and can never give rise to a genealogy; it is depicted not merely as a 
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foreigner but as entirely other—irrational, illegitimate, and barbaric. 57 It is 
without “rational origin in the vices, the misfortunes, the necessities or the 
aspirations of mankind,” “has neither a European nor an Oriental parent-
age,” “no root either in the institutions or the follies of this earth” (81). It 
comes from the sky, “like a curse from heaven falling in the darkness of ages 
upon the plains of forest and steppe” (82). There will be no heirs, no future 
for its people. The revolution “can never be a revolution fruitful of moral 
consequences to mankind” (84).
The essay repeats ideological premises underlying the historical processes 
of nation and continent building that excluded “rootless” elements in Europe 
during the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. It also responds to the 
remapping of the West as both greater than but also smaller than Europe, 
its “Western” part, the result of Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese war; 
however, it imagines this new community, the West, in the exclusionary 
terms that consolidated Europe.58 Classifying its people as nationless and 
rootless, the essay expels both an autocratic and a postrevolutionary Russia 
from its vision of the cosmopolitan community of nations. Although Conrad 
claims that any democracy that results from revolution and is detached from 
heirs and fathers must also be excluded, he treats Russia as inherently outside 
of genealogy, disconnected from a past and future. The essay expresses what 
Étienne Balibar calls “theoretical racism,” which isolates, expels, or elimi-
nates those who are claimed to lack a genealogy. This expulsion of “ ‘false,’ 
‘exogenous,’ ‘cross-bred’ ‘cosmopolitan’ elements,”59 and “stateless others” 
helped forge Europe as a community of modern nation-states, through of-
fi cial policies of anti-Semitism and imperialism.60 Russia, of course, consoli-
dated its empire through anti-Semitism while also denying colonized peo-
ples their own claims to genealogy, their own fathers and heirs. But Conrad’s 
criticism of Russia uses these same terms, refl ecting imperial modernity’s 
intolerance of rootlessness, imaginations of nationhood based on blood and 
soil, and visions of cosmopolitan community propped on these values.61
The essay argues that testimonial writing is the medium through which 
Russia contaminates the West. Russia defi es logic and truth, “hence arises 
her impenetrability to whatever is true in Western thought . . . when [the 
latter] crosses her frontier [it] falls under the spell of her autocracy and be-
comes a noxious parody of itself” (82). Western journalism gives hospitality 
to that illegitimate stranger by examining Russia’s political affairs and pon-
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dering its future. The materiality of the journalistic letter lodges the parasite 
within the Western reader, making its host as irrational and “morally cor-
rupt” as Russia’s autocrats and revolutionaries:
All these speculations . . . have appeared gravely in print; and if they have been 
gravely considered by only one reader out of each hundred, there must be some-
thing subtly noxious to the human brain in the composition of newspaper ink; 
or else it is that the large page, the columns of words, the leaded heading exalt 
the mind into a state of feverish credulity. The printed voice of the press makes 
a sort of still uproar taking from men both the power to refl ect and the faculty 
of genuine feeling.
(76)
Writing that documents and speculates about Russian current events—
exactly what the language teacher’s writing does in Under Western Eyes—
contaminates. The West becomes as mystical and delusional as Russia, “a 
fascination . . . a hallucination” (76). Compounding things is that “Il n’ya plus 
d’Europe—there is only an armed and trading continent, the home of slowly 
maturing economical contests for life and death and of loudly proclaimed 
worldwide ambitions” (92). The beginnings of globalization, the shift from 
nation-based imperialism to “empire,” has collapsed borders, rendering Eu-
rope unhomely, permeable to the “moral anarchy” and mysticism of that 
which lies “on the border of two continents” (87).
“Autocracy and War” indicates why Under Western Eyes conveys an anxi-
ety that its readers will become hostage to the Russian story it hosts through 
its central narrative conceit, translation. The frame narrative tries to im-
munize readers from the “noxious” contamination caused by documenting 
events in the Russian confession: the narrator draws a border between his 
own and the Russian text from the very beginning and throughout, but this 
border, as many have noted, erodes regularly.62 As theorists have argued, 
the act of translation carries with it the potential to activate nationalistic 
responses. Lawrence Venuti remarks, although “translation is seen as the 
practice that overcomes the boundaries between national languages and cul-
tures to communicate the universal spirit,” a universalist theory of language 
poses a threat. “Nationalism . . . goes hand in hand with a literary xeno-
phobia, a fear that foreign literatures might contaminate native traditions”63 
through translation. Whether translation agendas attempt to emphasize or 
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to erase cultural and linguistic differences, they “depend on the same circu-
larity: the national status of a language and a culture is simultaneously pre-
supposed and created through translation. Insofar as such agendas implicitly 
reveal the incompleteness of the nation, translation is a scandal to nationalist 
thinking, providing yet another motive for indignation and offense, for per-
ceiving a translated text as an international act of violence.”64 In the novel, 
the nationalist thinking that poses distinctions between Russia and the West 
is threatened by a universalist theory of language inhabiting the premises of 
translation the novel articulates.
Under Western Eyes orchestrates translation of the Russian confession to 
prove the impossibility of culturally translating between Russia and the West 
while linguistically contesting this impossibility by rehearsing the simula-
crum of a seamless translation. The translated language is never seen to dis-
turb, interrupt, nor, as Walter Benjamin famously theorized, “expand” the 
limits of the translating language65 through idiomatics or straining of syn-
tax. There is no inclusion of Russian words, phrases, or Cyrillic graphemat-
ics. English is protected from the infl uence of a language of a deracinated 
people, an “heirless” and “fatherless” nation. In A Personal Record, Conrad 
considers the relationship between language and national genealogy. He re-
jects the claim that he “had exercised a deliberate choice” to write in English 
rather than French:
I have a strange and overpowering feeling that [the faculty to write in English] 
had always been an inherent part of myself. English for me was neither a matter 
of choice nor adoption. The merest idea of choice never entered my head. And 
as to adoption—well, yes, there was adoption; but it was I who was adopted by 
the genius of the language, which directly I came out of the stammering stage 
made me its own so completely that its very idioms I truly believe had a direct 
action on my temperament and fashioned my still plastic character.66
Even before English law, in the form of the merchant shipping act, helps 
naturalize Conrad as English by serving as a “mother and father” to him 
(as “Poland Revisited” related), he had a preternatural capacity to write in 
the language, which then further molded his character. English, then, is a 
language that produces heirs. It inscribes him into a genealogy. The exclu-
sion of the Russian language in the novel, therefore, might signal another 
instance of Conrad’s unwillingness to contaminate the rooted with the root-
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less, a hypothesis that seems more likely given that another language does 
appear in text—French. But exclusion of Russian could function as an auto-
biographical cipher in another way: as a sign of anticolonial resistance. As a 
Polish subject, Conrad was sensitive to Russia’s imperial policy of the 1880s, 
which replaced Polish with Russian as the offi cial language of education as 
well as of social, cultural, and governmental institutions. The burying of the 
national language in a novel that purports to render “the essence of things 
Russian” could be a response to the imperial state’s interment of the Polish 
language.
Whatever the case, the performative contradiction of seamless linguistic 
translation undermines the cultural distinction on which the use of English 
is predicated and by which it is to be produced, tautologically. The con-
sequences are xenophobic disavowals that the Russian story is incompre-
hensible to Western readers as well as an ironic literary xenophobia. It is 
ironic because the narrative, itself structured by confession, denegates the 
very Russian texts that Under Western Eyes resembles. These include Crime 
and Punishment, the confessional work of a Russian female aristocrat and 
sympathizer to revolutionary assassins, the haunted writing of a “political 
confession of faith” produced by Razumov, and even the central intratext, 
Razumov’s diary. 67
Offering hospitality to a “noxious” force in the form of Razumov’s diary, 
the novel proves incapable of resolving the haunting effects of the Russian 
parasite within. The diary is replete with troubling confessions that, like 
“Poland Revisited,” composed years later, cannot bring things to an end. 
Just as the frame narrative struggles against the contaminating effects of 
Razumov’s diary, Razumov’s confessions detailed within the diary, and those 
that spill outside it, struggle against the contaminating effects of Haldin’s 
confession. Hoping to reestablish the “reason” for which Razumov is named 
and that Haldin’s confession suspends, Razumov confesses Haldin’s confes-
sion to an autocrat. As “Poland Revisited” made clear, however, confession 
escapes confessants’ control. In the novel, it generates the need for yet more 
confessions that endeavor to resecure borders between the West and Russia. 
Instead of providing closure and relief from shades and specters, however, 
confession mobilizes a struggle between competing models of responsibil-
ity. The ethics that emerges from this struggle is not that of a rational, self-
aware cultivation of obligations to others but rather one that locates these 
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obligations prior to and as discontinuous with decision and choice and that 
originates with and is sustained by confession.
In/conclusion: Other Obligations
A “sort of political confession of faith” (73) attributed to Razumov sum-
marizes an impasse readers encounter in Razumov’s confessions throughout 
the diary. This document simultaneously illustrates both the task of confes-
sion—to stabilize identities, to (re)establish differences between Razumov 
and revolutionaries, and the rational and irrational—and the failure to ac-
complish it. The document is intended to dispel any ambiguity on where 
its signatory’s sympathies lie, but the formal staging of the signature only 
amplifi es uncertainties. Composing it after confessing to having heard Hal-
din’s confession, Razumov then pins the document to the wall above his 
bed, where a confession of faith would conventionally appear in the image 
of one’s god.
He fl ung the book away and took a square sheet of paper. It was like the pile 
of sheets covered with his neat minute handwriting, only blank. He took a pen 
brusquely and dipped it with the vague notion of going on with the writing of 
his essay—but his pen remained poised over the sheet. It hung there for some 
time before it came down and formed long scrawly letters.
Still-faced and his lips set hard, Razumov began to write. When he wrote in 
a large hand his neat writing lost its character altogether—became unsteady, 






He gazed at them dully.
(49)
The passage’s formal elements immediately raise questions: Who confesses 
here? Is the writer the source of the confession? Is the confession an inten-
tional act? Is this even a confession? For the document appears as a literal 
interruption of an intended writing—logically, but grammatically as well, as 
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the dash in the fourth sentence relates—and is presented as an interrupted 
and doubled writing. The pen begins writing; then, in the next sentence, the 
passage relates that “Razumov began to write.” Composing it results in the 
loss of the confessant’s distinguishing features, his “character”—textual per-
sona as well as linguistic mark. Without determining that it is false, other 
narrative devices render the document’s truth status unverifi able. In the pre-
vious scene, the novel relates that Razumov fears arrest, since Haldin had 
escaped Razumov’s room before the police arrived to arrest him. This fear 
might motivate him to write the confession as a way of protecting himself 
from suspicion. Thus, rather than a cognitive act whose truth status can be 
determined by recourse to an extraverbal referent, this “confession of faith” 
might function as an excuse. These disruptions of the source and status of 
confession recur throughout the novel.
Under Western Eyes prefi gures the disturbances of confession that “Poland 
Revisited” enacts when that confession addresses colonial and revolution-
ary unrest. In the novel, however, such disturbances elaborate a staging of 
responsibility that defi es Conrad’s proclamations of the “moral anarchy” of 
revolutionary Russia while also denying that obligations to others are derived 
from the state, legally regulated, or a matter of moral decision. Counterpos-
ing the effects of the revolutionary’s confession with those of legal and reli-
gious traditions, the novel puts into confrontation competing theories of re-
sponsibility. Traditions of Western secular and religious thought rely on the 
autonomous, intending subject as the basis of defi nitions of moral decision, 
dissimulating the aporia of responsibility that haunts them.68 That aporia is 
that the subject must, but cannot, ground moral decision and responsibility, 
in part because these acts occur through language. Language, as testimony, 
separates the subject from herself and leaves her words (or gestures) open to 
effects that cannot be calculated. Testimony discloses that “decision and re-
sponsibility are always of the other[.] They always come back or come down 
to the other, from the other, even if it is the other in me.”69 Under Western 
Eyes brings this impasse to the fore and, in a deployment of mysticism unin-
tended by its author, makes the effects of the revolutionary Haldin’s confes-
sion the vehicle that elucidates it.
Razumov’s confessions are attempts to relieve the haunting aggravated by 
Razumov’s supposed betrayal of Haldin when he confesses Haldin’s confes-
sion to the authorities. Yet the novel simultaneously and ironically questions 
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the very reason for Razumov’s confessions, leading readers to wonder why 
they occur at all. The language of legal reasoning asks whether the “be-
trayal” that induces Razumov’s subsequent confessions occurs in the fi rst 
place. Razumov’s fi rst act after suffering the silencing caused by Haldin’s 
confession is to confess to the police, but his next act is to rationalize why 
such a confession will not constitute a betrayal. Razumov puts himself on 
trial and applies techniques of logical argumentation. The text spotlights the 
organizing term of “Poland Revisited”: “Betray. A great word. What is be-
trayal? They talk of a man betraying his country, his friends, his sweetheart. 
There must be a moral bond fi rst” (28). Razumov casts himself as witness 
on the stand while playing prosecution and defense also, as he examines and 
cross-examines himself by delivering a series of syllogistic questions and 
answers:
All a man can betray is his conscience. And how is my conscience engaged here; 
by what bond of common faith, of common conviction, am I obliged to let 
that fanatical idiot drag me down with him? On the contrary. . . . What can the 
prejudice of the world reproach me with? Have I provoked his confi dence? No! 
Have I by a single word, look, or gesture given him reason to suppose that I ac-
cepted his trust in me? No!
(28)
The passage rules that betrayal has not occurred by positing that no bond 
existed before the confession. Haldin’s confession cannot institute a bond; 
thus no responsibility to Haldin exists.
By indicating that Razumov has not necessarily truly given Haldin his 
word when he enters into what seems like a verbal contract, the novel sup-
ports this rational argument and legal conceptualization of responsibility. 
After Haldin confesses the assassination to Razumov, he makes a request to 
his reluctant host: “Confi dence” (14). Despite an exchange between the two 
that suggests Razumov agrees, the novel never determines that he prom-
ises to honor this request because it never establishes the conditions that 
make a promise a promise: the commitment to tell the truth. After Haldin 
asks Razumov to help him vanish by keeping his secret and carrying a mes-
sage to the peasant Ziemianitch, a digression into Razumov’s mental theater 
follows that details the punitive consequences and misery to befall him if 
caught. This concludes with Razumov’s summation that “he hated the man 
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[Haldin]” (16). When immediately after this interior monologue Razumov 
assures Haldin, “Yes, of course I will go. You must give me precise direc-
tions, and for the rest—depend on me” (16), the novel refuses to verify 
that this is a promise to keep Haldin’s confession in confi dence. Indeed, the 
passages preceding this imply that Razumov’s acquiescence to sending the 
message seems motivated by the desire to detain Haldin in his rooms should 
he decide to hand him over to the authorities. By leaving the status of the 
promise unclear, the novel apparently underwrites the model of responsibil-
ity grounded in reason Razumov’s quasi-trial scene relates.
Paradoxically, however, by portraying Razumov’s reasoning as sound, 
confi rming that he is not morally bound to and therefore cannot logically 
betray Haldin, the text accords the revolutionary’s confession all the more 
power, given its narrative effects: the compulsive repetitions of confessions 
that endeavor to exorcise the haunting within. The irrational, mystical force 
of the revolutionary’s confession challenges the rational, legal notion of 
responsibility espoused. Because it is never determined whether Razumov 
promises and it is even implied that Razumov’s response is actually com-
posed of empty words, it is irrational that Razumov can neither keep Hal-
din’s confession to himself nor give it up. More irrational is that the confes-
sion holds him captive even after he decides to turn Haldin in, for example, 
by compelling him to confess this betrayal/nonbetrayal to Haldin himself, 
“to pour out a full confession in passionate words that would stir the whole 
being of that man to its innermost depths; that would end in embraces and 
tears” (29). The revolutionary confession produces unintended results. It 
creates a bond that compels Razumov to make endless confessions.
Haldin’s confession’s irrational power manifests through the multiple 
confessions it incites. These attempt to eradicate the pest and make good 
on Razumov’s statement that “I am reasonable. I am even—permit me to 
say—a thinker, though to be sure, this name nowadays seems the monopoly 
of hawkers of revolutionary wares, the slaves of some French or German 
thought—devil knows what foreign notions” (66). His confessions, how-
ever, only continue to erode boundaries between the reasonable self and 
the foreign, mystical revolutionary, and they do so often while eroding 
boundaries between secular and sacred speech. It would seem that Conrad’s 
modernist novel includes a language associated with the sacred and mystic 
only to criticize its naiveté, just as the narrator criticizes Russian mysticism’s 
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naiveté. For, “If the novel is indeed the characteristic art form of seculariza-
tion, in Lukács’s words, ‘the representative art form of our age,’ and if mo-
dernity is indeed a secular age, we might expect the modernist novel to be 
doubly secular.”70 Pericles Lewis rejects this secularization thesis, however, 
arguing that novelists such as Kafka, Joyce, and Woolf went on a “quest for 
a modern form of the ‘secular sacred,’ ” which inspired the formal experi-
ments we identify as modernist.71 Under Western Eyes also takes the sacred 
seriously. The formal conduct of Razumov’s confessions maps the Christian 
ritual onto the legal tradition. Because juridical confession’s stated goal is 
to reveal a truth but Christian confession’s goal is expiation, this mapping 
disrupts Razumov’s speech. It generates a shift from confession to excuse, 
which, as “Poland Revisited” showed, will only prevent the closure and uni-
fi cation of the self that confession sets out to accomplish.
The choreography of Razumov’s confession to the state implies that its 
aim is exculpation rather than the revelation of truth. When Razumov fi rst 
confesses to harboring Haldin, he confesses to a godlike fi gure rather than 
an ordinary police offi cer or bureaucrat, whom the novel dismisses as in-
adequate. Bestowing a transcendent power in a patriarch of the state, the 
closest thing to (and unbeknownst to him, in actuality) Razumov’s own 
father—“There were no Razumovs belonging to him anywhere. His clos-
est parentage was defi ned in the statement that he was a Russian” (8)—a 
sentence depicts the confessor through appositions that move increasingly 
toward a higher power, “a senator, a dignitary, a great personage, the very 
man—He!” (30). Although the novel spends pages building tension as Ra-
zumov searches for a confessor with the potency to provide redemption 
from the haunting “pest,” when it fi nally describes him entering the pal-
ace of Prince K, then being admitted into his room, then on the verge of 
delivering his statement, it abruptly enacts a lapse where the confessional 
scene should appear. “Though he saw the Prince looking at him with black 
displeasure,” the narrative tells us that “the lucidity of his mind, of which he 
was very conscious, gave him an extraordinary assurance. He was not asked 
to sit down. Half an hour later they appeared in the hall together” (31). The 
confession is never narrated but occurs “offstage,” behind closed doors in a 
time and space from which readers are barred. This scenography invokes 
the religious sacrament: Confession “occurs” in the self-enclosed, shadowy 
enclave that marks and separates private communion and communication 
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from public. This mise-en-scène indicates that Razumov confesses to right 
wrongs and neutralize guilt through expiation by the all-powerful. Instead 
of God, the all-powerful is the state.
The mystical authority attached to the state here seems to support the 
narrator’s characterization of Russian autocratic power as exceptional, tran-
scendent, total, and nothing like power in the West. Such representations, 
like those of revolution, refl ect widely held beliefs of the time. That Con-
rad chooses Plehve as the victim of revolutionary assassination is especially 
symptomatic of these beliefs. This interior minister was the symbol of Rus-
sia’s “mystique,” the fi gurehead of an apparently centrally coordinated po-
lice state with a surveillance system extending to every corner of the em-
pire and that was thought to wield brutal counterinsurgency tactics. This 
mystique was more imaginary than real, however. Jonathan Daly argues 
that the picture of an “autocracy which transformed legislation, adminis-
tration, scholarship, church, school, and family into police [organs]”72 was 
exaggerated, and he shows that “the uncoordinated, disjointed nature of the 
civil administration continued to facilitate revolutionary action throughout 
1905.”73 Revising one revolutionary’s judgment that in Plehve’s death “the 
autocracy lost not only a most faithful servant: it lost its terrible mystique 
of power,” Daly instead asserts that “Plehve, by fulminating against sedi-
tion without vigorously rooting it out, had himself eroded much of that 
mystique.”74 Despite changes in the laws regulating state crimes and a new 
criminal code that made it easier to punish instigators in the court, “at a time 
when more and more public activists were castigating the regime as a ‘police 
state,’ when revolutionary conspirators were growing more numerous and 
bold, and when a relatively broad-based coalition of educated opponents of 
absolutism was maturing, a relatively modest number of people were be-
ing punished for political activism.”75 Moreover, the argument that Russian 
tactics were exceptional requires that one overlook the parallels and even 
collaborations between Western European nations and Russia throughout 
the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries in methods of surveillance 
and policing and the means used to contain and suppress colonial and revo-
lutionary unrest.76 In Conrad’s novel, though, Haldin’s strike against Plehve 
is presented as strike against an omnipotent state.
Yet it is not Haldin’s assassination of Plehve but rather his confession of 
it to Razumov that actually threatens autocratic power, and it does so as a 
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result of its own mystical force. While the choreography of the confession 
to Prince K ratifi es the narrator’s portrayal of state power as mystical and 
transcendent, the narrative logic of confession contradicts it: Prince K is not 
all-powerful because he cannot exorcise the irrational haunting produced by 
Haldin’s confession. Razumov’s confession to the Prince, which operates as 
an excuse, only tightens his attachment to the revolutionary other. By retro-
spectively relating that Razumov strategically edits his confession, the novel 
highlights that it operates within the Christian logic of expiation. Because 
it occurs offstage, readers are not made aware of what exactly or how much 
Razumov revealed. Did he reveal to Prince K that Haldin confessed and that 
he is complicit in Haldin’s attempted escape? Or did he censor these parts of 
the story, as the narrative censors the confession by omitting it? Only later 
do we learn that Razumov has not admitted complicity, and this retrospec-
tive revelation signals that the confession does not aim toward disinterested 
truth production but rather exoneration. By accusing Haldin, Razumov ex-
cuses himself. Consequently, the need to confess to attain relief from the 
haunting only gains strength as the narrative progresses.
When Razumov confesses to another representative of the state, the ef-
fects of Haldin’s confession once again bring to the surface connections be-
tween secular and Christian discourses and the limits of reason as well as 
the limits of autocratic power. The same textual choreography that shapes 
the confession to Prince K occurs in part 4, when Razumov is called before 
Councilor Mikulin. Initially, Razumov rejects the possibility of confessing to 
Mikulin that he has withheld information pertaining to de P’s assassination, 
namely, that he served as Haldin’s envoy and then killed the peasant. Razu-
mov’s rationalizing converts counterfactuality to truth: “Confess! To what? 
‘I have been speaking to him with the greatest openness,’ he said to himself 
with perfect truth. ‘What else could I tell him? That I have undertaken to 
carry a message to that brute Ziemianitch? Establish a false complicity and 
destroy what chance of safety I have won for nothing?—what folly’!” (219). 
But immediately following this reasonable refusal to wager against safety, 
the haunting becomes intolerable. “Nothing but Haldin—everywhere Hal-
din: a moral spectre infi nitely more effective than any visible apparition of 
the dead” (220–221). When the Councilor summons him, Razumov there-
fore responds with “eagerness,” for “Mikulin was the only person on earth 
to whom Razumov could talk, taking the Haldin adventure for granted” 
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(224). The novel primes readers for Razumov’s confession of complicity and 
murder—“Mr. Razumov, certain of relief, went to meet Councilor Miku-
lin with the eagerness of a pursued person welcoming any sort of shelter” 
(224)— only to frustrate expectations in the next sentence: “This much said, 
there is no need to tell anything more of that fi rst interview and of the 
several others” (224). The withdrawal of confession from representation in-
dexes the Christological tradition and conveys that it is delivered with the 
hopes of exculpation.
But autocracy is not omnipotent, the confessant is not absolved, and the 
haunting continues. Razumov is forced to confess again, then yet again. Like 
Razumov’s confession of faith and his confessions to Prince K and Mikulin, 
and Conrad’s confessions in “Poland Revisited,” disruptions prevent these 
fi nal confessions from achieving closure. They exacerbate self-othering 
rather than detaching Razumov from the other. After his confessions to the 
state, Razumov seeks out Haldin’s sister because “there is no one anywhere 
in the whole great world I could go to . . . Do you conceive the desolation 
of the thought—no one—to—go—to?” (259). The irony of Razumov’s 
confession to Natalia is that it never takes place all the while it appears to oc-
cur. Through interruptions of sentences, clauses, ideas, and voice, the novel 
frames Razumov’s confession in the mode of fi ction, a “tale” and “story” that 
only might have happened. Like Conrad at the end of “Poland Revisited,” 
Razumov does not identify himself as the subject or agent of the events but 
refers to himself as another, speaking in the third person. “Suppose that 
the real betrayer of your brother,” Razumov proposes, “—suppose that he 
was a young man, educated, an intellectual worker, thoughtful, a man your 
brother might have trusted lightly, perhaps. . . . But there’s a whole story 
there” (259). When Natalia demands to know this story, the text continues 
to double and split Razumov, positioning him as the confessor of the tale 
he presents rather than confessant. “I have heard it,” he tells her. “There 
is a staircase in it, and even phantoms, but that does not matter if a man 
always serves something greater than himself—the idea. I wonder who is 
the greatest victim in that tale?” (259). After Natalia demands “the story!” 
a lapse follows that would be extraordinary if this device did not appear so 
regularly whenever a confession is about to emerge. “ ‘There is no more to 
tell! . . . It ends here— on this very spot.’ He pressed a denunciatory fi nger 
to his breast with force, and became perfectly still” (260). Razumov’s con-
fession ends without having begun. Not only is the story, the events that 
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have occurred, excised, but the framing and pronouns displace responsibil-
ity. Situated as the climactic revelation, this “confession” culminates in frus-
trated expectation. As if to underline that confession has not unveiled the 
truth, the novel has Razumov leave the scene veiled from sight, literally and 
fi guratively. “Something, extreme astonishment perhaps, dimmed my eyes, 
so that he seemed to vanish before he moved” (261), the English language 
teacher, who witnesses this scene, relates, and then he expresses with shock 
to Natalia, “That miserable wretch has carried off your veil!” (261).77
This confession fails to produce truth or to exculpate Razumov. After he 
confesses to Natalia, Razumov confesses to the revolutionaries. The novel 
underlines that what follows is not a choice: “he stopped, thinking over the 
form of his confession, and found it suddenly, unavoidably suggested by 
the fateful evening of his life” (267). As in the previous confessional scene, 
the same use of third-person narration and of the self-positioning of confes-
sant as confessor while in the midst of confessing appears in this scene. “Am 
I to tell you of the feelings of that student, sought out in his obscure solitude, 
and menaced by the complicity forced upon him?” (268) he asks the crowd of 
revolutionaries, thus excusing himself as the victim of “forced complicity,” 
without, however, naming himself as that student victim. After he recounts 
that “the student went to General T——— himself, and said, ‘I have the 
man who killed de P——— locked up in my room, Victor Haldin, a student 
like myself ’ ” (268), the crowd’s response clarifi es that the testimony has not 
been received as confession. It demands that Razumov “name him!”(268). 
As in the case of the “confession of faith” and his “confession” to Natalia, the 
grammatical staging makes the source of this discourse unclear and its status 
as testimonial act uncertain. Here, Razumov does not follow the basic rule 
required to make a speech act a confession: using the fi rst-person pronoun 
and inhabiting the subject position in a declarative sentence. He describes 
the actions for which he would confess in the third person, and then, when 
he responds to the revolutionaries’ demand to name the perpetrator, his re-
sponse is an interrogative: “haven’t you all understood that I am that man?” 
(268). It is no surprise that even after this moment, the revolutionaries won-
der whether or not a confession has occurred: “ ‘But this is a confession!’ 
[was] uttered by somebody in a desperate shriek” (269).
This supposedly “closing” confession should serve as a narrative triumph 
of secular and religious discourses of responsibility. Razumov claims to un-
cover the truth and take responsibility for betraying Haldin, thus exorcizing 
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the revolutionary “moral specter.” After confessing to the revolutionaries, 
he declares himself “free.” “ ‘I beg you to observe,’ he said, already on the 
landing, ‘that I had only to hold my tongue. Today, of all days since I came 
amongst you, I was made safe, and today I made myself free from falsehood, 
from remorse—independent of every single human being on this earth’ ” 
(270). The effects of the confession ironize this statement, however. The 
revolutionaries beat him, he loses his hearing, and then he is hit by a tram-
car. At the end of the novel, he is “crippled, ill, getting weaker every day” 
(278), and is not independent but relies on a caretaker, the peasant woman 
Tekla, to live.
The novel ironizes Razumov’s claims to freedom in another, perhaps 
more important way, however. It relates that confession is a double bind: 
it obligates one to others, but it is also the condition of possibility of com-
munity. Rendered deaf as a result of the revolutionaries’ blows, Razumov is 
without use of an organ that mediates between inner and outer world, self 
and other, language and silence. That organ opened him to Haldin’s confes-
sion in the fi rst place. Left without the alterity that haunts within, Razumov 
is no longer in danger of receiving such dangerous confessions. He is, as he 
claims, “safe” (270). But he is also henceforth separated from the rest of the 
world in crucial ways. His “freedom” emerges at the cost of a loss of the 
possibility of community.
Under Western Eyes contests concepts of ethical agency founded on ra-
tionalism, autonomy, or moral decision, all of which the novel aligns with 
the West. The itinerary of confession rejects Razumov’s claim that in order 
to betray an other, there must be a “moral bond fi rst,” a bond that arises 
from one’s choice to commit to another. Irrational revolutionary confession 
as the language of the other—the other of reason and of the autonomous 
subject—is the medium through which responsibility emerges. The func-
tioning of Haldin’s confession separates ethics from volition and responsi-
bility from conscious decision by severing language from authorial control 
and intent while revealing the aporia of responsibility that juridico-legal 
discourses dissimulate. The revolutionary’s confession commits Razumov 
without waiting for him to countersign, except through a language that 
works beyond his control and exceeds, even thwarts, intention.78 Readers 
have often addressed Razumov’s actions in terms of “moral character,” but 
the staging of responsibility as incalculable effects of revolutionary confes-
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sion renders the question of moral character moot.79 According to Under 
Western Eyes, the ethical is not a matter of ego psychology, rational choice, 
or utility but an obligation to others beyond self-knowledge and intent.
In its elaboration of confession, Conrad’s work departs from articulations 
of community based on genealogy, ethnicity, or race that fi nd historical 
form in nationalisms and imperialisms as well as from articulations of com-
munity often expressed in culturalist theories of cosmopolitanism. Relating 
that “Western” and “Russian” are precarious markers of identifi cation and 
fragile subject positions, confession demonstrates that commitments to oth-
ers do not proceed from the basis of shared blood or soil. Neither, however, 
are these commitments formed on the basis of shared behaviors, consumer 
practices, affects, or ideals. They emerge through a testimonial language 
that repudiates the premise that subjective choice and free will determine 
one’s responsibility to others. It is necessary to point out, however, that 
although the novel subverts imperial and nationalist models of identity and 
belonging and attendant subject-centered models of responsibility, it also 
struggles against this subversion. If Christian and legal models of confession 
ultimately do not call an end to self-splitting induced by the revolutionary 
confession and therefore fail to consolidate an ethics founded on rationality, 
selfhood, and legal models of responsibility, it is not for lack of trying. The 
multiplication of these confessions, which is driven by unresolved attitudes 
toward anticolonial insurgency and revolution, warns that an age of increas-
ingly permeable borders in which transnational alliances multiply and shift 
as they travel through new economic and political circuits does not neces-
sarily herald a postracial, postethnic, or postnational ethics or politics. It is 
the very porousness of borders that can activate a resurgence of racialized, 
nationalist circumscriptions of community, a rejection of responsibility to 
others that confession demands.
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Traumas of Nation and Narrative: Legal and Literary 
Witnessing in Rebecca West’s Wartime Writings
Rebecca West was a prolifi c Anglo-Irish writer whose work appeared in 
diverse venues across the twentieth century, from books brought out by 
the Hogarth Press, to the Vorticist magazine Blast, to the New York Herald 
Tribune. Her novels, short stories, literary criticism, travelogues, reviews, 
and trial reports form an impressive body of transdisciplinary literature that 
often features an interdisciplinary approach to the topic at hand. Several of 
West’s pieces center on events frequently viewed as the most extreme, and 
exemplary, ruptures of modernity—the two world wars. Among these are 
the novel The Return of the Soldier, which was composed during the fi rst, and 
trial reports collected in The Meaning of Treason, composed in the aftermath 
of the second. The testimony to trauma that each work enacts demonstrates, 
as Bernard Schweizer argues, that “West cuts across traditional ideological 
categories, being neither wholly a conservative nor entirely a progressive 
thinker.”1 But testimony in each writing also challenges Schweizer’s asser-
tion, echoed by other scholars, that West’s oeuvre displays “a syncretic blend 
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of political ideals emphasizing stability, tradition, loyalty, and nationalism, 
as well as anti-imperialism.”2 In distinct, even contrasting ways, The Return 
of the Soldier and The Meaning of Treason relate that anti-imperialism cannot 
be syncretically blended with stability, tradition, loyalty, and nationalism. 
In both works, anti-imperialism disrupts narratives that enable and sustain 
these ideals.
Like Conrad’s essay “Poland Revisited” and novel Under Western Eyes, 
which Chapter 1 examined, West’s novel about a shell-shocked English 
soldier and her coverage of the trials of the “Irish revolutionary” William 
Joyce encourage us to expand and revise critical understandings of British 
modernism as a literature that imagines a transnational ethics and politics 
of community and that arises out of historical traumas of modernity. As is 
the case with Conrad’s writing, West’s is often associated with modernism 
but not considered the most canonical example of it. West employed some 
of modernism’s stylistic techniques and broached modernist subjects in her 
works but also became increasingly wary of forms of leftist internationalism 
shared by Bloomsbury and other modernist vanguards. West’s commitment 
to feminist and socialist principles early in her career did make her critical 
of patriarchal, bourgeois ideologies that writers such as Virginia Woolf ar-
gued were of a piece with imperialist and nationalist discourses. As decades 
passed, however, West’s politics separated her ever further from modernist 
peers. One reason for this is that by the 1940s, as Marina MacKay points 
out, West found the literary left’s critiques of nationalism generally an ex-
pression of Western privilege. She developed this position in part through 
encounters with the history of imperialist repressions of diverse nationali-
ties and nationalisms in her trip to the Balkans during the 1930s. West docu-
mented these encounters in the magisterial 1941 travelogue Black Lamb and 
Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia. Like Conrad’s, however, West’s 
perspectives on imperialism and resistance to it are not consistent across her 
oeuvre, or even within a single work. Responding to a shifting global order 
of the present and to colonial traumas of the past, Conrad attacks Russian 
imperialism throughout his writing but does not subject British imperialism 
to this same assault; similarly uneven treatments of imperialism occur in 
West’s fi ctional and nonfi ctional responses to wartime presents and colonial 
pasts. Testimony in her World War I novel subtly nudges readers toward a 
critique of narratives of modernity that underwrite British imperial nation-
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alism and that its plot, characters, and narrator express. The deployment 
of such narratives in The Meaning of Treason indicates that by the end of 
World War II, West is more capable of criticizing Eastern imperialism than 
British imperialism and that her sympathy for nationalist movements in the 
Balkans does not extend to those in British colonies. Although their per-
spectives on imperialism and nationalism diverge more than converge, both 
wartime writings’ modes of witnessing help dislocate Eurocentric responses 
to trauma in literary and cultural studies that focus on the two world wars.
Testimony in The Return of the Soldier and The Meaning of Treason sug-
gests that because the wars threaten the stability of empire, state, and nation, 
they elicit narratives of modernity that obscure structural violence shap-
ing high and late imperial eras. By elucidating how the grammar of con-
nectivity and rhetoric of continuity molding such cultural, socio-scientifi c, 
politico-economic, and legal narratives—and critical models that consoli-
date them—conceal forms of repression that contour and drive them, these 
works dispute representations of the European wars as ruptures of otherwise 
stable and peaceable eras. I explore, fi rst, how The Return of the Soldier asks 
readers to situate World War I trauma writing in wider contexts than that 
of the nation and European continent and within a longer historical trajec-
tory than that of the twentieth century. I then analyze how the report en-
titled “The Revolutionary” in The Meaning of Treason obliges—rather than 
asks—us to situate the writing of West’s middle period in the context of two 
co-implicated processes often treated separately in literary studies, World 
War II and imperial retrenchment.
Confl icting Scenes of Trauma
The Return of the Soldier, fi rst published in 1918, tells the story of a sol-
dier who returns home an amnesiac as the result of shell shock. This work 
has attracted renewed interest in recent years in part because it centers on 
trauma and memory loss, issues of concern in contemporary criticism, but 
also because it explores the war’s effects on women as well as men. The novel 
therefore supplements, by adding to and exposing a lack within, the literary 
and literary-critical canon on World War I trauma, which has long been 
dominated by a focus on masculinity, often through masculinist interpreta-
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tions such as those of Paul Fussell and Samuel Hynes.3 Although the novel 
features a wounded soldier, the domestic sphere and not the military theater 
takes center stage. It relates how amnesia prompts the male protagonist, 
his wife, cousin, and former lover to return to the past and reexamine love 
affairs and fi lial attachments from before the war, and, moreover, it em-
ploys a female witness to tell this story. For these reasons, the novel might 
contribute to what Margaret Higonnet calls an “alternate history of World 
War I traumas” that would restore voice to female witnesses of the period 
1914 –1918, who were silenced by modernist literature and criticism alike.4 
Testimony in this novel does articulate an alternate perspective of a period, 
but more than World War I, that period is what Eric Hobsbawm calls the 
“age of empire.”5 This is the era in which England’s economic and political 
power as a nation is sustained through imperial and quasi-imperial exploita-
tion and uneven gender and class arrangements.
This claim contradicts the novel’s plotting, characters’ statements, and 
critical interpretations, which identify the war, and war wounds, as the text’s 
organizing traumas. Attending to the novel’s formal staging of testimony re-
veals a more diffuse conceptualization of trauma, one that locates its sources 
beyond French and British soil and battle wounds. To trace the indirect ar-
ticulation of historical trauma by concentrating on the rhetorical itinerary of 
testimony is to break with contemporary approaches to trauma that analyze 
it as a clinical affl iction of character and an explicit focus of war narratives. A 
confl ation of trauma with battle wounds has dominated writings that refer-
ence the war, such as Hemingway’s, Lewis’s, Woolf ’s, and Brittain’s, and the 
category of post–traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is sometimes invoked to 
understand literature of this period.6 Fragmented language and other mod-
ernist formal devices become legible as refl ections of a clinical condition of 
war rather than self-conscious strategies that emerge in response to wider 
literary and cultural histories. In The Return of the Soldier, it is these devices, 
which elaborate a crisis of memory through testimony, that challenge in-
terpretations of trauma as an individualized affl iction with a single cause—
war—and trouble claims that the work mourns an idyllic Victorian past.
Because it is written under the pressures of a nation rendered vulnerable 
by war and imperial unrest, however, West’s novel presents confl icting ar-
ticulations of trauma and incompatible stagings of collective memory. On 
the one hand, it plots trauma as an illness suffered by a soldier in battle that 
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causes him to yearn for a reputedly stable Victorian past. This plotting con-
solidates entrenched approaches to trauma in modernist studies that envi-
sion the twentieth century as a rupture in former national and historical sta-
bility. On the other hand, the formal enactments of testimony situate origins 
of trauma beyond a war fought on European terrain, and they trouble the 
narrative of historical rupture the novel plots. Testimony indicates that in a 
climate of national anxiety, vulnerability, and retrenchment coincident with 
war, nationalist and metropolitan focalizations become resolute, and other 
traumatic histories both within and without the boundaries of the nation-
state become impossible to witness and archive. This warning remains perti-
nent today, because literary criticism continues to center the European war 
as the site of trauma in modernist literature, neglecting Anglophone mod-
ernism’s imbrication in the economic and cultural imperialism from which it 
emerged and includes within itself, Fredric Jameson famously contended, as 
a structuring absence.7 By foregrounding testimony’s unverifi ability, its lit-
erarity, the novel invites readers to become active witnesses to—by becom-
ing facilitators of—the precarious emergence of a counter-representation 
of England’s past. This counter-representation problematizes critical nar-
ratives that posit the war as the central crisis of modernity, the event that 
constitutes a break from earlier historical moments, and retroactively defi ne 
the prewar past as static and stable.8
The Return of the Soldier is a novel about mourning. The losses in the 
novel seem to accumulate or “condense,” but they also appear to substitute 
or displace one another, making an original loss diffi cult to identify. The text 
calls to mind Freud’s observations regarding mourning, and pathological 
mourning particularly. “Mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a 
loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place 
of one, such as fatherland, liberty, an ideal.”9 Freud points to the conun-
drum that a loss generating pathological mourning, or melancholia, poses. 
In these “other cases,” he writes, “one feels justifi ed in concluding that a 
loss of the kind has been experienced, but one cannot see clearly what has 
been lost, and may the more readily suppose that the patient too cannot 
consciously perceive what it is he has lost.”10 Thus, pathological mourning 
produces an interpretative crisis not only for the analysand, the witness who 
“experiences” the loss without knowing who or “what it is he has lost,” but 
also for the analyst, a witness whose task it is to facilitate the analysand’s ne-
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gotiation of this unconscious loss.11 In its articulation of British modernity 
through a vexed narrative of loss it depicts as characterologically and textu-
ally unconscious, the novel produces a crisis of interpretation for both its 
internal witnesses and external witnesses, or readers.
The theater in which this crisis unfolds confounds the divide between 
fi ction and history, signaling to readers a rift in historical claims the novel 
will locate there. That locus is Monkey Island, the site of an idyllic interlude 
in the plot in which the story of the male protagonist’s past, before he has 
suffered shell shock, is related. The portrayal of Monkey Island illustrates 
the modern novel’s attempts to consolidate fragments of space, as landscape, 
into a unifi ed whole and fi gure the nation as a cohesive topos. Depictions of 
landscape convey completeness and tranquility: “The whole world seemed 
melting into light. Cumulus clouds fl oated very high, like lumps of white 
light against a deep, glowing sky, and dropped dazzling refl ections on the 
beaming Thames. The trees moved not like timber shocked by wind, but 
fl oatingly, like weeds at the bottom of a well of sunshine.”12 The oxymoron 
“well of sunshine” is representative of the island. Oppositions dissipate into 
specular identifi cation; from the height of the heavens to the subterranean 
depths of the Thames, everything there neutralizes its other, coinciding 
with itself. It is a spatial fi guration of a time of pure unity, Victorian Eng-
land bathed in the master trope of light, untouched by the “shock” of later 
years.
Monkey Island is part of the novel’s fabula, but it is also real, an actual 
place whose idyllic surface covers over personal and collective unrest, even 
trauma. West visited the small island in the Thames with her lover H. G. 
Wells, claiming it as a favorite place, but it might have functioned as an 
ambivalent site also, the locus of escape, refuge, perhaps even exile. When 
West became pregnant with the married Wells’s child, Wells requested she 
avoid their social circle. She retreated there, where Wells would join her, 
and Monkey Island allowed the lovers to avoid the pressures of London so-
ciety, for which, however, West’s letters suggest she yearned.13 Monkey Is-
land is also a site whose history and topology are thickly layered. According 
to records, the island was fi rst used by monks fi shing on the Thames. By the 
fourteenth century it had become property of Canonesses of Burnham Ab-
bey, a mile north. In 1723 it was purchased by Charles Spencer, Third Duke 
of Marlborough, who erected its fi rst buildings, a pavilion and temple. Com-
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missioning a French artist to paint the pavilion with fi gures of fully dressed 
monkeys engaged in human activities—shooting, fi shing, and boating—he 
gave Monkey Island its most famous feature, which, as the aleatory effects 
of language’s materiality would have it, obscured the origin of the island’s 
name. “Monkey Island” derives not from the paintings in the pavilion, now 
the inn, but from the earlier, old English Monks Eyot, or Monk’s Island. The 
Monkey Island of the duke’s day, West’s day, and today owes its existence 
to a catastrophic event in history, the Great Fire of London in 1666. The 
island was employed as a dumping ground for the rubble carried away from 
the burned city. This waste provided a solid foundation for building and the 
elevation necessary to prevent fl ooding.14 Monkey Island’s literal founda-
tions are the ashes of England’s capital, the future metropolitan center of 
the empire. The traces of the dead and a national traumatic past lie buried 
beneath its charming inn, manicured lawns, and temple.
The novel appears to contrast England’s long period of national and im-
perial peace in the nineteenth century it fi gures through Monkey Island 
with ruptures and violence that emerge in the twentieth and to mourn the 
loss of this peace.15 The present is 1916, and Chris Baldry returns home with 
amnesia, the consequence of an exploding shell. He remembers nothing af-
ter 1901, neither his marriage to upper-middle-class Kitty, nor the death of 
their son Oliver, but only his love affair with working-class Margaret, which 
in fact ended in 1901. Samuel Hynes notes that Chris’s amnesia eclipses not 
only this affair’s end but the dawn of the Edwardian age, a tumultuous time. 
Increasingly powerful pressure was exerted on Britain in the decade before 
the war, as social, economic, and political unrest grew at home and abroad. 
In England, the agitation of mass labor movements coincided with the grow-
ing popularity of the Women’s Social and Political Movement, the suffrag-
ists, and, after the return to power of the Liberal Party in 1906, with violent 
public demonstrations by its radical factions up to 1914. Indian national-
ist demands for self-rule strengthened with the outcry against the colonial 
partitioning of Bengal in 1906. Demand for home rule in Ireland regained 
momentum even after its attempted quashing through the Irish Land Acts, 
the latest implemented in 1903. And in another “peripheral” nation that the 
novel specifi cally references, Mexico, nationalist unrest over foreign control 
of land had culminated in revolution by 1910. Although Mexico was not a 
British colony, longstanding British commercial interests were threatened 
by revolution. The text, we will see, underlines this.
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The Return seems to join the many modernist works that critically reg-
ister the transformative effects of the long nineteenth century on English 
topography and culture through its protagonist’s reaction to this period of 
unrest. “Chris’s amnesia has taken him back to the time before change,” 
Hynes contends. “Other Englishmen yearned back, too, to an innocent, un-
spoiled England that had been lost, not because of the war alone, but be-
cause of the whole disfi guring process of modern change.”16 Expressed here 
is the dominant narrative of the transition from the Victorian to Edwardian 
eras. According to this view, the former, reputedly belle époque was a time 
before rupture in the longue durée of English stability, before “modernity” 
and its attendant modifi cations, or “disfi gurations,” of English landscape and 
social life. Allegedly responsible are not only civil, labor, and colonial agita-
tion but also the decline of an agrarian economy, the rise of industrialism, 
and the ecological violence accompanying technologies of industrialization, 
warfare, urbanization, and suburbanization.
There are biographical as well as textual reasons to suspect the novel’s 
endorsement of this narrative of a fall from stability and pastoral plenitude 
into twentieth-century trauma, however. A feminist, suffragist, and socialist 
with Anglo-Irish parentage, West also attacked British imperialism, deny-
ing the distinction between Britain’s benevolent imperialism and malevo-
lent imperialism.17 In her monograph on Henry James, published in 1916, 
West criticized James for mythologizing a national past shaped by historical 
struggles. In The Passionate Pilgrim
you have the fi rst statement of the persistent illusion, to which he was helped 
by his odd lack of the historic sense and which confused his estimate of modern 
life, that the past would have been a happier home for those who like himself 
loved fastidious living. . . . He was always being misled by such lovely shells of 
the past as Hampton Court into the belief that the past which inhabited them 
was as lovely. The calm of Canterbury Close appeared to him as a remnant of a 
time when all England, bowed before the Church, was as calm; whereas the calm 
is really a modern condition brought about when the church ceased to have any-
thing to do with England. He never perceived that life is always a little painful 
at the moment, not only at this moment, but at all moments.18
By claiming that a lack of “historic sense” misreads confl ict as a peculiarly 
modern condition, this passage illustrates that appropriating a single mo-
ment as the origin of trauma generates fi ction as history. It also suggests 
F6635.indb   81 9/23/15   9:24:49 AM
82   Traumas of Nation and Narrative
that, as Dominick LaCapra points out, if “one assumes that there was . . . 
some original unity, wholeness, security, or identity that others have ru-
ined, polluted, or contaminated and thus made ‘us’ lose . . . to regain it one 
must somehow get rid of or eliminate those others.”19 West’s words indicate 
that fi ctional representations of idyllic national pasts entail the violence of 
erasure.
The Return attacks the normative narrative of a “fall” into modernity that 
Hynes’s introduction conveys and that her criticism of James would seem to 
reject, but it also expresses it. In the episode recounting Chris’s affair with 
Margaret on Monkey Island fi fteen years earlier, the novel converts the ab-
sence of an Edenic, prewar era into a loss while concealing the effacement 
of those who threaten this idyllic image. The Return appears to ratify the 
narrative of loss most intently in the interlude recounting Chris’s affair with 
Margaret on the island fi fteen years earlier. The text presents this time that 
escapes Chris’s amnesia as memory. Later, when familial, social, and eco-
nomic obligations arise, their love will be thwarted, but in 1901, on Monkey 
Island, no such confl icts exist, and division and discord are declared absent. 
Even the island’s name, which West opens to interpretation by forgoing 
mention of the monkey paintings, fi gures a “prehistorical” moment, before 
humans acquire language, marking their fall into separation and their per-
petual attempts to bridge the distance that language opens between them. 
However, the novel also disturbs this image of an uncontaminated Victorian 
nation through testimony, which operates as a vehicle of aesthetic contesta-
tions over national histories.
The framing of the section on Monkey Island in terms of psychoanalytic 
treatment throws into relief the confl icting interpretations of trauma the 
work elaborates while troubling the coherence, unity, and reality of the sup-
posedly prelapsarian national past. 20 This framing operates in friction with 
the novel’s critical assessments of psychoanalysis in its concluding pages—
the plotting of trauma ends by rejecting the possibility of a talking cure. A 
cure is found not through methods advocated by the doctor loosely modeled 
on Freud but through Margaret, whom the doctor approaches “as though 
she were the nurse in charge of the case” (73). After the doctor searches into 
Chris’s Oedipal past for the cause of amnesia, the text dismisses the value of 
testimony while mocking the analyst for his “glib assurance, his knowing-
ness about the pathways of the soul” (81). “What’s the use of talking? You 
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can’t cure him” (81), Margaret tells the analyst, and then she brings Chris’s 
memory back not by listening to him speak but by showing him an object 
that recalls to him the death of his son. The introduction of the episode on 
Monkey Island, however, pushes against Margaret’s dismissal of testimony 
as talking cure. Here we fi nd another nurse and the miming of a psychoana-
lytic scene that both suggests that the novel attempts to bring something 
beside the son’s death to consciousness and that doing so requires the fa-
cilitation of a witness, a listener, a reader. Chris’s cousin Jenny, the novel’s 
narrator, is cast as analyst to Chris’s analysand. The narrator recognizes that 
in returning to Baldry Court in 1916, Chris enters what for him is a fantasy 
world, because his reality is 1901. “He was like a patient when tiring visitors 
have gone and he is left alone with his trusted nurse; . . . I watched him vigi-
lantly and was ready at that moment when thought intruded into his drows-
ings and his face began to twitch” ( 32). The medical attendant, “nurse,” 
reads the language written on the “patient’s” body, interpreting physical 
symptoms as signs of inner confl ict. She then intervenes by promoting the 
talking cure and establishing herself as listener: “ ‘Tell me what seems real to 
you,’ I begged” (33). Chris responds, “Why, Monkey Island’s real. But you 
don’t know old Monkey. Let me tell you—” (33). The narrator interrupts 
where Chris’s speech cuts off, claiming, “I have lived so long with the story 
which he told me that I cannot now remember his shy phrases. But this is 
how I have visualized his meeting with love on his secret island. I think it is 
the truth” (33).
The choreography of this scene does not pinpoint the source of amnesia 
in either war or shell shock, or where the doctor, Margaret, or the cure 
locate it—in Chris’s relationships with a cold mother and jealous father 
and the death of his son. Neither, however, does it situate trauma entirely 
outside of history and representation. The scene’s structure disputes what 
Jenny and Chris declare. The past on Monkey Island is not “real” but a 
belated invention through narrative of a moment that can never be grasped 
as itself. Because it formally confi gures the episode on Monkey Island as an 
unverifi able testimony to trauma, or, in Freud’s words, Nachträglichkeit, the 
novel presents this episode as an event that calls for representation and clari-
fi es that such representation can only occur through an interaction between 
text and reader, a witness who will help translate it.21 In Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle we fi nd the most oft-cited defi nition of Nachträglichkeit, literally 
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“carrying-afterness,” translated as “aftereffect.” The traumatic neurotic 
[traumatisch Neurotiker] suffers from a paradoxical aftereffect, a compulsive 
return from the past of a self-differing event. The event differs from itself 
because its origin is unavailable, and it returns only through displacements, 
interruptions, or transfi gurations.22 In the novel, the story of Monkey Is-
land is never supported by an omniscient or third-person narration but in-
stead undergoes multiple translations, from Chris’s memory, to language, 
to Jenny’s memory, to Jenny’s visualization, and, fi nally, to the words on the 
page framed with an oath: “I think it is the truth.” Because the oath is a per-
formative utterance it is heterogeneous to either truth or falsity. The past it 
dispatches to readers is therefore necessarily discontinuous with verifi cation. 
This testimonial framing of Monkey Island hence disrupts the narrative of 
modernity that locates loss and rupture with the turn of the century and the 
war while placing readers in the role of facilitating this disruption.
The signifi cance of testimony in the novel, then, is not that it recovers 
historical truth or that it fails to because it is “false.” It is, fi rst, that as an un-
verifi able mode that is (also) literary, testimony provides the lineaments of a 
collective past that cannot emerge through the discourse of psychoanalysis 
that the text parodies as a science of family romance, or through the clinical 
discourse of PTSD that would explain Chris’s trauma as the effect of battle 
wounds. Second, testimony foregrounds the need for reader-witnesses to 
enable the submerged past to surface. Finally, this abyssal framing highlights 
that because testimony remains disconnected from both source and destina-
tion, author and receiver, it “must allow itself to be parasitized by precisely 
what it excludes from its inner depths, the possibility, at least, of literature.”23 
Indeed, to portray the so-called real past the novel paradoxically deploys 
testimony’s parasites, literature, even fi ction. Although West includes ele-
ments of the historical Monkey Island—Lord Marlborough, the pavilion-
turned-inn, and the temple—she replaces its most famous feature, the mon-
key paintings, with literary works that share its own concerns: Proust’s In 
Search of Lost Time and Wordsworth’s “Lines Composed a Few Miles Above 
Tintern Abbey.” Both question the capacity of memory to access the past. 
The engagement with these literary works suggests that the national anxiety 
coincident with war produces collective amnesia. Inviting readers to trace 
the indirect emergence of trauma through interruptions, displacements, and 
transfi gurations, the novel conveys that the rhetorical details that compose 
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Monkey Island provide clues about what other histories must be obscured 
for the normative narrative of loss to cohere.
The White Hawthorn and the Magic State
The fi rst reference The Return makes to another literary work, one pub-
lished just fi ve years before the novel, is through the white hawthorn. The 
white hawthorn, like the madeleine, is an important element in Swann’s 
Way, authored by the only modern writer whose “greatness,” West declared, 
“cannot [be] exaggerated.”24 I would argue, however, that Proust’s white 
hawthorn is important to the novel not because it functions as a symbol 
that provides access to memoire involontaire but, on the contrary, because it 
frustrates the act of symbolization and memory, troubling attempts to at-
tain a correspondence between nature as object and the mind of the subject 
contemplating it.
In West’s and Proust’s novels, the relationships between art and artifi ce 
on the one hand and nature and reality on the other coalesce around the fi g-
ure of the white hawthorn, which both texts inscribe into a literary history 
of the symbol. In both novels, the rhetorical mode of symbol is also deposed 
by allegory. Allegory, Paul de Man demonstrated, operates in aesthetic and 
ideological struggle with symbol throughout literary history.25 Through 
symbol, the poetic subject claims to exceed fi nite limits and attain mastery 
over himself and the objective world. Symbol’s materiality evanesces, pro-
viding unmediated access to truth or the real. In contrast, allegory is a de-
based mode that forces unbridgeable distance between subject and world, 
because allegory is pure mediation and fi guration. Symbolic achievements 
are illusory, however, and allegory persistently displaces this valorized mode 
by exposing its reliance on mediation. These displacements are often in-
stances of intertextuality that arise at the point at which symbolic truth is 
purported to occur. Through the allegory of the white hawthorn, West’s 
and Proust’s writings challenge symbol’s mastery while betraying anxieties 
of memory peculiar to twentieth-century history and literary history.
The recurring mention of the white hawthorn implies its “immense sig-
nifi cance” (35), as well as the signifi cance of tracking rhetorical fi gurations 
outside of the main plot or action, for the hawthorn plays no part in these. 
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First, after describing the pathway leading toward Monkey Island, West 
writes, “between the two [poplars]—he [Chris] described it meticulously 
as though it were of immense signifi cance—there stood a white hawthorn” 
(35). The second mention of the plant provides more direct reference to 
Proust’s novel. When the hawthorn appears again, so does the titular fi gure 
of Swann’s Way, his proper name transformed into a common noun, high-
lighted through an alliteration that makes it diffi cult not to stutter over, or 
at least notice, the word.
Past the spit of sand at the far end of the island, where a great swan swanked 
to the empty reach that it would protect its mate against all comers, the river 
opened to a silver breadth between fl at meadows stretching back to far rows of 
pin-thick black poplars, until it wound away to Windsor behind a line of trees 
whose heads were bronze with unopened buds and whose fl anks were hidden by 
a hedge of copper-beech and crimson and white hawthorn.
(39, my emphasis)
Invoking another fi ction, West’s novel challenges, by ironizing, claims that 
Monkey Island is real. More ironic, or rather allegorical, is that this par-
ticular allusion directs us to passages that refute Monkey Island’s past unity. 
Proust’s novel portrays the white hawthorn as a fi gure of disunifi cation, as 
what creates distance within and between self and world. Marcel is frus-
trated by his inability to get beyond unsignifying nature in order to turn 
it into a symbol, as Chris Baldry says of the white hawthorn, of “immense 
signifi cance.”
But it was in vain that I lingered beside the hawthorns—inhaling, trying to fi x 
in my mind . . . , losing and recapturing their invisible and unchanging odor, 
absorbing myself in the rhythm which disposed their fl owers here and there 
with the lightheartedness of youth and at intervals as unexpected as certain 
intervals in music—they went on offering me the same charm in inexhaustible 
profusion, but without letting me delve any more deeply, like those melodies 
which one can play a hundred times in succession without coming any nearer to 
their secret. I turned away from them for a moment so as to be able to return to 
them afresh.26
Marcel turns back to them but again is frustrated by their inability to en-
lighten. His turning is also a troping, which, in the passage that follows, is 
disclosed as irreducible. For the hawthorns will not reveal their “inner es-
F6635.indb   86 9/23/15   9:24:49 AM
Traumas of Nation and Narrative   87
sence,” “offer no enlightenment.”27 The problem cannot be resolved, for the 
white hawthorn alone holds the secret of truth Marcel pursues: “I could not 
call upon any other fl owers to satisfy this mysterious longing.”28
These passages enact a thwarting of symbolic by allegorical discourse. 
They illustrate the white hawthorn’s refusal to submit to the self that con-
templates it as if symbolic, preventing the male protagonist from identify-
ing with the real, or natural, world. Marcel takes recourse to metaphors of 
artistic production at moments he seems to describe its opposite, nature. 
The fl owers’ refusal to reveal their secret is likened to “melodies” one plays 
to solicit their inner meaning, but without success. Later, he frames them as 
art, a “masterpiece,” metaphorically and literally.29 Still, they fail to signify 
other than themselves, nor do they allow unifi cation of feeling and object. 
Employing a rhetoric of artifi ce to portray the real manifests the fi gurative 
deposing of nature by art and underscores the overcoming of symbolic by 
allegorical diction.
This intertextuality projects an allegorical structure to the white haw-
thorn in West’s novel. The blossom can no more bridge a distance within 
the self and between the self and the natural world for Chris on Monkey 
Island, where he attempts to transcend his distance from the “real” past 
through the white hawthorn as symbol, than it can for Marcel. Proust’s text 
indicates that the unity of the national past Monkey Island fi gures is illusory, 
that it is already marked by separation and loss. Allegory intimates the gap 
between history and memory, the past and its belated reinvention.
The third mention of the plant reveals how the dominant narrative of 
loss obscures uneven gendering and class formations in England’s past. The 
struggle between allegory and symbol questions whether the hawthorn can 
overcome the distance not only between memory and history but also be-
tween men and women of different classes. Jenny fi nds it “strange” (49) that 
both Margaret and Chris “should describe meticulously the one white haw-
thorn that stood among the poplars by the ferryside” (49) but then surmises, 
“I suppose that a thing that one has looked at with somebody one loves 
acquires for ever after a special signifi cance” (49), which suggests the blos-
som’s reality and symbolic force, its capacity to bind Chris and Margaret. 
However, because the white hawthorn is located on Monkey Island, it is 
situated outside of reality, and thus its binding of these two is predicated on 
illusion. “It was strange that both Chris and she spoke of it [Monkey Island] 
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as though it were not a place, but a magic state which largely explained the 
actions performed in it” (49). If Monkey Island is a “magic state,” a fantasy, 
as is the white hawthorn within it, the latter can bridge the distance be-
tween Chris and Margaret only through fi ction. “State” doubles its referent 
here; in addition to a quality of feeling, it designates a sociopolitical entity. 
Magical Monkey Island is a fi gure for England before 1901, a phantasmatic 
geopolitical topos.
Allegory’s deconstruction of symbol in passages that present Margaret 
as an aesthetic object illustrate that the narrative of loss is marked by fi c-
tion and that it censors heteronormative and patriarchal policing of mas-
culinity and femininity, classes, and sexualities. These passages parody late 
nineteenth-century academic art, which revived neoclassical motifs to fi gure 
the female body in painting and sculpture, as well as aesthetic discourses 
that emerge in the 1870s and become more reactionary in relation to social 
purity movements of the 1880s and 1890s.30 Just as this testimony misreads 
the white hawthorn’s signifi cance as symbolic, a dematerialized and tran-
scendent access to truth, so it treats Margaret as a symbol, dematerializing 
and disfi guring her. Symbol is exposed as allegory again, however, revealing 
that this Margaret is created from textuality and artifi ce. Recycled fi ctions 
and art of the past shape her as a reactionary, patriarchal ideal of the late 
Victorian period, the epitome of feminine modesty and chastity. The im-
agery of classical Greece and the language of the medieval chivalric code, 
whose intimacy with the religious practice of object worship is ironized, 
portray Margaret as divine symbol, beyond the reach of everything human 
and “base”—beyond fi gure, fi guration, and thus allegory.
He drew her out into the darkness . . . to a circle of smooth turf. . . . On this 
stood a small Greek temple. . . . He had never brought Margaret here before 
because Mr. Allington had once told him . . . it had been built by the Dook for 
his excesses, and it was in the quality of his love for her that he could not bear 
to think of her in connection with anything base. . . . He lifted her in his arms 
and carried her within the columns and made her stand in a niche above the 
altar. . . . He could not tell if her hair was white as silver or yellow as gold. . . . 
His love was changeless. Lifting her down from the niche, he told her so.
(41)
The lower-middle-class female body operates as the site of a fetishistic re-
action, the production of the upper-middle-class male’s erotic investment 
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and denegation at once. The realist conventions persistently used to portray 
Margaret as utterly material, too material, throughout the novel indicate the 
need for this effacement of the body. She enters Baldry Court with a “de-
plorable umbrella, her unpardonable raincoat” (14), “muddy boots,” and “a 
seamed red hand” (10). A “stain” (16) on the English drawing room and 
the English garden, both metonymic of the English nation, Margaret pos-
sesses “the gift of animals and those of peasant stock” (14), the “heaviness 
of the draught-ox or the big trusted dog . . . repulsively furred with neglect 
and poverty” (10). A belated invention of an unmarked Margaret, a lack of 
“historic sense” that positions the working-class woman as an immutable 
symbol of a masculinist ideal of femininity, divesting her of materiality and 
historicity, enables Margaret and Chris’s relationship to form in 1901. The 
doubled articulation of Margaret—she is all too material, historical, and 
“scarred” on the one hand, and not material at all, lacking a relation to time, 
history, and sensuousness—is paradigmatic of many philosophical and liter-
ary representations of women in Western modernity.31
This allegory of Margaret can also be read as West’s indictment of the 
discursive management of the laboring female body in the last decades of 
the nineteenth century. A host of phenomena contributed to variegated so-
cial purity movements: the perceived but by no means actually widespread 
liberation of women from monogamous, patriarchal, reproductive, and het-
eronormative constraints, for example in the form of “free love” practiced 
by women and men in socialist and intellectual circles; the rise in popular-
ity of neo-Malthusian justifi cations for contraception; the change in legal 
statutes granting unmarried women property rights and protecting married 
women against marital rape; and calls for the protection of lower-class and 
working-class women and prostitutes, whose regular, even organized sexual 
exploitation by middle- and upper-class males was journalistically decried.32 
A biopolitics devoted to regulating the desires of middle- and upper-middle-
class young men like Chris Baldry by inculcating self-discipline or “manly 
purity” through a language of chivalry in educational and religio-medical 
tracts was one dominant strain of these. The social discourses of chivalry of 
the 1880s and 1890s also affected aesthetic deployments of the female body, 
and specifi cally working-class female bodies, such as artist’s models’, danc-
ers’, and performers’ bodies. As one art historian explains, “the association 
made by purists between vice and upper-class morals did much to discredit 
the nude in the domain of high art. . . . In the 1880s the artistic nude was de-
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nounced, alongside tableaux vivants and billboards advertising dancers, ac-
tresses, and acrobats, as a demoralizing infl uence.”33 West’s own politics and 
behavior, her affair with the married Wells, and the highly eroticized ex-
changes with him as “Jaguar” and “Panther” arguably place her on the other 
side of this biopolitics and aesthetics of male chivalry and its accompanying 
effacement of female desire and sexuality. West’s essay “1900” also castigates 
the hypocrisy of the era in which middle-class men regularly engaged pros-
titutes while women of all classes were denied sex outside of marriage. She 
points out that most of the art and literature of the time was “restrained by 
formal manners and religious practice” while in fact “the pudency of the age 
was . . . absurd.”34
When the aesthetic ideology of symbol betrays anxieties toward the fe-
male body, allegory indicates that Margaret and this past are fi ctions taken 
for history. The ironic portrayal of the episode in the temple conveys that 
Chris, like Henry James, is “always being misled by such lovely shells of the 
past . . . into the belief that the past which inhabited them was as lovely.”35 
Only by misreading fi ction as history and effect as cause can Chris believe 
that Monkey Island, a shell of loveliness containing another shell, the Greek 
temple, held a past as lovely. His scene of religious worship obfuscates its 
history. It was never employed for physical denial and spiritual purifi cation, 
only for sensual indulgences, those “excesses” of the aristocratic male that 
social purity campaigns targeted by regulating the impulses of young men. 
That Margaret scandalizes Kitty and Jenny at the end of the novel by re-
marking on Chris’s pronounced sexual drive when they were together at this 
earlier time gives the lie to this symbolic staging as well.
The novel suggests that the narrative of loss articulated through these 
aesthetic practices, and the drive to symbolize, results not only in failure 
but in the disappearance of women as witnesses to history. By literally and 
fi guratively “exulting” as a mythic object and by metaphorically freezing, or 
“friezing,” Margaret by lifting and making her “stand in a niche above the 
altar” like a statue of a goddess in this Greek temple, Chris evacuates her of 
her human, material form, her gendered and classed subjecthood, to render 
her transcendent and inanimate. The testimony concludes with Margaret’s 
literal disappearance: “And as he spoke her warm body melted to nothing-
ness in his arms. The columns that stood so hard and black against the quiv-
ering tide of moonlight and starlight tottered and dissolved” (41). Margaret 
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dissolves “as he speaks” twice—testifi es to and through his proxy—because 
this speech turns her into a symbol. The testimony implies that women can 
be included in the master narrative of the Victorian era only in objectifi ed, 
dematerialized, and fi ctional form.
“Tintern Abbey” and Colonial Trauma
If the intertextuality of Proust’s white hawthorn illuminates that the narrative 
of Victorian stasis that the war inspires relies on the occlusion of struggles 
over gender, sexuality, and class relations, the deployment of Wordworth’s 
“Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey” illuminates how the 
stability of England’s past is constituted through the instabilities generated 
by imperialism and anti-imperialism, which the narrative of loss marginal-
izes. The Return enacts what Edward Said identifi es as the European novel’s 
consolidation of imperialism. Analyzing its deployment of “Tintern Abbey” 
also enables a “contrapuntal reading”36 demonstrating how the novel re-
sists the imperialist logic it apparently underwrites. The text implies that 
colonial space is the supporting but excluded structure of the metropole, 
what Fredric Jameson contends remains unconscious in English modernism. 
Modernism will “always have . . . a privation that can never be restored . . . 
an outside . . . it constitutively lacks, and which can never be made up or 
made good.”37 West’s novel departs from literary examples that fi t neatly 
into Jameson and Said’s models, however. Rather than (dis)articulating a 
dependency of metropole on offi cial colony, this work encodes a space with 
a more complex politico-economic connection to Britain: Mexico. Perhaps 
because Mexico did not have a formal colonial relationship to the British 
state, Britain’s imbrication in the trauma of land relations there is even less 
represented in British modernism than that of offi cial colonies, histories al-
ready displaced. Situating Mexico at an oblique but pivotal point in the nar-
rative construction of trauma indicates its limited visibility textually as well 
as historically. The novel’s reappropriation of “Tintern Abbey” attempts to 
bring this constitutive lack to consciousness, paradoxically by manifesting it 
as unconscious.
Like the staging of the white hawthorn, that of “Tintern Abbey” also 
disturbs the narrative of loss and illustrates an alternative vision of the col-
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lective past. The novel guides readers toward the poem, not the abbey itself, 
by framing memory as Wordsworth does: as a work of art. The artwork 
in the novel is even oriented from the same vantage point as in the poem, 
which is “Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey.” The painting The 
Views Overlooking Tintern Abbey appears twice. It hangs on the otherwise 
unadorned walls of Monkey Island Inn in 1901 and in Margaret’s terraced 
house in 1916. The recurring mention of a temporal interval also points 
to the poem, specifi cally the incipit, which details the time since the poet’s 
return to Tintern Abbey: “Five years have passed; fi ve summers, with the 
length / Of fi ve long winters!”38 In the novel, fi ve years have passed since 
Chris’s son Oliver’s death, but fi ve years also separates every date in the 
novel, moments signifi cant, and dated, because each fi gures a transforma-
tive event: 1901 is when Chris’s memory ends; in 1906, he marries Kitty; in 
1911, his son dies; and in 1916, Chris suffers shell shock.
Although their publications are separated by over a century, both novel 
and poem are written in the midst or recent aftermath of an event of great 
interruptive force that called into question the future of Europe and the 
conventions, traditions, and philosophical premises of the past on which 
its polities and cultural formations were structured: the French Revolution 
and the First World War. One might expect their historical contexts to in-
duce them to enact what LaCapra diagnoses as a compensatory movement 
caused by a traumatic event. Faced with radical uncertainty of the future 
and the crises in witnessing posed by such events, they might manifest a 
desire to escape the instabilities of the present by retreating into a past of 
their author’s invention, one that offers an illusory stability. But even if such 
authorial desires were operative in these texts’ composition, both works’ ar-
ticulations of memory expose such a compensatory movement as ultimately 
insupportable.
Through their memories, both the poetic persona of “Tintern Abbey” 
and Chris Baldry revisit a space unmarked by modernity. The “I” of the 
poem returns to the pastoral scene on the banks of the Wye after fi ve years, 
although he has often returned before, through the faculty of memory. The 
poem represents this return as an escape from the tumult of contempo-
rary life. The poetic voice relates that “‘mid the din / Of towns and cities” 
(66, lines 25–26) and “when the fretful stir / Unprofi table, and the fever of 
the world, / Have hung upon the beatings of my heart— / How oft, in spirit, 
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have I turned to thee, / O Sylvan Wye!” (67, lines 52–56), in order to recall 
the “beauteous forms” of the Wye valley (66, line 23). Both the poetic sub-
ject and Chris seek to take refuge in the idyllic space-time of memory when 
modernity, or the “fever of the world,” becomes too great.
The poem’s orchestration of this past and the subject’s relation to it re-
veal, however, that this space-time is more likely a belated invention, an in-
stance of Nachträglichkeit, than reality. By bracketing the natural world from 
the subject’s conscious experience, or cognition in the Kantian sense, Word-
sworth intimates that this past self had an inauthentic relation to the place 
and time “Tintern Abbey” describes. Then, nature “To [him] was all in all” 
(68, line 75). Consequently, he could not experience nature as it was because 
he failed to employ the faculties of mind that come later, with maturity, 
when he has “learned / To look on nature, not as in the hour / Of thoughtless 
youth” (68, lines 88–90). Toward the end of these lines, one might hear the 
infl uence of Coleridge, and his debt to Schelling, when Wordsworth writes: 
“Therefore am I still / A lover of the meadows and the woods, / And moun-
tains; and of all that we behold / From this green earth; of all the mighty 
world / Of eye, and ear,—both what they half create, / And what perceive” 
(68, lines 102–107). Earlier, nature was only what the subject could see ab-
sent the intervention of cognition, thought, or understanding. Later, he rec-
ognizes what he sees in nature is not the world as it is, without mediation, 
but the product of an interaction between mind and external phenomena. 
The senses, “eye and ear,” do not passively receive images, “perceive,” but 
also “half create.” By making this distinction between childhood and adult-
hood, Wordsworth suggests this subject will always remain barred from the 
world of his youth because his experience of nature was not comprehended. 
It escaped the mind’s cognitive faculties, was shaped by a “thoughtless” 
youth, and therefore is without foundation in reality.
Moreover, while this earlier time purportedly lacks the anxieties coter-
minous with modernity, the poem renders untenable this temporal opposi-
tion. Even in the past, nature functioned as refuge from reality. The poem 
relates that the feeling that prompts the subject to return to this pastoral 
scene in his memory also occurred in the past. Then, too, he sought to es-
cape from “the burthen of the mystery, / In which the heavy and the weary 
weight / Of all this unintelligible world” (67, lines 38– 40) cannot be lifted 
without the “gift” of a “blessed mood,” by taking fl ight into nature. “Like 
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a roe / I bounded . . .  / Wherever nature led: more like a man / Flying from 
something he dreads than one / Who sought the thing he loved” (67–68, 
lines 67–72). The subject confesses he has entered this pastoral scene not to 
search for what he loved but to fl ee from what he feared—the end of child-
hood, mortality, death, an anxiety without an object that can be posited: 
“dread.”
The novel intimates that for Chris, too, the natural world operated as an 
escape from reality even before 1916. In his youth, a retreat into nature was 
an escape into the imagination. Chris has always projected his desires onto 
natural objects, evading life’s mundanities, anxieties, and disappointments. 
Jenny remarks, “he had always shown great faith in the imminence of the 
improbable. He thought that the birch tree would really stir and shrink and 
quicken into an enchanted princess, that he really was a Red Indian . . . with a 
stronger motion of the imagination than the ordinary child’s make-believe” 
(7). Like Wordsworth’s poetic persona, Chris also has limited access to the 
natural landscapes of his past. That he treated the woods in his childhood as 
a supernatural place through imagination suggests that soon he would treat 
Monkey Island similarly. It will become the site of his fears transformed 
by fi ctions created to avoid the dread confronted as a young man, which 
eventually become sedimented as truths. Reading the novel’s and poem’s 
articulation of returns as homological, we can infer that Chris goes to Mon-
key Island not to seek out “what he loves” (Margaret), as he attests, but more 
“like a man fl ying from something he dreads.” The fears that drive him to a 
fi ctional world are similar to those from which the voice of “Tintern Abbey” 
fl ed, the end of childhood and transition to adulthood.
Unlike Wordsworth’s poem, however, West’s novel ties this transition di-
rectly to economic and political vicissitudes; intertextuality stages capitalism 
and imperialism as traumas, interrupting the plot’s substitutive designations 
of trauma. Adulthood means becoming an English patriarch, “gentleman,” 
and capitalist, the inheritor of an overseas mining fi rm. This is a transition to 
which Chris cannot bear witness, an impasse—a trauma. The day he leaves 
to embark on this new life is where his memory abruptly ends. Attempting 
to learn why she is “barred out” (38) of the last day in Chris’s memory, Jenny 
thinks back to a spring “fi fteen years ago . . . Chris had lingered with Uncle 
Ambrose in his Thamesside rectory as he had never lingered before, and old 
Mr. Baldry was fi lling the house with a sense of hot, apoplectic misery” (52). 
F6635.indb   94 9/23/15   9:24:49 AM
Traumas of Nation and Narrative   95
Eventually Mr. Baldry does send for Chris, who has retreated from reality to 
Monkey Island. Jenny announces, “I had got the key at last”:
That night he talked til late with his father and in the morning he had started for 
Mexico, to keep the mines going through the revolution, to keep the fi rm’s head 
above water and Baldry Court sleek and hospitable, to keep everything bright 
and splendid save only his youth, which after that was dulled by care.
(52–53)
Through its homologies with “Tintern Abbey,” the novel opens onto a 
politicohistorical situation outside the plot and diegetic space of England. 
Becoming the English gentleman means exploiting the resources of a com-
prador state and functioning as stopgap to the effects of a revolution against 
a dictatorship.39
Chris participates in the counterrevolutionary movement, expanding 
English wealth by exploiting the resources of foreign soil while helping ren-
der its people landless and indigent. The novel makes the causal logic clear 
while undermining the image of the healthy English soldier who heads into 
battle in the European War. This quasi-imperialism has already damaged 
Chris Baldry before the war. British fi rms benefi ted from Porfi rio Diaz’s 
dictatorship in the latter half of the nineteenth century and had much to lose 
in a revolution that would overthrow him. By giving enormous land conces-
sions to foreign speculators who greatly increased gold and silver production 
in Mexico, Diaz bankrupted a majority of rural farmers by 1910. The Min-
ing Law of 1884 was particularly signifi cant, producing long-term effects, 
such as the growth of the foreign-owned oil industry and the removal of 
lands from common ownership by Mexicans. As Peter Calvert writes,
Common rights in the subsoil, including vital water supplies, were replaced in 
the Mining Law of 1884 by the concept of private ownership of irreplaceable 
minerals being vested in the ownership of the surface. In the poorest parts of 
the country, rich foreign colonies suddenly appeared, offering high wages which 
might cease at any time when the deposits ran out.40
British investment was concentrated not only in mining but in industry and 
railways, which also contributed to the traumatic effects of land enclosures 
in Mexico at the end of the nineteenth century. Land held by village com-
munities in common ownership since precolonial times was opened by the 
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government to enclosure by plantation owners and foreign corporations, 
and as a result “more than a quarter of the land surface of Mexico passed into 
the hands of not more than 834 men. . . . Of all these factors in the growth of 
pre-revolutionary discontent, it was agrarian revolt against enclosures that 
was to have the most signifi cance for the internal history of Mexico.”41
By suggesting this historicopolitical situation is what Chris fl ees, what 
drives him to an invented world and to inventing this world, the novel indi-
cates that England’s economic dependence on foreign soil and labor gener-
ates a phantasmatic pastoral nation-state: Monkey Island, a fi gure for En-
gland itself. The textual site mirrors the historical site. Undergirding both 
idyllic places are traumas. Although the Mexican confl ict induces Chris to 
escape the “misery” of the law of the father as (neo)imperialist by retreat-
ing to Monkey Island, this “retreat” is actually a running toward “what he 
dreads”—the trauma of imperialism appears excessively displaced across the 
island. We see this through associations that repeatedly recall the Mexican 
mines, the whiteness of silver and references to gold and copper: Margaret, 
“a girl in white who lifted a white face or drooped a dull gold head” (38), 
a “white fi gure” (38) whose “white dress shone like silver” (39), her hair 
“white as silver or yellow as gold” (41); the poplars’ “silver spires” (35); the 
clouds, lumps of “white light” (38); chestnut candles, “no longer proud fl ow-
ers, but just wet white lights” (37); Mr. Allington’s boots, “white ducks” and 
his “copper-coloured hair” (37); the inn, a “low white house” (35); the “silver 
breadth” of the river (39); and the high trees “whose heads were bronze . . . 
whose fl anks were hidden by a hedge of copper-beech” (39). And of course, 
the white hawthorn.42 Monkey Island is the chronotope of the Victorian era 
as the age of a displaced colonial trauma.
By fi guring Monkey Island as this chronotope, the novel sends a warn-
ing. Staged as a missed encounter with history, a “key” event that cannot be 
recalled, imperialism’s effects are traumas in danger of succumbing to col-
lective amnesia in twentieth-century wartime and postwar narratives of mo-
dernity as loss. The testimony relates that in the midst of the contemporane-
ous international crisis and reactionary nationalist retrenchment, England is 
in danger of forgetting past historical moments in which the suppression of 
others are enacted in the consolidation and perpetuation of British empire 
and wealth, which relied on the appropriation and exploitation of natural 
resources and labor power by the 1890s in Africa, India, the Caribbean, and 
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South America. By generating formal parallels with “Tintern Abbey,” the 
novel recalls that colonialism and capitalism function as supporting struc-
tures of England’s prewar peace and stability. Allegory and intertextuality 
reveal the violent underpinnings of “Pax Britannica.”
Reading Beyond the Cure
Whether colonial complicity is the key to Chris’s amnesia remains the site 
of narrative contestation, however. This uncertainty has enabled readers to 
locate the cause of trauma in war and shell shock, or outside of history and 
representation, or where the plot locates it by providing a cure to amnesia: 
the death of Chris’s son. When Margaret returns memory to Chris by re-
minding him of Oliver’s death, the novel contradicts the testimony’s desig-
nation of colonial complicity as the key to amnesia. But by correlating the 
departure to Mexico with the end of Chris’s memory, the fi nal day in his 
recollection, the text produces a narrative manipulation of “consecution” 
into “consequence.”43 The departure to Mexico offers an explanatory power 
other diagnoses lack. Yet Margaret’s is the last word on the matter because it 
resolves the organizing confl ict, even though the doctor cannot explain why 
recalling the son’s death should cure amnesia: “I don’t know why [it matters 
so much]. But it does” (82), he tells Kitty. The cure suggests that the loss of 
the patronym’s power, survival through the male heir, is what Chris mourns 
and is the trauma perpetuating his amnesia. By relating that Kitty cannot 
have another child, the novel supports this interpretation.
The testimony’s interrogation of the narrative of loss seems subsumed 
by the cure’s closure. The working-class woman and the upper-middle-class 
man become sutured not through an illusory white hawthorn that reveals 
political, economic, and social inequities and discontinuities concealed by 
a nostalgic image of Victorian stability but through their failure to secure 
through social and biological reproduction what is now imputed as En-
gland’s former stability. Both Chris and Margaret have sons who die, and 
this represents the fragmentation of life in the Edwardian age, the disrup-
tion of national continuity and genealogical futurity. “It’s as if . . . they each 
had half a life” (77), Margaret muses. If, as Freud contends, the melancholic 
may know who has been lost but not what he himself has lost thereby, Chris’s 
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cure relates that what is lost is the possibility of reproducing the name of 
the father and ensuring the nation’s future. This resolution makes Marga-
ret’s role primarily reproductive, maternal (just as Jenny does throughout 
the novel). Although Margaret fails to secure the patronym and the nation’s 
future through her own child, who dies, by curing Chris she enables the 
soldier to return and secure that future through war. The novel of course in-
dicates that the cure is poison because it returns Chris to the traumas of the 
front; however, even if the cure ironically comments on the reality to which 
the soldier is made to return, by displacing colonial trauma, the closure it 
provides apparently supports Jameson’s hypothesis that life in the colonies 
cannot be included consciously in the modernist novel and must remain part 
of the textual unconscious.
Yet the novel departs from this paradigm of modernism’s relation to im-
perialism through its highlighting of the unverifi able and literary structure 
of testimony. Testimony persistently asks readers to bear witness to the tex-
tual unconscious, to address the incompatible staging of trauma the novel 
cannot resolve within itself. Although the exposure of colonial complicity 
and uneven class and gender arrangements shaping the nostalgic narrative 
of loss is jettisoned by the plotting of cure, testimony’s intertextuality in-
terrupts narrative closure by directing readers’ attention to the lacks that 
enable that closure. By troubling the historical narrative of the fall into a 
fragmented Edwardian age and war-torn modernity, testimony does not 
merely invite but indeed requests that readers imagine alternative versions 
of England’s past scripted by those who have been expelled from the Garden 
but cannot be banished from history.
West’s other work that illustrates how war induces amnesia toward Brit-
ain’s past is The Meaning of Treason. The differences between the novel 
and the report’s negotiation of colonial trauma demonstrate the effects of 
changes that occur between their publications. The trial reports are written 
after the process of imperial contraction has greatly accelerated and after the 
conditions of warfare have dramatically shifted from a soldier’s battle fought 
at the front to a “People’s War” that brings death home in unprecedented 
ways. Like The Return of the Soldier, The Meaning of Treason also relates how 
dominant narratives obscure histories of violence, but the World War II 
text conveys a stronger desire to secure the nation than the World War I 
novel. It therefore mobilizes those narratives rather than calling attention 
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to their coercive effects, which, in turn, interrupt its articulations of law and 
justice.
Blackout as Juridical Unconscious
The Meaning of Treason earned West the title of “The World’s Number One 
Woman Writer,” bestowed by the magazine Time. West began reporting 
on trials in 1945, a labor for which she professed little love but continued 
to perform. Over the next decade she would cover the Nuremburg trials, 
murder trials in Britain and the United States, and treason trials, which were 
collected in The Meaning of Treason, later developed and revised as The New 
Meaning of Treason. “The Revolutionary,” the fi rst part of The Meaning of 
Treason, initially published in the New Yorker in 1945, focuses largely on the 
trials of William Joyce. Joyce, or Lord Haw Haw, as he became known, trav-
eled on a British passport to Germany, where he broadcast Nazi propaganda 
into England over the radio. The great interest the Joyce trials held for legal 
and lay communities alike was due to the technical question at their center. 
Joyce’s English mother and Irish father traveled from Ireland to the United 
States and were naturalized before Joyce was born. The family returned to 
Ireland and eventually settled in England; Joyce learns during the trials he is 
an American citizen by birth. If Joyce is not legally a British subject, could 
he be guilty of committing treason against the British state? How will the 
court defi ne treason in this case? Over the course of three trials, the court 
decides that because Joyce lived under the King’s protection for thirty years 
and traveled on a British passport, he owed allegiance to the state. By be-
coming naturalized as a German citizen during the war, he commits high 
treason for which he is served the death penalty. By crafting the Joyce trials 
into something more and other than a documentary report, West attempts 
to dress the wounds England suffers as a result of World War II and imperial 
contraction. She shapes these legal events into a narrative of development 
and rehabilitation of a colonial subject who tries and fails to become an 
English citizen.
Recently, critics have sought to bridge the apparently oppositional forces 
of antifascism and anticommunism, nationalism and anti-imperialism at 
work in West’s interwar, wartime, and later writings.44 Not suffi ciently ex-
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amined, however, is how British imperialism particularly is implicated in the 
network in which her criticism of fascism and communism, and her support 
of national rather than transnational alliances, cross. West’s political views 
shifted during the interwar period. West became a vocal antifascist but also 
an emphatic nationalist and intense critic of communism over the next de-
cades, which separated her further from a modernist grouping to which she 
had never really belonged and also helped marginalize her postwar writing 
for decades. Reconsiderations of her work, however, have led critics to as-
sert that West’s writings that emerge on the cusp of the postcolonial era are 
prescient of postcolonial critiques and that they critique as well the rise of 
an English bureaucratic state that betrays the promises of the nation. Marina 
MacKay argues that in Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, West’s most celebrated 
work of the interwar/wartime period, the author motivates nationalist ide-
als toward a “tentative post-colonial sensibility” that demonstrates, as West 
puts it in the travelogue, that “one empire is very like another.” MacKay 
contends that West does not dwell on British imperialism because by the 
end of the 1930s it is no longer an issue; “she writes as if the empire were 
already thing of the past.”45 But The Meaning of Treason, published six years 
after the travelogue, shows that the affective force of empire has not yet 
settled into the past, that it is reactivated by war and the ramifi cations of 
imperial decline. The effects of these pressures on the report’s form ques-
tion Patricia E. Chu’s compelling argument that West presents Joyce’s story 
as an encapsulation of “the diffi culty of defi ning the British subject . . . as 
national defi nitions were fi tted to the needs of the bureaucratic welfare 
state” and that she lays bare the divide between national affect as imaginative 
and fl exible and “a state that imposes ‘durable’ identities amenable to state 
administration.”46
The report does expose a breach between nation and state and attests 
to the diffi culty of defi ning the British subject. I contend, however, that 
rather than sympathetically portraying Joyce’s desire to become English and 
criticizing the bureaucratic state for denying his national aspirations, as Chu 
argues, West condemns the state for potentially enabling Joyce to pose as 
English. Instead of countering the state’s imposition of durable identities 
with a fl exible model of national belonging, West deploys narratives that 
serve imperial and ethnonationalist aims to correct for what she perceives 
as the state’s failure to secure national identity and community. She also at-
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tempts to correct for the state’s increasing separation from the missions of 
an organic nation by reestablishing English law as the means for carrying 
out those missions. These textual strategies, I maintain, are reactions to co-
implicated historical traumas of war and imperial retrenchment.
While trauma in West’s reports on the Nuremburg trials has been ex-
amined, overlooked is how trauma deforms the treason trial reports.47 In 
“The Revolutionary,” trauma is translated into a problem of restricted vi-
sion, or “blackout.” Blackout refers to material, epistemological, and po-
litical phenomena that together crystallize England’s interrelated struggles 
with fascism and its colonies during World War II. On the most basic level, 
the report responds to the blackout of information caused by the wartime 
economy. In The New Meaning of Treason, West explains the origin of the 
fi rst version: “I was encouraged to make a book about [ Joyce, John Amery, 
and other World War II traitors] by an eminent lawyer who was con-
cerned because the shortage of newsprint due to the war meant that these 
trials were either not reported, or were reported too briefl y for the public 
to gain any real information regarding a signifi cant tendency.”48 The Mean-
ing of Treason centers on that signifi cant tendency, a “force” that returns 
and refuses to settle into the past. “When I began my book I was under the 
impression that I was dealing with a spent force only interesting as part of 
the past,” West writes, “but when I was halfway through it Alan Nunn May 
followed William Joyce into the dock of the Old Bailey, and I became aware 
that the force still lived, and that its signifi cance was even more grave than 
had been supposed.”49 The report aims to fi ll in the gaps produced through 
the blackout of information by making the compulsive repetition of trea-
son comprehensible, but struggles with other forms of blackout hamper its 
efforts.
Blackout structured life and literature during the war in at least three 
other ways. It was a literal phenomenon that harkened the arrival of bomb-
ings; it was an effect of propaganda, of which Joyce was a notorious war-
time practitioner; and, fi nally, as Patrick Deer has shown, it was experienced 
as curtailed surveillance of geopolitical boundaries, a lack of oversight of 
a decentralized empire whose “fronts were everywhere,” which made the 
English isle, and the British empire, vulnerable to enemy forces.50 The trial 
report mentions the fi rst sense of blackout only once and registers the after-
effects of the other two through narrative strategies that (dis)avow  En gland’s 
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 limited sight and foresight during the war. These strategies react to the fail-
ure to oversee the empire’s many fronts, but especially those within the 
English nation, whose porous boundaries, its airwaves, make it vulnerable to 
the invisible migrant William Joyce.
The opening pages of The Meaning of Treason relate that England con-
fronts blackout in the form of Joyce’s voice. According to the court, Joyce 
commits a crime against the British state, but according to West, he commits 
a crime against the English nation as a fi lial and cultural formation. Joyce’s 
crime is a scandal to Englishness itself, “for throughout history treason has 
always been the crime most abhorred by the English, as parricide has been . . 
. by the French.”51 Joyce “sinned that sin which is the dark travesty of legiti-
mate hatred because it is felt for kindred, just as incest is the dark travesty of 
legitimate love” (3). Likened to a violation not of just any law but the law on 
which law and culture is founded and exogamy secured, Joyce’s crime threat-
ens a regression to nature and lawlessness that undoes “England-as-family,” 
a formulation West expressed in her letters.52 Joyce incestuously penetrates 
the English body politic; his voice “climbed into the ears of frightened peo-
ple” (28). The fi rst sentence names the desire that drives the report, to see 
what has never been seen before and could not be “foreseen.”
Everybody in London wanted to see William Joyce when he was brought into 
trial as a radio traitor, for he was something new in the history of the world. 
Never before have people known the voice of one they had never seen as well 
as if he had been a husband or brother or close friend; and if they had foreseen 
such a miracle they would not have imagined that the familiar unknown would 
speak to them only to prophesy their death and ruin.
(3)
The disembodied voice questions limits between the known and unknown, 
proximate and strange. A “dark travesty” (3) who evades surveillance and 
makes England the object of surveillance, Joyce is literally part of the fam-
ily—a “familiar unknown” (3)—but also a rupture. Radio technology com-
pounds blackout by compromising borders that would secure national com-
munity and makes Joyce into “something new in the history of the world,” a 
“miracle,” a “hideous novelty” (3).53
To confront these threats, “The Revolutionary” tries to establish a stable 
legal foundation by which to judge Joyce that would simultaneously differ-
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entiate the English state from (post)revolutionary, fascist, and anticolonial 
formations. In its elaboration of English law generally and the treason tri-
als specifi cally, however, the report illuminates what Shoshana Felman calls 
the juridical unconscious. Felman argues that “despite its conscious frames 
and rational foundations, the law has quite conspicuously and remarkably 
its own structural (professional) unconscious.”54 Trials translate trauma into 
“legal-conscious terminology” to reduce its disruptive force, but trauma 
can recapture trials, revealing the law’s unconscious. “The Revolutionary” 
discloses the problematic of the juridical unconscious as the ineluctable re-
turn of blackout. Law must contend not only with the unforeseeable and 
violent Joyce but must also wrestle with its own partial vision, even its own 
violence—a fact the text continually suppresses after regularly bringing it 
to light.
Joyce’s exposure of the state’s instability leads West to safeguard the na-
tion from the masquerading “Irish revolutionary” by staging England as an 
impermeable cultural formation. The ethnographic strategies she uses to 
bolster England and Englishness illustrate the importance of examining how 
events often disaggregated in literary study—World War II and imperial 
decline—are in fact imbricated.55 During the era of imperial retrenchment, 
West’s contemporaries, such as Woolf, Eliot, and Forster, repurposed eth-
nographic discourses to restore national integrity in response to the “the 
over and under-determined nature of Englishness”56 while rejecting the ide-
ologies of race and ethnicity that characterized Nazi Germany. The over- 
and undetermined nature of Englishness to which West’s report reacts, 
however, is as much the result of wartime treason by a subject who confused 
the distinction between Nazis and British citizens as it is imperial retrench-
ment. Consequently, although West employs ethnographic discourses to 
consolidate Englishness, she does not repurpose them to avoid ethnic abso-
lutism but to insist on absolutes. She responds to the People’s War by writ-
ing against the legal category of the traitor as intimate enemy, a man of and 
against the people. The report’s ethnographic eye materializes the ephem-
eral and spectral by making Joyce’s body visible and portraying his crime as 
a violent rupture orchestrated by a failed Englishman only English law can 
cure. But although the report strives over and again to fortify and protect 
both state and nation from blackout and violence, the juridical unconscious 
relentlessly returns and thwarts its efforts.
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Law, Vision, and Violence
In a highly infl uential essay, the legal scholar Robert Cover writes, “Nei-
ther legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be properly un-
derstood apart from one another.”57 Cover explains that legal decisions on 
violence are authorized by and practice violence. “A judge articulates her 
understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his 
property, his children, even his life. Interpretations in law also constitute 
justifi cations for violence which has already occurred or which is about to 
occur.”58 Christopher Menke expands Cover’s argument but also qualifi es 
it, arguing that “every attempt at defi ning the relationship between law and 
violence must start with two tensely related, if not blatantly contradictory,” 
premises:
On the one hand there are the discourses of the legitimation of law, according to 
which legal verdicts are justifi ed verdicts and thus, no matter how harsh they 
may be for those sentenced, they are not violent. For violence—in the relevant 
sense of the term—is not the same as restriction or even violation. Violence is 
a restraint or violation imposed by somebody on somebody against their will. 
But if the legal verdict is justifi ed, it is valid also for the person sentenced, and 
insofar as it is not against her will, it is not violence. On the other hand, there 
are the discourses of the critique of law: legal verdicts are enforced by exerting or 
threatening violence. There is no law—and this holds also for post-sovereign 
law that has given up on the cruel celebrations of punishment and torture—that 
does without violence. Even the justifi cation of the legal verdict does not change 
this: neither the legitimation by (just) purposes nor by (conventional or fair) 
procedures can free law from its violence.59
West’s report runs together discourses of legitimation and critique of law. 
By highlighting law’s belatedness and limited vision, “The Revolutionary” 
discloses that violence underpins the British state and empire as well as revo-
lutionary regimes, entities she assiduously seeks to differentiate.
The report argues that partial sight accompanies and even enables the 
emergence and conservation of social and political formations, from the 
British state to African tribes to nomadic groups across Asia. As a founda-
tional act of ordering and constituting the socius, law is both universal and 
universally lacking a fully rationalized foundation. No society can compre-
hend and envision the conditions of its emergence.
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The law is a force which has never yet been fi nally analyzed. To make laws is a 
human instinct that arises as soon as food and shelter have been ensured, among 
all peoples, everywhere. There have been yellow people who have fl ashed on 
horseback across continents, apparently too mobile to form customs, apparently 
preoccupied with slaughter and destruction; there have been black people who 
have squatted on their thin haunches unchangeably through the centuries, their 
customs drooling to superstition round them. These have been thought by men 
of other kinds to be without law, but it was an error. Both societies had reached 
a general agreement as to how to order their lives, and ordained penalties 
against its violation. But neither they nor any other society could defi ne exactly 
what they were doing when they were making that agreement and ordaining 
those penalties.
(62)
West employs Eurocentric axiomatics of race to contest Eurocentric axi-
omatics of race that claim that non-European societies lack law, while com-
paring the English nation-state with those formations. She then inverts the 
gesture that typically attends such imperialist formulations: Rather than 
cast these societies as enlightened because they found community through 
legislation as Europe does, she subjects Europe to darkness. European law 
mirrors other laws not because they are grounded in reason or natural jus-
tice—how English common law has always defi ned itself—but because all 
law is blind and lacks a fi rm foundation. No “society could defi ne exactly 
what they were doing when they were making that agreement and ordaining 
those penalties.”
Using metaphors that assert affi nities between the seemingly disparate 
domains of law and art in “The Revolutionary” (affi nities her other reports 
also assert),60 West relates that the limited vision that accompanies the law 
that institutes the socius also accompanies the laws that conserve it, and 
she suggests that Joyce’s case lays bare the imperative built into all law. The 
relationship between art and law “The Revolutionary” proposes compli-
cates paradigms in critical legal and literature and law studies, which often 
treat art as the repressed of law that returns to interrupt it from the outside. 
Dismissing the intricate legal arguments about the nature of allegiance as 
“fi ligree work” (27), describing the trials as “an Irish drama” (6), “tragedy” 
(73), “cinema or concert” (29), and “three performances of the same piano 
concerto by the same conductor and the same soloist but by three separate 
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orchestras” (43– 44), West argues that legal and artistic interpretation alike 
endlessly confront an “inevitable time-lag” (63):
The law, like art, is always vainly racing to catch up with experience. Life is 
always unpredictable. At every turn of history it presents the citizen with new 
obligations, and renders dangerous the exercise of his liberty in some sphere by 
suddenly rendering that exercise an affront to the liberty of others. It is the task 
of judges and legislators to alter the law that it may cope with these capers of 
time . . . they run as fast as the hands of the clock, reaching out to the present 
with one hand, that they may knot it to the past which they carry in their other 
hand. There are always lapses in time when the present and the past are not 
joined, and it is these which Englishmen such as wished Joyce to live loved to 
exploit.
(63–64)
Art and law labor to make historical time continuous while remaining always 
provisional. Structured by limited vision and belatedness, racing “vainly” 
against the march of time, both demand persistent self-alteration. Art, in-
cluding literature, thus does not expose law’s bad conscience from the out-
side, therefore; rather, as Mark Sanders explains in his study of law and lit-
erature, “the self-othering that can be termed ‘literary’ (allegory, irony, for 
instance) does take place within the operations of the law, . . . is not separate 
from it.”61 Joyce’s case seems exceptional but is actually exemplary. Both 
unique and general, it demands that law forge a passage across the interval 
between past and present by repeating while “altering” precedent.
This elucidation of the limited vision and internal irony of law creates 
an irreducible commonality between things West wants to keep separate: 
the English state and revolutionary and fascist regimes. For it is the limited 
sight and foresight of the French and Russian revolutions that led to their 
ironic interruptions. “The scaffolds of Paris took, in the end, all those that 
set them up; and of the actual engineers of the Russian Revolution, all but 
a handful were hoist by their own petard” (114). Joyce’s trials threaten that 
English distribution of justice might come to resemble Nazi violence: “En-
gland was anxious to see Joyce suffer the just penalties of the law, but it was 
very anxious, too, that no penalty should be infl icted that was not just.” To 
this end “people were asking themselves whether the trial was perfectly fair 
and whether we were being careful to be loyal to our tradition of impartial 
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justice and to escape the Nazi contamination of our troubled times” (48). 
The report has shown, however, that it is not only these “troubled times” 
that raise the possibility of “contamination” of just by unjust dispensations of 
power. The potential for this contamination is ever present given the abys-
sal, blind, and repetitious structure of law at the root of all social and po-
litical formations. By disclosing this, “The Revolutionary” raises a question 
West would rather not: how does one distinguish between “the force of law 
of a legitimate power and the supposedly originary violence that must have 
established this authority and that could not itself have been authorized by 
any anterior legitimacy, so that, in this initial moment, it is neither legal nor 
illegal— or, as others would quickly say, neither just nor unjust”?62
West’s descriptions of the origins of the state and law’s potential for con-
tamination resonates with Jacques Derrida’s reading of the “contamination”63 
of state and revolutionary violence in his analysis of Walter Benjamin’s Cri-
tique of Violence (Kritik der Gewalt). Derrida explores how violence not only 
attends revolutions but founds and preserves the polis and law, or droit. 
Pressing on the double meaning of the German term Gewalt—both “vi-
olence” and “sanctioned authority”—Derrida theorizes that the force or 
“violence” that founds a state and law erupts in an interval between past 
and future. States analeptically interpret this force of law as legitimate, but 
it is neither legitimate nor illegitimate in essence because this positional act 
generates the conditions for determining (il)legitimacy. Revolution projects 
a new order, proleptically legitimating its own destructive force, but because 
the order it seeks to institute does not yet exist, this force, too, is neither es-
sentially legitimate nor illegitimate. Therefore, “the foundation of all states 
occurs in a situation that we can thus call revolutionary.”64 Yet the state fears 
revolutionary situations that threaten it through “founding violence, that 
is, violence able to justify, to legitimate (begrunden, to found, p. 283), or to 
transform the relations of law (Rechtsverhaltness), and so to present itself as 
having a right to law” [“un droit au droit”].65 The foundations of authority are 
hence “mystical” and prohibit all nonviolent or neutral interpretation and 
justifi cation. Benjamin wants to maintain a distinction between founding 
violence and conserving violence, violence that “ensures the permanence 
and enforceability of law,” but this distinction cannot hold, Derrida argues. 
On the one hand, every positional act of ordering encodes within it the call 
to conserve. Its origin is divided, fi ssured by the promise of repetition and 
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conservation. On the other hand, the force that conserves and enforces law 
always refounds it, because “the decision of a judge . . . must not only follow 
a rule of law or a general law, but must also assume it, approve it, confi rm 
its value, by a reinstating act of interpretation, as if ultimately nothing pre-
viously existed of the law, as if the judge himself invented the law in every 
case.”66 Derrida concludes that a “différantielle contamination”67 relates 
conserving and instituting violence.
Had West pursued the implications of her analysis of law, she might have 
glimpsed in the foundation and conservation of the English state the force 
she condemns, which is embodied in the French, the Russian, and what she 
calls the “Nazi Revolution” (114). Her description of the act instituting the 
social order implies that no interpretive metalanguage can rigorously justify 
either revolutionary violence or state authority because no society “could 
defi ne exactly what they were doing when they were making that agreement 
and ordaining those penalties” (62) that constitute it and its law. She also 
rejects the distinction between founding violence and the laws that con-
serve the state, to which Benjamin imputes permanence, by proposing that 
historical change demands that law suspend, repeat, and alter itself. Because 
belatedness and necessary lack of foresight must underlie founding as well 
as conserving violence, states, like revolutions, cannot rigorously legitimate 
their orders through retrospective and projective justifi cations. According 
to her own analysis, therefore, England is not fundamentally different from 
postrevolutionary states such as France, whose “increases of liberty, equality, 
and fraternity [were] no greater than were won by other nations untouched 
by revolution” (114).
The Joyce case is disturbing because it continually illuminates uncanny 
resemblances. For example, in revealing the shifting ground and limited vi-
sion of English law, the case of this “familiar unknown” defamiliarizes the 
familiar, raising to the surface the revolutionary tendencies of a people “un-
touched by revolution.” West derides the “vast number of English people” 
who cheer men like Joyce and Horatio Bottomley for exploiting the legal 
time lag, condemning their “winking admiration for the rogues” who “travel 
through life with a criminal purpose” yet maintain legal innocence (64). 
Versions of what Benjamin calls the “great criminal,”68 they expose how the 
legal system falters. The mass pleasure at their “rogue” acts derives from 
these acts’ exposure of law’s belatedness and blindness. Both men “exploit 
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[an] unforeseen situation” and in doing so “opened to all of them [the Eng-
lish people] the prospect that one day they might fi nd some such opportu-
nity of gain easier than honest and unpunishable” (64).
West employs tenets of natural law to cover over the instabilities Joyce’s 
case elucidates and to distinguish English law from revolutionary force. 
Countering her insight that the founding and conserving of the state is never 
entirely rational and that all law is subject to an “inevitable time-lag,” West 
writes, “Pagan and Christian alike realized that the law should be at once the 
recognition of an eternal truth and the solution by a community of one of 
its temporal problems, for both conceived that the divine will was mirrored 
in nature, which man could study by the use of his reason” (62–63). English 
law has its source in “eternal truth,” reason, and divine will, which are also 
“written into nature” and secular life in the form of “service of humanity, 
the rights of the state, the sovereignty of intelligence or moral sense” (63). 
Revolution assaults the order that supposedly endures even among those 
states not necessarily erected upon the pillars of reason, truth, and natural 
justice that support England. The revolutionary “wants to overthrow the 
existing order which exists and which may be the only order capable of exist-
ing. But he risks the annihilation of all order only because he believes he can 
evade that disaster and can substitute for an existing order another which 
he believes to be superior” (113). Repeating the root “exist” to the point 
of absurdity desperately (and paradoxically) endeavors to bestow duration 
and permanence upon the state, which the report has already argued relies 
instead upon instantaneity for its origin and persistent interruption and rep-
etition for its conservation.
The other ways the report denies the abyssal foundation of English au-
thority it exposes indicate that West responds to blackout and war’s threats 
not only to the endurance but also the legitimacy of Britain’s rule over a 
large swath of the world. West delegitimizes colonies’ increasingly strident 
and powerful claims to self-rule by identifying anticolonial agitation with 
revolution rather than autonomy or nation building and by defi ning post-
revolutionary states—and, by extension, future post-colonial states—as the 
product of unconscious, compulsive repetitions of violence. She maintains 
that English law repeatedly but consciously alters itself and, in doing so, fo-
ments historical change, whereas states “touched by” revolution lack rational 
necessity and testify to a death drive in European history:
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Perhaps the revolutionary is not really treating order as an end in itself but 
is using it as the means to an end. Perhaps he is really preoccupied with the 
establishment of a balance of forces within the sphere of his being: that bal-
ance which alone can restore nothingness to a world so obstinately created, so 
irretrievably stuffed with things. . . . In revolution there is a vast explosion of the 
creative powers, and nothing is created; nothing is even altered. So the appetite 
for death that is in us all is immensely gratifi ed.
(113)
Revolution in France and Russia initiates the blind, compulsive reenactment 
of the political violence/legitimate authority of a previous order, for “when 
the dust settled, France was ruled by a self-crowned emperor who wielded 
power more absolute than any French king had ever been given by the 
priests that crowned him,” and Russia “slowly reconstituted the Tsardom it 
destroyed, identical in spirit, and reinforced in matter” (113–114). Revolu-
tions not only repeat the orders they overthrow, but each other. Among the 
French, Russian, and “Nazi revolutions” the main difference is “the expen-
diture of blood” (114). Fearing “violence able to justify, legitimate . . . or 
to present itself as having a right to law,”69 West suggests that anticolonial 
insurgency is the most recent manifestation of this death drive. Although 
she grants “the severance of England and Ireland as an historical necessity” 
and concedes that the counterinsurgency was of such violence that “even 
those who thought that England should not have relinquished Ireland were 
ashamed at this reminder of the impudicity of the conqueror’s sword”(17), 
she portrays Irish anticolonialism as criminal, not entirely conscious, or 
even sane, thus without right to law: “the furtive slouching of a peasantry 
distracted with poverty and revolutionary fever” (16).
As the oscillating and contradictory depictions of English law and au-
thority convey, however, the report is divided on the subject of imperial 
legitimacy. A writer ambivalent toward her own Irish ancestry,70 West de-
livers her strongest and most disruptive claims about the violence inhabit-
ing English authority when she diagnoses the root cause of Joyce’s treason: 
British imperialism. West translates Joyce’s trauma into the narrative of the 
alienated colonized intellectual. Like so many other historical cases, decolo-
nization of the Irish state does not amount to decolonization of the heart 
and mind. Colonization persists as a wound well after Ireland gains home 
rule and Joyce commits his crimes against Britain. Raised as a loyalist by 
his father while Ireland was under British rule, both men, father and son, 
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turned against “their own kind and worked with the alien oppressor” and 
were “passionately sincere” (16) in this. As a teenager Joyce fought with the 
counterinsurgency Black and Tans, professing not mere loyalty to but even 
love for England, and “it was this love, slanting across time, which made 
him a Fascist” (18). England betrayed Joyce by granting Ireland indepen-
dence, and “this meant an actual, material betrayal. The family had to leave 
Ireland. . . . William Joyce found himself exiled from his real motherland, 
Ireland, which his blood must have loved, and confi ned in England, for love 
of which he had betrayed Ireland, and which showed no gratitude for that 
sacrifi ce” (18–19). As in the cases of the Russian and French revolutionar-
ies, so too in the case of the Nazi revolutionary Joyce does the law fail to 
alter itself while repeating the violence of the (colonial) past; “inexorably 
the law that to him hath it shall be given would have come into operation 
again” (112). This law determines his “completely unnecessary death” at 
the hands of the British state, which results from the desire to identify with 
the colonizer, “his own and his father’s lifelong determination to lie about 
their nationality” (28), to claim British citizenship. But it also results from 
the love of Ireland programmed into his blood, which makes Joyce hate the 
colonizer. West elucidates that the divided self created by colonialism causes 
his treason when she considers Joyce’s reaction to the traitor John Amery, 
another propagandist during the war who was an English citizen by birth:
When Amery was tried for high treason there were eight counts against him in 
the indictment. In Joyce’s indictment against Amery there were four. First, Amery 
was an Englishman, and the confl ict between England and Ireland had never quite 
resolved itself in Joyce’s mind. He adored the English, he had fought for them as 
a boy, or had at least performed some services which he thought of as fi ghting for 
them, and he genuinely believed that as a Fascist he was laboring to confer benefi ts 
on England. All the same it was to England that he had come as a boy and had 
been sniggered at as a queer little bog-trotter with a brogue, it was in England that 
he had been denied the power and position which he felt to be his right by virtue 
of his intellect; and ancient hatreds, however much they be adulterated, often re-
turn under stress to their fi rst purity. When William Joyce cursed the raiders who 
were bombing Berlin, he cursed them as an Irishman cursing the English.
(139)
The return of the repressed “ancient hatreds” ultimately leads to the event 
that launches the trial report, the penetration of the English people. Like a 
boomerang, the force that returns to generate World War II trauma, there-
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fore, is British imperialism, the source of crimes by the revolutionary—“the 
sublime example of this extreme type” (115).
By inserting Joyce’s case into a narrative of imperial history, West de-
picts treason’s assaults on English national integrity as the manifestation 
of Britain’s death drive, imperialism’s boomerang effect. Joyce’s crime was 
not a rupture, this argument states, but prepared for by the long history of 
British control over social, political, and economic forces. In making this 
argument, West mobilizes narrative critically, illustrating the importance of 
story making not for clinical healing of individual trauma but for a postcolo-
nial politics of historical memory. Trauma studies has long focused on how 
traumatic events resist discourse, and narrative in particular, while debat-
ing the politics of representing the unrepresentable. While some, perhaps 
most famously Theodor Adorno, argue that certain aesthetic modes cannot 
do justice to the traumatic event in its alterity because they give meaning 
to what evades meaning, make it consumable, and too neatly clear up the 
past,71 others have emphasized the importance of narrativizing what denies 
sequential logic and sequencing and thus of breaking protocols of veridi-
cality.72 West breaks documentary protocol when she fabulates a narrative 
of trauma induced by imperialism—Joyce never testifi ed that he suffered 
the wounds of the colonized intellectual and that this is what drove him to 
deliver Nazi propaganda during the war. This constructed psychobiography 
offers a counternarrative of British history that never appears in the court. 
Though it is not strictly “correct” or historically verifi able, it puts the state 
on trial.
But once the juridical unconscious returns in the form of West’s state-
ment that British imperialism developed the revolutionary whose voice 
makes it impossible to envision nation and empire as integrated wholes, it is 
buried again. Not only does West abandon the narrative of colonial trauma 
she invents; she also revives another narrative in order to refuse Joyce entry 
into it. Unable to secure the state from the boomerang effects of imperial-
ism and the blindness of English law, both of which facilitate Joyce’s crimes, 
she attempts to secure the nation by employing a narrative whose aim is to 
produce the citizen-subject while projecting the nation as the “highest and 
most natural form of human sociality”—that of Bildung.
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Failed Bildung: Mimicry, Physiognomy, and Resistance
Whereas The Return of the Soldier challenged the continuity of the narrative 
of loss in World War I to reveal the imperial ideology of traumatic rupture, 
The Meaning of Treason institutes a narrative defi ned by continuity and har-
nessed by imperial ideology to stage as rupture the colonial subject’s treason 
during World War II. The revolutionary’s story is that of failed Bildung. As 
Joseph Slaughter explains, the Bildung narrative is both antirevolutionary 
and reformist, and, by formally emphasizing the values of continuity and 
development, has been used to justify colonialism as civilizing mission.73 
The narrative through which man is turned into “man,” Bildung’s “historical 
social work was to patriate the once-politically marginal bourgeois subject as 
national citizen.” In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, “the Bildungs-
roman’s progress narrative represents a German cultural nationalist coun-
ternarrative to the violent eruptions of the modern French nation-state,”74 
and to achieve its ends, the narrative uses a grammar of “amplifi cation and 
expansion rather than . . . substitution.”75 This form is reactivated in cultural 
practices and throughout literary history and often in response to distur-
bances of the stability of the nation-state. “The Revolutionary” deploys the 
Bildung narrative to show how Joyce resists it, but in doing so, it disrupts 
its own formal continuity, its staging of amplifi cation and expansion. The 
report shifts from fl eshing out a story behind Joyce’s acts to foreclosing it. 
This shift transforms Joyce into a scarred mimic who in turn scars the re-
port’s coherence.
Whenever “The Revolutionary” probes the origins of Joyce’s treason, it 
modulates from specifi city to abstraction and transposes from what Roman 
Jakobson calls the associative, metonymic pole of language—a move, how-
ever minor, toward narrative expansion—to the redundancy of the meta-
phoric pole of substitution. Metaphor and metonymy designate expressive 
modes here; tendency toward positional similarity and replacement or tau-
tology defi nes the fi rst, and semantic contiguity, expansion, and combina-
tion, the second.76 West continually replaces referents, concepts, and events 
that plot treason within a historical trajectory with metaphors that substi-
tute the tautology of mystery for narrative causality. She claims, for instance, 
that the trial centers on the “fantastic and ironical story of a family who, 
for obscure reasons springing from one convulsion of history, engaged in 
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disingenuous conduct which, long after, brought their dearest member a 
peculiarly nonsensical doom in another convulsion of history” (8). “Con-
vulsions of history” obscures the reenactment of colonial trauma in Ireland 
in England during World War II. Citing “obscure reasons” for the Joyces’ 
behavior masks what West narrativized as a typical effect of colonial subject 
formation. A “peculiarly non-sensical doom” pretends the British state did 
not shape Joyce’s life and death, fi rst through colonization and then through 
the death penalty. And a “fantastic and ironical story” disguises that many 
other Irish concealed their nationality and fought on the English side, some 
for monetary reward, but “many were people who honestly loved law and 
order and preferred the smart uniforms and the soldierly bearing of the 
English garrisons and the Royal Irish Constabulary” (16). This tautology of 
mystery manifests again when West asks why this American by birth mas-
queraded as British and regrets that “in the third trial, as in the fi rst and the 
second, that question was never answered” (43), insisting “this mysterious 
imposture, and this alone, brought Joyce to the gallows” (43). Legal nar-
ratives fail to explain anything: “The arguments of his counsel could not 
disguise the ineluctable process” (43).
“The Revolutionary” asserts that treason is the effect of inexplicable 
physical abnormalities and idiosyncrasies—that Joyce’s body is metaphor, 
resistance to narrative. West transfers onto Joyce the traumatic effects of 
limited vision that Joyce infl icts on England and English law, when frag-
mented prose “explains” treason through tautology and redundant meta-
phors: “there was at some point a partial blackness, as if a perforated ear 
drum or a detached retina, and the consequence was barbarity. This was 
apparent even when the unscarred side of his face revealed his humor and 
acuteness, to a degree that was remarkable” (41). The fi rst sentence not only 
refuses to narrativize treason as effect with historical cause but, by expel-
ling the grammatical subject as passive recipient of the wounds, it even re-
fuses to complete the narrative of treason as physical trauma. The passage 
confuses the physical and historicopolitical, and Joyce’s body becomes at 
once unreadable and immediately readable. Rather than a metonym that 
points elsewhere, to a colonial past, Joyce’s “wound” refers back to itself as 
absolute resistance, legible as illegibility. The abstract phrase “partial black-
ness” denotes a psychic condition that invites narrative expansion, which a 
simile appears to provide through concrete referents. Instead of explaining 
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the abstract, however, these concrete, physical affl ictions entirely supplant 
it. Mystery substitutes for explanation, redundancy for contiguity. Conse-
quently, the scar on Joyce’s face does not operate as a sign of the political ef-
fect, “barbarity,” but is confl ated with it. Physical ruptures, a “perforated ear 
drum, a detached retina,” transform from fi gural analogies into literal causes 
of treason. Making treason the effect of chance bodily rupture tightens the 
tautological circle that articulates revolutionary violence as blackout, blind-
ness, the fall from culture into nature. In attacking England, Joyce attacks 
“the complex social organization of Western civilization” (115).
By treating his body as that of a scarred mimic, the report forestalls 
Joyce’s insertion into the Bildung narrative and thereby recodes England 
from a territorial state vulnerable to boomerang effects of imperialism in-
carnated in the intimate enemy it hosts into a cultural formation secured 
from the colonial outsider within. Although Joyce was an American citizen, 
he testifi es that “we were generally treated as British subjects . . . we were 
always treated as British during the period of my stay in England whether 
we were or not” (11). The state issued him a passport, enabling him to travel 
to Germany and broadcast propaganda, but also, by providing him an ex-
tensive education, fi rst in the sciences and then the humanities, it allowed 
him to become, in theory, a member of the English nation, a “brother.” 
By insisting that he was incapable of being remade by this English educa-
tion, West consolidates a legacy of philosophical nationalism summarized 
in the Fichtean concept of the separation and subordination of the machine 
state to the living, organic nation, whose development relies on education 
as acculturation.77 By casting Joyce as a desiring but aberrant subject of the 
Bildung narrative of development, whose end is the civilized, or civicized, 
individual,78 West corrects for the laws that enable Joyce to pass as En-
glish and turns England into a national culture secured from a revolution-
ary death drive. As Pheng Cheah writes when glossing Fichte’s nationalism, 
“when the nation’s physical borders have been penetrated, it must preserve 
its invisible spiritual borders to avoid total destruction. The alien power 
may have overcome political borders, but as long as the cultural borders re-
main, the seeds of resistance are preserved.”79 To preserve resistance, West 
devises a discursive strategy in which the colonized becomes “the effect of a 
fl awed colonial mimesis, in which to be Anglicized is emphatically not to be 
English.”80
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Here, as throughout literary and cultural histories of colonial representa-
tion, the civilizing education of a colonial subject does not create an English 
person but a farcical double, a buffoon. “Passionately he longed to enjoy 
certain things which are the fruits of a highly developed civilization” (41), 
but Joyce’s extensive education fails to surmount his shortcomings. “It had 
not mattered . . . how he cancelled the disadvantages of pygmyhood by cour-
age and learning. . . . There was something there which would have been 
a bar between him and advancement, whatever he made of himself” (41). 
This mysterious “bar,” the “illiterate quality never dispelled by his Univer-
sity education” (181), emerges throughout the text. Joyce shifts from almost 
part of the English family, “as if he had been a husband or a brother” (3, my 
emphasis), to radically other. This radical alterity is fi gured, for example, 
through West’s invocation of the shibboleth, evidence of a physical resis-
tance to acculturation, as well as buffoonery. The shibboleth leads to his 
arrest in Germany, for “he among men spoke with the blended voices of 
Tamerlane and Punchinello, and . . . whatever he said he also said ‘I am Wil-
liam Joyce’ ” (178). Soldiers jeer him, “crying out, ‘This is Jairmany calling.’ 
This must have been the fi rst intimation to him that he was considered by 
the British public as a comic character” (178), hence his farcical title Lord 
Haw Haw. By mocking his voice, however, West contradicts her claims that 
it allows him to pass as English and that it was dangerous and tempting 
rather than comical.81
Staging Joyce as mimic disrupts the report by generating not only contra-
dictions, tautologies, and redundancies but also a residual “scientifi c” sys-
tem whose premises confl ict with ideals espoused and practiced in West’s 
other writings. The act of subjecting the colonized to a civilizing mission 
that refuses them Englishness is often menaced, Homi Bhabha writes, by 
the colonized’s “displacing gaze” on the level of form. This displacing gaze 
inspires “pseudo-scientifi c theories . . . spurious authorities, and classifi ca-
tions” that constitute a “desperate effort to ‘normalize’ formally the distur-
bance of a discourse of splitting that violates the rational, enlightened claims 
of its enunciatory modality.”82 If the mission of the Bildung narrative is to 
repair the divide between citizen and subject, West revives a pseudoscience 
to prove that this divide cannot be repaired in Joyce’s case, that he could 
never be (English) citizen, only (colonial) subject. His stunted development, 
“infancy”(115) and “adolescence” (82), is realized through a rehashed Vic-
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torian criminal anthropology and its taxonomy of social types, which charts 
Joyce’s transition from mimicry, “a difference that is almost nothing but not 
quite—to menace—a difference that is almost total but not quite.”83
High modernists employ ethnology to produce more ethical cross-
 cultural encounters, and late modernists employ it to imagine Englishness 
on shared cultural values rather than race.84 Yet West does neither. In an 
effort to restore national integrity by denying colonials culture, her deploy-
ment of ethnology in fact menaces her own modernist theories and practices. 
West departs from the principles of character and subject formation that ap-
pear in her most extended work of literary criticism, The Strange Necessity, 
published in 1928. Like Woolf in “Modern Fiction,” West criticizes the 
Edwardians Galsworthy, Bennett, and Wells for focusing, in Woolf ’s words, 
on the “body” more than the “spirit.” West contends that Wells reduces 
the variegations of characters’ thoughtworlds by “fl at statement” of innate 
traits. In Lord Raingo, he “gives no explanation of the girl’s cruel desertion 
of her old lover for death except an innate melancholic taint, acted upon by 
the appearance in the casualty list of a former lover.”85 Suggesting that these 
traits are not legible on the body, she also implies that a character cannot be 
reduced to a social type based on physical appearance. “Never once,” West 
chides, “does he invent the phrase, the speech, the incident that would be 
the right hieroglyphic to stamp on our minds forever the conviction that 
this creature, though young and beautiful and passionate enough to make an 
aging man feel that his age was an adjustable defect like something a little 
wrong with the eyesight, had nevertheless looked on the waters of life and 
seen them dark.”86 Attention to the outwardly visible, the physical, elides the 
complexities of Lord Raingo’s mental theater, too. Although “the physical 
circumstances of his death are magnifi cently described,” physical appear-
ance cannot on its own tell us what occurs within; “the obvious poignancy of 
his mental situation, the despair which must have crept over the old man . . . 
is simply not stated.”87 Compare these articulations of (literary) character 
that emphasize the discrepancy between exterior features and interior world 
to what serves as her theory of (historical) character in the trial report.
Men who are perfect specimens of a type feel pleasure in their representative 
perfection, even though the type itself is not happy. . . . A work of art gives 
satisfaction to the artist and the spectator because it analyzes an experience 
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and synthesizes its fi ndings into a new form that makes people eager for fresh 
experience. It is natural enough that something of the same sort of satisfaction 
should be enjoyed by a human being whose character lies limned before the eye 
with the particularity of an anatomical drawing, so that it can be comprehended 
as never before, and judged.
(187–188)
The model of character representation, “an anatomical drawing,” describes 
the representational system that makes Irish subjects objects of comprehen-
sion and judgment in this work. “The Revolutionary” details Joyce’s stalled 
development not merely “with the particularity of anatomical drawings” but 
actually through a form of anatomical drawing: physiognomy.
West draws from the imaginary of physiognomy—an ethnology that, 
more than others, obtains energy from visual analysis—to racialize Irish 
subjects and make English culture and civility unavailable to them. Physiog-
nomy taxonomizes social types based on the premise that physical features 
mirror innate traits, make visible the invisible. Deployed during the nine-
teenth century to identify criminal types, it also classifi ed Irish and English 
into separate and unequal races.88 Among these Victorian ethnologists who 
helped transform popular understandings of race was John Beddoe, a found-
ing member of the Ethnological Society and president of the Anthropologi-
cal Institute. Through his “Index of Nigrescence,” Beddoe used “science” 
to contrast the lighter-skinned upper classes and darker lower and working 
classes of the British Isles, positing an “Africanoid” Celt, a “Celtic Caliban.” 
Physiognomy was later discredited, and this image recedes by the 1920s, but 
it reemerged in English popular media such as Punch at moments of Irish 
anticolonial revolt. The Celtic Caliban does not appear in its exactitude, but 
its lineaments are visible in descriptions of Joyce and other Irish “revolu-
tionaries,” or British fascists.
Men of violent and unhappy appearance, with a look of animal shyness and 
ferocity, and, in some cases, a measure of animal beauty, they were for the most 
part darker in complexion than one would expect in subscribers to the Aryan 
theory. One especially, looked like a true gipsy. Most of them had an Irish cast 
of feature, and some bore Irish names. It must be remembered that these men 
were not followers of Sir Oswald Mosely, who picked a more varied and more 
cheerfully brutal type. Joyce had seceded from Mosely’s movement some years 
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before the war and started his own. This was his private army, part of his indi-
vidual hell.
(8)
Shifting between desire for (“animal beauty”) and fear of (“animal shyness 
and ferocity”) the other, this passage expresses the ethnological vision of 
the Irish as closer to ape than human and more negroid than Caucasian. 
More important than whether it presents the Irish precisely as Beddoe de-
scribes, however, is that it enacts a residual epistemic that ossifi es the Irish 
into an immediately legible “type” based on “cast of feature” and denies 
what West articulates in The Strange Necessity: the gap between outward ap-
pearance and inner worlds. To be guided by this epistemic is to refuse the 
possibility of development on the grounds of perceived physicality. Indeed, 
“the net effect of Victorian ethnology . . . was to undermine the environ-
mentalist view that Englishman and Irishmen were fundamentally alike and 
equally educable.”
That this physiognomic discourse is a response to blackout and constitutes 
an effort to the defend the English nation from colonial masquerade during 
war and imperial decline seems clear when one compares “The Revolution-
ary” with West’s other reports on trials where issues of race are at the center, 
but not Englishness or Irishness. Consider, for example, the report on the 
1947 trial in which white taxi drivers stood accused of lynching the African 
American Willie Earl in Greenville, South Carolina. Although West refers 
to the defendants as a “type,” it is a professional type (a more specifi c marker 
than class). West does not racialize or nationalize their character and asserts 
that environmental factors played a part in their crime.89 She condemns the 
racist attitudes of white attorneys.90 Signifi cantly, however, when she attacks 
the argument that racial struggles do not exist outside the United States by 
citing European and British cases, she refers to Germany and South Africa. 
She only mentions England in order to analogize intra-U.S. relations, and 
she does so, ironically, by emphasizing England’s difference from Ireland. 
By proposing that the gap between the northern and southern United States 
“was a breach as divides England and Ireland,”91 West insinuates a racial 
character to this latter by analogizing it to the U.S. North and South. In the 
Nuremberg trial reports, West does not racialize German fascists by treat-
ing them as animals, as she does the Irish fascists in “The Revolutionary.” 
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She depicts them as humans, a status they of course denied their victims 
based on their alleged racial compositions.
In both the Nuremburg reports and “The Revolutionary,” criticism of 
anti-Semitism might occasionally function as a foil for colonial racism in-
forming depictions of the Irish. In the former, West recalls an encounter 
with a German woman—critical of the Nazis—who mistakes the British 
chief prosecutor for a Jew because she “has seen him” and because his name 
is “David.”92 West and her companions correct her, noting that Scots can 
physically resemble Jews and that David is a common name in Britain. “Oh, 
you English are so simple; it is because you are aristocrats. A man who called 
his son David might tell you that he was English, or Scottish, or Welsh, 
because he would know that you would believe him,” the woman replies. 
“But we Germans understand a little better about such things, and he would 
not dare to pretend to us that he was not a Jew.”93 West’s choice to present 
this reply without comment proves the woman’s point. The English would 
not make judgments about race based on sight and name; only the Germans 
would. Highlighting Joyce’s anti-Jewishness in “The Revolutionary” serves 
a similar self-exonerating purpose. West recalls a broadcast “of the famil-
iar and ill-advised type” she implies is authored by Joyce: “ ‘Next time you 
travel by train or bus and one of your companions is obviously a Jew, I want 
you to observe his actions. You can hardly mistake their dominant char-
acteristics—their coarse, greasy hair, their greasy foreheads, their negroid 
lips—but their actions betray their race more than their appearance’ ” (131). 
Joyce’s deployment of the physiognomic in his Nazi propaganda distracts 
from West’s deployment of it throughout the report.
The discourse meant to establish Joyce’s mimicry repeatedly menaces the 
report’s coherence, however. These textual disturbances challenge the va-
lidity of the epistemological system on which the denial of Joyce’s access to 
acculturation rests. Commenting again on his “resistance” to the narrative 
of development, West muses,
it also appeared that Joyce’s body had the same resistance to culture as his mind. 
He was a graduate with honours of London University, but there was a quality 
about all his sayings and doings which suggested illiteracy; he was good rider, he 
swam and dived to Polytechnic Standard, he had tried hard as a featherweight 
boxer, he fenced, but his body looked as if he had been a poor child without 
exercise.
(48)
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This passage struggles, and fails, to create a seamless parallel between the 
body and soul of the desiring subject fl ung back from English accultura-
tion. The semicolon after illiteracy suggests that West will prove how his 
mind and body, “saying and doings,” resist cultivation, but she proves the 
opposite by cataloguing how he cultivates himself as an effective athlete. 
The fastening of these examples of athleticism to the fi nal clause, therefore, 
is also a breach in logic as well as a departure from expectations. Because 
she inadvertently illustrates his successful acculturation, physical literacy in 
English sport, she undermines her aim while simultaneously attacking phys-
iognomy’s premises: Outward appearance does not refl ect inner world. The 
look of Joyce’s body does not testify to his resistance to culture but, on the 
contrary, testifi es to the discrepancy between physical appearance and real-
ity. Such logical ruptures undermine the representational system on which 
the report’s protection of English national integrity relies.
Yet faced again with the specter of violence inhabiting English law—and 
this time legal violence in its most naked form, the death penalty—West 
fi nally does allow Joyce to succeed in the narrative of development, if only 
for a moment. Crafting a narrative of rehabilitation, West has the trials tame 
Joyce’s Irish “animal ferocity” and make him into a man. The cost of orches-
trating this rehabilitation narrative is that Joyce becomes an English citizen 
rather than a colonial mimic. The gain is that the apotheosis of English 
state violence can be converted into the climactic victory of legal reform, 
or Bildung.
The Rehabilitation of William Joyce
West’s presentation of the trials creates a narrative arc, a story with a plot, 
protagonist, confl ict, and resolution, elucidating further affi nities among ar-
tistic and legal practices. West does not simply impose literary conventions 
onto law, though, for law relies on narrative. As Kieran Dolin remarks, dis-
cussing Robert Cover’s contributions to the study of law and literature, trials 
are “contests over narrative, not just at a surface level of evidence presented 
and contradicted, but at a deeper level of established versus alternative social 
visions.”94 The Joyce trials rehearse the contest between a social vision of 
English law as the triumph of a civilizing mission and an alternative vision 
of English law as a form of retributive violence. Extracting from the piece-
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meal and interrupted trials a connected story, the report, like law, marshals 
“formulas . . . to impose form and rule on stories,”95 fi nessing the violence of 
both Joyce and the English state.96
The narrative of law’s rehabilitation of a “demonic” Irish soul is a story of 
the trials’ illumination of darkness and its restoration of physical and spiritual 
fulsomeness. The legal process makes Joyce’s trauma visible as physical af-
fl iction rather than historical phenomenon, for “whoever followed William 
Joyce from the Old Bailey to the Law Courts found themselves thinking of 
him no longer as base and shabby, but as damaged and deformed” (41), and 
then ministers to the wound. “Time had acted on him during the trials . . . 
strongly. . . . At the Old Bailey he had seemed meanly and repulsively ugly. 
At the Law Courts, where he appeared before the Court of Appeal he was not 
so . . . the alteration in effect was in part due to a considerable improvement 
in his health” (40). The law cares for and transforms not only biological life 
but mental and spiritual life. It acculturates the revolutionary: “Here at the 
house of Lords he had endured a further change. . . . He still followed the 
legal argument with a bright eye. But the long contemplation of death had 
given him a dignity and refi nement that he had lacked before” (42). Though 
Joyce’s crime originates—mysteriously—in a moment of “disaster, when a 
demon entered” into him and he said “yes” instead of “no” (185), after the 
fi rst trials, “he changed to the man we saw at his later trials, who seemed no 
longer to trouble himself about his demon’s unfortunate reply, but to ponder 
on an answer he must shortly make to another question” (185). Stimulating 
in Joyce a “process of enlightenment” (43), the trials theatricalize English 
law’s rationalism and continuity, embodied, for example, in the Lord Chan-
cellor, “the symbol of the continuing rule of law” (51).
The rehabilitation narrative also relieves anxieties about the growing le-
gitimacy of anti-imperial movements around the world. Fearing that the 
courtroom might erupt in violence by imperial subjects, West turns it into 
a forum in which British civil and civic structures are honored and desired. 
Among the trials’ spectators were many “Negroes and Hindus,” and “noth-
ing seemed more unhappily clear than that these must be discontented 
members of the British empire’s subject races, sympathetically attending the 
trial of a fellow-rebel” (33). By “eavesdropping” (33), however, West gathers 
with relief that no sympathy for Joyce exists among them. The trial’s draw is 
not that it offers an occasion for alliance against the imperial power but that 
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it offers instead an appreciation for its institutions. These Africans and In-
dians “belonged to that large class of person, to be found in all races, which 
delights in the technicalities of Western Law for their own sake, and would 
exchange a native dance or the Taj Mahal any day for a good tort” (34). And 
rather than serving as a rallying point for a worldwide anticolonial insur-
gency, Joyce fragments and divides it. The trials are a theater for colonial 
masochism and sadism, for “subjected races” to dramatize the enjoyment of 
their own and others’ oppression: “they were interested in Joyce only as a 
golfer might be in a ball that has taken up an unusual position in the rough” 
(34). Shattering any “fellowship” among the “rebels,” this remark pits co-
lonial subjects against each other as one becomes the plaything the other 
strikes for sport while the colonizing power referees.
By rehabilitating Joyce’s body and soul, however, the courts destroy the 
“bar” that prevents the civilizing and civicizing narrative from accomplish-
ing its work, turning Joyce into an English person. To resolve this intolerable 
situation, West ensures that Joyce’s transcending of that bar coincides with 
his death, which allows her to recode the death penalty as nonviolent, just, 
and legitimate simultaneously. West disputes the popular and professional 
sentiment that prevailed at the time, now widely accepted, that the Joyce 
trials were a miscarriage of justice and the death sentence an excessive use 
of force. Among laity and legal professionals alike, the trials were accused 
of marshalling state power as a form of vengeance. In his report for the No-
table British Trials Series, the law reporter J. W. Hall criticized the prosecu-
tion’s methods and argued that death was not a punishment commensurate 
with Joyce’s crime. Alan Dershowitz also writes that the trial “succumbed to 
the passions of the day” and asserts that it “shows the British legal system 
in far from its best light.”97 West rejects such positions, censuring the “ve-
hemence” of Hall’s preface to the trial and contesting his insinuation that 
the law was operating in “haste and venom.” She also disputes the position 
voiced not only by Hall but many legal professionals that the sentence was 
unjust and motivated by passion and emotion. Recall Menke’s observation 
about discourses of the legitimation of law: “violence—in the relevant sense 
of the term—is not the same as restriction or even violation. Violence is a 
restraint or violation imposed by somebody on somebody against their will. 
But if the legal verdict is justifi ed, it is valid also for the person sentenced, 
and insofar as it is not against her will, it is not violence.”98 West transforms 
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state killing into nonviolence while articulating the execution as the climax 
of the Bildung narrative, the transformation of subject into citizen.
The sentence marks the victory of reform over revolution because it re-
fl ects Joyce’s own desires and is proof of English law’s natural justice, which 
is accessible to the “fi nite mind” through the moral sense. “In the infi nite 
mind there is reconciled justice and injustice. The moral sense of a man is 
clairvoyant: if he chooses to love rather than to hate he shall be right both 
in time and eternity” (184), West maintains. By defi ning treason as a strike 
against “his own fl esh,” the report asserts that the trials have transformed 
Joyce—soul and body—into an English citizen, made him part of the body 
politic. The trials create a moral sense in him, which enables him to see that 
an Englishman turned against himself is unjust: “William Joyce, knowing 
that he had struck against his own fl esh, had written it down that every time 
he had broadcast he had committed treason. He took a short cut to the same 
conclusion reached by the lawyers who knew so much about him that he 
did not” (184). At the moment the report converts Joyce and reveals a death 
drive at work in what is rhetorically constituted as an English citizen, it si-
multaneously articulates English law’s death dealing as nonviolent. Capital 
punishment is not violent or unjust if Joyce’s moral sense makes him agree 
with the court, makes it “valid” for him. Moreover, it cannot be violent if he 
accepts it without coercion, even if not for the right reasons. Dying would 
mean “an end to mediocrity” and resolve the “war between the forces in 
himself which desired to live and those which desired to die” (196). Execu-
tion “was the beginning of such distinction as would ideally be conferred on 
him in a society which believed that a man’s soul was immortal and precious 
to the higher powers. Thus made serene (for all who saw him would concede 
his serenity), he waited his time” (196–197).
The need to assure readers of his serenity by parenthetically invoking 
other witnesses signals West’s struggle to prove that the death sentence is 
both nonviolent and just, however. The social vision of the trial as rehabili-
tation rather than retribution is punctured when blackout again reveals the 
sentence as a form of legal violence discontinuous with reason and natural 
justice. Efforts to distinguish the English distribution of justice from vio-
lence and limited sight strain under the language of abyss, repression, and 
mystery. West criticizes the logic of calculation or measurement of guilt 
and punishment in Hall’s claim that Joyce should not have been hanged be-
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cause the sentence was not commensurate with the crime. In doing so, how-
ever, she admits that one can never verify if the (death) penalty is just: “The 
mind seeking justice envies such measurement, but must content itself with 
erecting on the edge of an abyss signboards crudely warning of disaster” 
(61). “Abyss” refers both to the beyond of legal knowledge as well as Joyce’s 
crime, which exceeds law’s ability to justly measure and which execution can 
only “crudely signpost.” West also defends the punishment by maintaining 
that a double repression shapes criticism of the death penalty, but at the 
same time, she admits without admitting that law is violent and that law’s 
relation to justice remains inaccessible to vision and reason.
Like the journalists, like the public, [the lawyers] felt distaste for any attempt of 
the law to lay hands on Joyce which proceeded from the emotions and did not 
consult the intellect until it was asked to furnish an explanation for its own ve-
hemence. They felt it more sharply and personally, because it was their mystery 
which being profaned: and as they, as all of us, are forced sometimes to doubt 
whether the mystery of the law is not itself a profanity, since we live in the New 
Testament world, and justice has been blown upon by mercy. This reluctance 
has forgotten its cause, since we are no longer Christian. Hence, it remains as 
an arbitrary awkwardness about infl icting punishment, which is the more pas-
sionate by reason of its puzzled ignorance of its origin, and which reverts to the 
fi ery prejudices of the Old Testament without regaining the caution which is 
characteristically patriarchal. One cannot live to be a patriarch without being 
careful as well as violent.
(58, my emphasis)
This passage relates, without ever directly stating, that law was originally 
violent and that Joyce’s sentence is a repetition of violence. Diversionary 
tactics displace legal violence onto critics of legal violence. The report man-
ages the abyss it generates between law and justice and violence and mercy 
through chiasma in order to achieve rhetorically a symmetry between logi-
cally asymmetrical terms. Lawyers criticize the passion of Old Testament 
violence in the name of mercy; mercy is justifi ed by recourse to the passion 
of Old Testament violence. Law profanes the mystery of justice; the mystery 
of justice profanes law. These neat reversals distract from the discrepan-
cies dividing each term in the set: the difference between the instrumental 
violence of “passionate” and “fi ery” criticism of the death sentence and the 
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performative violence of a death sentence—words that actually kill—and 
the difference between the profanation of law’s mystery and the profana-
tion of justice’s mystery by law. The second chiasmus obscures that the term 
“profane” bears two separate meanings in usages here. The lawyers fear that 
the law (“their mystery”) will be desecrated by violence, but “the mystery of 
the law” is a profanity because it is a curse. West implies it is a curse because 
its relation to justice is inaccessible to knowledge and cannot be grounded 
in reason. The justice of legal punishments, repetitions of divine violence, 
cannot be verifi ed, remain a “cautious” mystery. Justice is incalculable.
The trials’ civilizing and civicizing of Joyce enables West to have it both 
ways. The legal institutions accomplish the reform that colonial trauma pre-
vented (and caused), but at the moment this is accomplished, Joyce has to 
die. He is only a good English citizen insofar as he is a dead one. Through 
narrative and ethnography, the report tries to establish a legally and cultur-
ally stable English community and identity in the wake of communism and 
fascism’s rise on the one hand and the imminent end of empire on the other. 
Attesting to individual and collective historicopolitical crises with colonial-
ism at their root, The Meaning of Treason marks a continuity and a break with 
The Return of the Soldier. The novel contends that the narrative of an insular, 
idyllic English nation and Pax Britannica relies upon the interment of struc-
tural violence, the uneven social and economic formations within England 
and abroad generated by colonialism and capitalism. The trial report at-
tempts to establish an insular, organic nation by suppressing colonial and 
state violence through a vindication of English law. In the next chapter, we 
shift focus to Jamaican authors who confront colonial trauma from within 
the colony rather than metropole. In their own ways, they, too, endeavor to 
vindicate English law.
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t h r e e
Vindicating the Law
H. G. de Lisser, V. S. Reid, and the Morant Bay Rebellion
The previous chapters examined how efforts to bear witness to historical 
traumas, events in which the nation and empire are threatened by revolt 
and state violence, shaped the formal strategies of British modernist writ-
ing. To glean a fuller sense of how twentieth-century Anglophone literature 
responds to crises in collective memory when the status of a nation and 
empire, and the laws that secure them, are particularly unstable, I shift focus 
now from works written from the metropole to writings produced from 
within the colonies during colonial and postcolonial periods. In the second 
half of this book, we will see how the staging of testimony to such crises by 
authors who were not part of the great waves of postwar and postcolonial mi-
gration manifests the diffi culties of managing the often confl icting demands 
of national and transnational forces. These works also invite us to reassess 
divisions between categories that govern contemporary literary study. In 
this chapter, those categories are national literature and world literature, in 
the next chapter, modernism and postcolonial literature.
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This chapter functions as a transition between the preceding chapters, 
centered on works written before and immediately after the Second World 
War, and the fi nal chapter, which will address a text composed in the recent 
aftermath of postcolonial independence in Kenya. Here, I consider three 
writings that span the period of anticolonial nationalism in Jamaica: H. G. 
de Lisser’s 1919 historical romance Revenge: A Tale of Old Jamaica; V. S. 
Reid’s 1949 epic novel New Day; and, fi nally, Reid’s 1960 young-adult no-
vella Sixty-Five, published two years before Jamaican independence. Each 
one presents a version of the Morant Bay rebellion, an event in imperial 
modernity still largely overlooked in literary criticism.1
By analyzing these particular works by these particular authors, I respond 
to Paul Gilroy’s request to investigate this key historical moment in black 
Atlantic history, but I do so with aims and a method distinct from the ap-
proaches initiated by Gilroy. In his groundbreaking and fi eld-generating 
book, Gilroy argued that “the specifi city of the modern political and cul-
tural formation I want to call the black Atlantic can be defi ned, on one level, 
through this desire to transcend both the structures of the nation-state and 
the constraints of ethnicity and national particularity. These desires are rel-
evant to understanding political organizing and cultural criticism.”2 Twenty 
years later, these desires drive contemporary literary and cultural criticism. 
Explorations of how fi ction imaginatively transcends the structures of the 
nation-state and the constraints of national and ethnic particularities orga-
nize postcolonial and world literature studies. This work continues to be 
important, but because migration and diaspora narratives have taken center 
stage in critical scholarship, and because mobility and rootlessness have be-
come master tropes for contemporary ontology, literature that does not the-
matize these conditions increasingly eludes our attention. Alison Donnell 
makes this point in her study of twentieth-century Caribbean literature.3 I 
consider two Caribbean writers who were important in their own times but 
whose works have fallen out of print, not having triumphed in what Pascale 
Casanova calls the “world republic of letters.”4 These novels are set within 
the space of the colony. I focus on them because, like Donnell, I want to 
“draw attention back to the local and the dweller as fi gures worthy of intel-
lectual attention.”5 I also want to question critical models that oppose world 
literature to national literature.
I acknowledge that “the kinds of transcultural and intercultural work that 
Gilroy locates as somehow exceeding and even deconstructing the nation 
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can actually be located within the Caribbean nation, city, or even village.”6 
My goal, however, is not only, or even mainly, to show how de Lisser’s text 
and Reid’s responses to it enact a transcendence of national particularities 
through intercultural and transcultural work. It is, instead, to demonstrate 
how the Morant Bay rebellion and the legal controversy that followed it 
determined for both the antinationalist de Lisser and the cultural national-
ist Reid that the intercultural and transcultural history of Jamaica could not 
form the basis of an independent nation-state nor provide suffi cient condi-
tions by which to work through colonial trauma. For de Lisser to argue 
against national independence and for Reid to argue for it, each must vindi-
cate English law.
The details of the rebellion are by now well established.7 On October 16, 
1865, several hundred Jamaican men and women, mostly black, entered the 
town of Morant Bay. They were led by Paul Bogle, a native Baptist minister. 
Bogle made clear that he was not rebelling against the Queen, to whom he 
even appealed to help Jamaicans resist the inequities and injustices produced 
by the colonial government. The rebels targeted the Morant Bay courthouse 
and the vestry. They were protesting unfair wages, decisions regarding land 
distribution, and among their grievances also listed the expulsion from the 
vestry of another of their leaders, the minister and politician George Wil-
liam Gordon. At Morant Bay, eighteen offi cials and members of the militia 
were killed and thirty-one were wounded, and seven members of the crowd 
were killed. The rebellion then spread throughout the parish of St. Thomas 
in the East. Thomas Holt explains that “at its peak, the rebellion involved 
an estimated fi fteen hundred to two thousand people, men and women, Af-
rican and creole, estate workers and settlers” and that “the rebels’ griev-
ances included proletarian issues such as higher wages and better working 
conditions on the estates along with peasant issues such as lower taxes and 
more land.”8 In response to the uprising, Governor Edward Eyre declared 
martial law, and Jamaica was placed under Crown colony rule until 1944. 
The counterinsurgency was of a length and violence such that it gave rise 
to an enormous controversy in England, which set conservative Victorians 
such as Thomas Carlyle and Charles Dickens against liberals organized as 
the Jamaica Committee, led by Charles Buxton and John Stuart Mill.
On July 7, 1866, the Jamaica Committee made a case for trying Governor 
Eyre before a court of law in England. The committee framed its argument 
in terms of vindication. The word “vindicate” appears numerous times in 
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this brief appeal. To be vindicated, however, are not those Jamaicans who 
suffered multiple and varied acts of torture and killing under Eyre’s au-
thority, or even the colored leader Gordon, who was hanged following a 
court-martial that the English government’s extensive inquiry into events 
in Jamaica through the Jamaica Royal Commission ( JRC) had determined 
broke with procedures under martial law.9 To be vindicated is law itself. 
“When there is reason to believe that a British subject has been illegally 
put to death, or otherwise illegally punished by a person in authority,” the 
Jamaica Committee claims, “it is the duty of the Government to inquire 
into the case; and if it appears that the offence has been committed, to vin-
dicate the law by bringing the offender to public justice.”10 Although “the 
Government declined to take any steps for the vindication of the law,” the 
committee persists, but not because it is motivated “by vindictive feelings.” 
Rather, its goal, “besides upholding the obligation of justice and humanity 
towards all races beneath the Queen’s sway, is to vindicate, by an appeal to 
judicial authority, the great legal and constitutional principles which have 
been violated in the late proceedings, and deserted by the Government.”11 
Upholding justice and the humanity of colonial peoples is presented not 
quite as an afterthought, but certainly not as the central motivation of the 
committee. What has been deserted and abandoned by law are not those 
who suffer its violence but law itself. Law is outside of itself, because English 
law is discontinuous with violence, which has been infl icted in its name, ac-
cording to Mill and the Jamaica Committee. Eyre was charged with murder 
but was never found guilty.12
Neither de Lisser nor Reid would comfortably identify with the philoso-
phies of Mill or the Jamaica Committee, and they certainly would not iden-
tify with each other’s positions on colonial rule. Yet both, I will argue, try to 
vindicate English law in their representations of the rebellion. They do so in 
ways distinct from Mill and from each other. Revenge attacks Mill’s liberal 
principles and supports the ideals espoused by an acolyte of Carlyle, Mill’s 
antagonist during the Governor Eyre controversy. New Day, which Reid 
composes as rebuttal to the racist portrayal of Jamaican history he ascribes 
to de Lisser’s historical romance,13 vindicates law through the performance 
of a dialectical history of liberation whose rhythm and pacing in fact refl ects 
that of historical romance.14 Despite their antithetical positions on colonial 
rule, both authors’ works attempt to vindicate English law by separating 
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it from violence. In both works, too, the formal production of witnessing 
generates unintended effects that create a friction with the strategies of vin-
dication. This friction alerts us that structures of feeling underwriting the 
nation as an autonomous political formation either to be strived toward (in 
Reid’s case) or prevented (in de Lisser’s case) confl ict with the demands of 
transcultural as well as global economic forces that would crosshatch and 
even constitute the nation.15 In de Lisser and Reid’s novels, the effort to vin-
dicate law is the symptom of this confl ict, which stymies the effort.
Catching the Myal Spirit: Revenge and the Temporality of Necessity
Herbert George de Lisser, a brown Jamaican of Portuguese Jewish and Afri-
can ancestry, began his career as a writer for the Jamaica Times in 1898, be-
came editor of the Daily Gleaner in 1904, a position he held until his death in 
1944, and was also an editor of Planter’s Punch. Mervyn Morris named him 
“the fi rst competent Caribbean novelist in English.”16 Many of the twenty-
fi ve novels and novellas he composed beginning in 1913 were made available 
to Jamaicans in the pages of Planter’s Punch and were also published in Eng-
land. de Lisser’s career and racial and class identifi cations shifted drastically 
between the 1890s and 1920s and thereafter. Transforming from a brown-
indentifi ed supporter of the middle classes to a strong supporter of the white 
business elite, de Lisser opposed struggles for economic and social justice by 
the working class, serving as secretary of the Jamaica Imperial Association. 
Leah Reade Rosenberg argues that these personal shifts refl ected the chang-
ing place of Jamaica in the world system.17 In her recent study of nationalism 
and the formation of Caribbean literature, Rosenberg asks, “Why, having 
achieved such infl uence in Jamaican literary production, has de Lisser been 
eclipsed from literary scholarship?”18 Her answer is persuasive: his historical 
romances, which cover events spanning the Spanish Conquest of Jamaica in 
1492 to the labor riots of 1938, do not meet the aesthetic or ideological stan-
dards of later twentieth- and twenty-fi rst-century scholarship. “Insidiously 
and unremittingly antilabor and antiblack,” these works, of which Revenge 
is one, are “derivative of European popular romances and opposed to the 
political empowerment of Jamaica’s black majority . . . the antithesis of a 
liberated poetics.”19 Add to this that de Lisser’s literary output precedes that 
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of the great wave of migrant writers from the Caribbean in the 1950s—the 
reputedly authentic origin of Caribbean literature, as it has become canon-
ized through postcolonial studies20—and it is no surprise de Lisser’s fi ction 
has been forgotten.
Revenge is worth revisiting, however, not only because it engages a legal 
dilemma that returns in different ways throughout the twentieth and twen-
ty-fi rst centuries, but because it is one of very few representations of the 
Morant Bay rebellion in fi ctional prose form. Moreover, it is written by a 
prolifi c author known as one of the “ ‘pioneers’ of ‘authentic Jamaican litera-
ture’ ”21 whose works were enormously popular in the fi rst part of the twen-
tieth century. Revenge thus helped shape how both English and Jamaicans 
understood an event that was the site of transnational legal and cultural con-
testations in imperial modernity. Reid underscores this point by delivering 
not one but two literary counterattacks to challenge de Lisser’s portrayal of 
this historical event. The rebellion was a turning point in Jamaican history 
because it initiated a culture war, an “open war for civilization,”22 a bid to 
control what constitutes culture, which involved white and educated brown 
elite policing (literally and fi guratively) of Afro-Creole religions, rituals, 
and languages. The rebellion also caused a dilemma in British law: how to 
defi ne the concept of necessity so as to judge whether the violence that oc-
curred under emergency and martial law was legitimate. The rebellion and 
the controversy that followed elucidated that legal defi nitions of necessity 
rest upon specifi c cognitions of time. Through its staging of temporality, 
Revenge attempts to solve the legal problem of defi ning necessity; however, 
it also relies upon principles of witnessing shared by cultural systems that 
law is enlisted, both historically and in the text, to control.
Set in the weeks leading up to the rebellion, Revenge emphasizes from its 
fi rst to its fi nal pages that thwarting the insurgency, and thus avoiding the 
brutal counterinsurgency, demands a correct cognition of time. The novel’s 
main characters include the mixed-race Rachael Bogle, the fi ctional daugh-
ter of Paul Bogle; Dick Carlton, a member of the white plantocracy whose 
sympathy with black estate workers and refusal to engage in cross-racial 
sexual dalliances sets him apart from that plantocracy; and Joyce Graham, 
Carlton’s English cousin and fi ancée recently arrived in Jamaica. The plot 
centers on the relationships among these three in the context of growing 
unrest in the colony. The novel is obsessed with marking time, and it chas-
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tises Carlton, its liberal protagonist, for failing to recognize threat in order 
to deter the rebellion—that is, for failing to see how various events in the 
present are urgent signs of future catastrophe. de Lisser contrasts the near-
sightedness of Carlton with the far-aiming scopic drive of a time-obsessed 
Eyre: “Fifty miles away the Governor of the colony was pacing to and fro 
like a caged lion. . . . Now and again he would look out of the window of 
his house in the direction of St. Thomas, as if he would pierce through the 
darkness and see what was happening there,” for “one question obsessed his 
mind. Would the relief he had sent arrive in time? Could it arrive in time?”23 
The novel concludes that liberalist perspectives, or ways of looking, did not 
try hard enough to penetrate darkness of the present to read the future, and 
consequently they are responsible for the violence of both the insurgency 
and counterinsurgency. The passage describing the launching of the coun-
terinsurgency summarizes this point neatly in its formal conduct. By fi lling 
sentence after sentence with minute temporal indices, de Lisser performa-
tively scolds his protagonist while instructing readers about the importance 
of attending to the infi nitesimal intervals that compose time:
Over the sea came the deep roar of a cannon. Starting up Dick saw a steamer 
in the distance heading toward the shore . . . in an instant the beach was alive 
with people all gazing intently at the ship which momently grew nearer. . . . Then 
the vessel was seen to come to a stop in the open roadstead and one, two, three 
boats dropped from her side into the water. . . . The crowd around Dick was 
thinning rapidly; Bogle’s garrison were fl eeing as fast as their limbs would go. 
Straight towards the beach fl ew the boats, each crowded with black soldiers and 
with marines. . . . The fi rst boat grounded, the men leaped ashore, and a young 
lieutenant came hurrying up to where the wounded men were grouped. . . . “Not 
quite too late, I hope?” were his fi rst words; then, glancing at the haggard, blood-
stained men before him he added sadly, “it looks so.”
(85, my emphasis)
The desire to control events through a minute-by-minute narrative of them 
can be read as a response to the crisis of the temporality of necessity that was 
at the center of the arguments of the defenders and accusers of Governor 
Eyre in their respective efforts to vindicate law.
At stake in defi ning necessity on the basis of a particular cognition of 
time was nothing less than protecting English law from charges of illegiti-
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mate violence. The conduct of colonial administration, coupled with the 
proliferation of instances of anticolonial resistance throughout the nine-
teenth and into the twentieth centuries, make this protection increasingly 
diffi cult to achieve. As we saw in our exploration of West’s reports on the 
treason trials, violence is often viewed as external rather than internal to 
law, or as an exceptional aspect of it. In the aftermath of the Morant Bay 
rebellion, Victorian jurists and intellectuals debated whether violence was 
internal or external to law, whether it was justifi ed under martial law and 
emergency. The legal scholar Nasser Hussain explains that “emergency is 
an elastic category, stretching over political disturbances such as riots, the 
situation of sovereign war, and even constitutional crises within the sphere 
of the state,” and he argues that much political theory and constitutional 
jurisprudence mistakenly treat it as an external “third term” between sov-
ereignty and law. History shows, however, that emergency is not external 
or exceptional, but forms “a constitutive relation between modern law and 
sovereignty.”24 Moreover, it is colonialism that challenges the claims of En-
glish jurists that emergency was an exceptional rather than constitutive facet 
of English law. “The nineteenth-century empire, covering India, and later 
Africa and the Middle East, consisted of people who were not slaves but, 
because they seemed utterly incapable of participating in their rule, were 
not quite free subjects either,” Hussain writes. “This empire required a new 
conception of sovereignty, one that was neither despotic nor democratic. 
And for such a historically specifi c reason, it was in this empire that law in 
general, and the problematic of a rule of law and emergency in particular, 
assumed a greater ideological weight.”25 During the Governor Eyre contro-
versy, the question of how to defend the violence that occurred under the 
emergency while portraying martial law as an exception or “third term” was 
answered inadequately. This is because justifi cations for Eyre’s actions were 
based on a category impossible to defi ne rigorously: “necessity,” which, in 
legal terms, is a temporal condition. The rebellion and its suppression raised 
the question: what is the temporality of necessity?
It was the transference of martial law from the metropole to the colonies 
that made clear that the concept of necessity was an irresolvable epistemo-
logical and juridical problem or, rather, a problem that could be solved not 
with logic and constitutional principles of English common law but only 
through colonialist ideologies of uneven racial formation. This, Hussain as-
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serts, was the lesson of the Governor Eyre controversy. The rebellion dem-
onstrated that in the colonies “the legal defi nition of necessity would prove 
more varied and vexing” than in England.26 To justify the use of martial law, 
there must be evidence of a pressing danger, an imminent threat to the se-
curity of the state. Based on the testimonies gathered by the JRC, Eyre had 
extended martial law well after that danger had expired. “What keeps the 
line between very similar acts of violence intact here is a correct cognition 
of necessity,” but “the rhetorical structure of martial law begins to crumble 
the moment one asks for some exactness to the description of ‘pressing dan-
ger,’ ” Hussain explains. This is because “the category ‘necessity’ is itself 
a temporal condition . . . it must be represented as an interruption in the 
otherwise smooth functioning of lawful politics. Only its minute by minute 
narrative, its always so closely anticipated ending, can make legitimate the 
exercise of violence.”27
The arguments of Chief Justice Sir Alexander Cockburn and the jurist 
William Francis Finlason clashed when they confronted the question of ne-
cessity. Cockburn maintained that imminent threat collapsed immediately 
after the troops arrived in Jamaica. Under English common law, imminent 
violence was the only justifi cation for martial law. Acts committed dur-
ing the month-long emergency were illegal violence, therefore. Finlason 
disputes Cockburn’s arguments by citing racial difference as the grounds 
for another defi nition of necessity that he asserts must be applied in the 
colonies. This concept of necessity pivoted on an alternative cognition of 
time: it replaced imminent threat with deterrence as its guiding principle. 
As justifi cation for this, Finlason claimed, fi rst, that English common law 
in the colonies pertained only to white descendents, not those of Africa, so 
the defi nition of necessity must be adjusted to suit the situation. Second, 
the situation during the Morant Bay rebellion was that Jamaica was poised 
to become another Haiti during the revolution—a genocidal scene. Neces-
sity did not collapse with the arrival of the troops, Finlason maintained, 
because the blacks greatly outnumbered the whites, because blacks were of 
a different species from whites, and because, he alleged, they had been plan-
ning to kill the entire white population. This defi nition of necessity based in 
deterrence demands a dilated temporal view that travels backward to events 
in the past (in this case, to the Haitian revolution) and then forward to proj-
ect what will happen in the future. To assess accurately what the correct 
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course of action is one must look into the temporal and spatial distance, like 
de Lisser’s Eyre, rather than with the nearsighted presentism of Cockburn 
and Dick Carlton. Violence committed by the counterinsurgents during the 
entire length of the emergency in Jamaica was legal, and English common 
law protected from charges of illegitimate violence under this defi nition of 
necessity.
Finlason’s defi nition does not rest on stable ground or constitutional prin-
ciples. It is propped on sociological categories of race and historical prece-
dents. Hussain points out that Finlason’s argument proceeds tautologically.
Finlason’s criticism of the chief justice’s charge ends then with an explanation of 
dizzying circularity:
“He utterly failed to realize the danger of the rebellion, and therefore he 
of course failed to recognize the necessity for deterrent measures, of which 
the necessity could only be recognized by realizing the danger, and without 
realizing which severities would easily appear to have been cruelties.”
Martial law appears here as a deeply cognitive problem. We can now rec-
ognize the anxiety over the slippage between the same act of violence as it can 
appear within the authority of the law and opposed to it, so that an excessive 
cruelty can easily be mistaken for a warranted severity.28
The tautological formulation fails to express the reality of the situation in 
Morant Bay. While the argument for deterrence dictated that Eyre had to 
look to past events in Haiti as evidence of what would occur in the future 
in Jamaica, doing so did not provide an accurate assessment of the situation 
Eyre faced. The Morant Bay rebellion was not an attempt at secession from 
the empire, nor was there any plan to eradicate the white population that 
needed to be deterred. The contested defi nition of necessity was also cen-
tral to the debates between two intellectuals involved in the Governor Eyre 
controversy, Thomas Carlyle and John Stuart Mill.
Given de Lisser’s extensive historical research, he was no doubt aware of 
the jurists’ debates about imminent threat versus deterrence, but likely, too, 
is that these debates were also fi ltered for him through Mill, Carlyle, and 
Carlyle’s disciple, James Anthony Froude, who was a strong infl uence on de 
Lisser’s political thought and whom he references directly and indirectly in 
his works. Examining the Jamaica Committee and the Eyre Defense Com-
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mittee’s testimonies, along with Froude’s discussion of the rebellion in his 
travel writing, enables us to see how Revenge reworks Mill’s and Carlyle’s 
arguments under the more recent infl uence of Froude and in response to 
contemporaneous cultural and legal practices in Jamaica.
To vindicate English law, Mill argues for imminent threat as the defi -
nition of necessity and claims that violence committed during the emer-
gency was illegitimate.29 In a speech delivered in the House of Commons 
on July 31, 1866, Mill asserts that “martial law is another word for the law 
of necessity, and that the justifi cation of acts done under that law consist in 
their necessity. Well, then, we have the right to dispute the necessity.”30 He 
attempts to vindicate English law not only by charging Eyre for extending 
martial law past the point that imminent violence had ended but also by 
arguing that the treatment of Jamaicans was inhumane and that “feelings 
of humanity” cannot legitimately be suspended when ordinary law is sus-
pended. Counterinsurgents
are not justifi ed in the use of excessive or cruel means, but are liable civilly or 
criminally for such excess. They are not justifi ed in infl icting punishment after 
resistance is suppressed, and after the ordinary courts of justice can be reopened. 
The principle by which their responsibility is measured is well expressed in the 
case of Wright v. Fitzgerald. Mr. Wright was a French master, of Clonmel, 
who, after the suppression of the Irish rebellion in 1798, brought an action 
against Mr. Fitzgerald, the sheriff of Tipperary, for having cruelly fl ogged him 
without due inquiry. Martial law was in full force at that time, and an act of 
indemnity had been passed to excuse all breaches of the law committed in the 
suppression of the rebellion. In summing up, Justice Chamberlain, with whom 
Lord Yalverton agreed, said:—“The jury were not to imagine that the legisla-
ture, by enabling magistrates to justify under the indemnity bill, had released 
them from feelings of humanity, or permitted them wantonly to exercise power, 
even though it were to put down rebellion.”31
If for Mill the colonial administration’s suppression of the rebellion was in-
humane, for Carlyle and Eyre that suppression served to protect a higher 
form of civilization from a lower form: the “white race” from the “black.”
Carlyle argued for the defi nition of necessity as deterrence by claiming 
that black subjects act under the infl uence of superstition rather than ac-
cording to reason. A crucial part of his defense of Eyre was that the gover-
nor safeguarded the boundaries between races by protecting white women 
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from rape by black men, thereby preventing miscegenation. Catherine Hall 
analyzes Carlyle’s defense and demonstrates that statements in Eyre’s tes-
timony before the JRC recall those of Carlyle’s 1849 notorious essay “Oc-
casional Discourse on the Nigger Question,” published anonymously in 
Fraser’s magazine. ( J. A. Froude assumed editorship of Fraser’s for fourteen 
years, relinquishing it in 1874 at Carlyle’s request.) Eyre testifi ed “that the 
negroes form a lower state of civilization and being under the infl uence of 
superstitious feelings could not properly be dealt with in the same man-
ner as might the peasantry of a European country.” Their attachment “as 
a race” to superstition proves that deterrence rather than imminent threat 
must operate as the guiding principle of necessity outside of Europe: “As 
a race the negroes are most excitable and impulsive, and any seditious or 
rebellious action was sure to be taken up by and extend amongst the large 
majority with whom it came in contact.”32 Carlyle commended Eyre for his 
deployment of a correct variety of English masculinity in suppressing the 
rebels, whose sexuality posed as much of a threat as their superstitious na-
tures. Hall explains that Carlyle’s defense drew together antiliberal concepts 
of racialization and gendering while displaying fears of black masculinities 
and femininities. For Carlyle, “Eyre was not only the hero who had saved 
Englishmen from a gruesome death; he had also protected Englishwomen, 
and protecting ‘the weaker sex’ was, of course, a crucial aspect of indepen-
dence and manliness.”33 Moreover, she writes, “Englishmen’s fears of black 
male sexuality and the threat it posed to ‘their’ women were linked with 
fears about unleashing the powers of black women.”34 Fears about the mix-
ing of races through sex are expressed throughout Revenge.
Before returning to the novel, let us consider a fi nal refl ection on the 
rebellion, one whose date is closest to Revenge’s publication: Froude’s 1888 
travelogue The English in the West Indies; or, the Bow of Ulysses. Although 
well received in England, this ethnography was pilloried by colonial writ-
ers for its polemical meditations on race, colonial rule, and chattel slavery.35 
Froude, who wrote biographies of Carlyle (which eventually gave rise to a 
Froude-Carlyle controversy), constructs a similar defense of Eyre and ar-
gues for deterrence as the basis of necessity, citing black colonial subjects’ 
superstitious natures as justifi cation. Declaring that black Jamaicans belong 
to “an inferior race,” he claims that “they have shown no capacity to rise 
above the conditions of their ancestors except under European laws, Euro-
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pean education, and European authority, to keep them from making war on 
one another,” and also “their notions of right and wrong are scarcely even 
elementary; their education, such as it may be, is but skin deep, and the old 
African superstitions lie undisturbed at the bottom of their souls.”36
Revenge suggests that de Lisser envisions Froude’s work as a mediator 
between the immediate postrebellion controversy and his own historical 
situation of anticolonial activity. It indicates this most clearly by generating 
narrative energy through multiple employments of an image that occurs 
in the travelogue’s pages. This image concretizes the juridical arguments 
for the redefi nition of the concept of necessity in an astonishingly literal 
way—as the eradication of whiteness by blackness. Through this image, 
Froude makes a connection between the Morant Bay rebellion and his own 
time, a period of growing anticolonial consciousness, increasing desertion 
of whatever white land owners remain in the colony, and battles over the 
place of Afro-Creole culture in Jamaicans’ resistance to Crown colony rule. 
These three conditions have only intensifi ed by the time de Lisser writes 
Revenge. The temporal perspective of the image Froude draws underwrites 
the arguments for making deterrence rather than imminent threat the basis 
of necessity. Froude looks to the future by gazing into the distance of the 
past, envisioning the Morant Bay rebellion as a reiteration of the Haitian 
revolution, which is imprinted in his, Finlason’s, and Eyre’s minds as the 
attempted eradication of whites by black subjects. The removal of whites 
by blacks from colonial spaces is on the verge of materializing once again, 
he warns. This time it portends the loss of British economic power in the 
world. “The only good that came of [the Morant Bay rebellion] was the 
surrender of the constitution and the return to Crown government, and 
this our wonderful statesmen are beginning to undo,”37 he laments, and he 
continues in an ominous tone that
Lands once under high cultivation are lapsing into jungle. . . . Every year the 
census renews its warning . . . The white is relatively disappearing, the black 
is growing; that is the fact with which we have to deal. . . . The West India 
Islands, once the pride of our empire . . . are passing away out of our hands; the 
remnants of our own countrymen, weary of an unavailing struggle, are more 
and more eager to withdraw from the scene, because they fi nd no sympathy and 
no encouragement from home, and are forbidden to accept help from America 
when help is offered them, while under our eyes their quondam slaves are mul-
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tiplying, thriving, occupying, growing strong, and every day more conscious of 
the changed order of things.38
The image of an encroaching blackness that eclipses whiteness structures de 
Lisser’s entire novel. Revenge deploys it to make a case for deterrence as the 
basis of necessity during the rebellion.
The novel reacts to the unsettling of racial divisions and political hierar-
chies within Jamaica and to Jamaica’s changing place in the global economy 
during the time of the rebellion as well as during the time of Revenge’s com-
position. By mounting a defense of Carlyle and Eyre through the use of 
Froude’s imagery, Revenge responds to exigencies produced in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the rebellion. By framing this imagery within a scenogra-
phy and iconography associated with Myal, an Afro-Caribbean religion it 
(mis)identifi es as Obeah, the text responds to exigencies contemporaneous 
with its composition. In the fi rst decades of the twentieth century, Jamaica 
instituted laws to control various creolized indigenous and diasporic cultural 
practices, especially Obeah. These laws operated in an effort to keep pace 
with an intensifi ed anticolonial movement that drew upon such practices 
and beliefs. Though he invokes Afro-Creole practices and beliefs, de Lisser 
does not depict those that were actually used in Jamaica during the rebel-
lion. Moreover, he confuses the rituals he depicts with practices in use in 
Haiti during the revolutionary period. Combining the imagery found in 
Froude’s travelogue with such rituals to tell the story of the rebellion, the 
novel makes claims for understanding necessity on the basis of deterrence 
by warning readers about the dangers of mixing of races during both Eyre’s 
time and de Lisser’s time.
The novel rehearses the ideologies of racial separatism that it projects 
onto the insurgents in order to mark their difference from the English and 
the white plantocracy. Prohibition against miscegenation is the law of the 
rebel father, not the law of liberal Dick Carlton and Joyce Graham, who 
treat Rachael Bogle as a token friend of color. “Colour for colour” is both 
Bogle’s war cry and the basis of his domestic rage. After Rachel disobeys 
Bogle’s orders forbidding her to visit Carlton (who confronts her romantic 
overtures with polite but fi rm civility, advising her to obey her father), she 
and her dead mother become victims of that rage. “ ‘You forget your colour? 
Don’t you always hear me say ‘colour for colour’?” an incredulous Bogle 
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asks, then accuses, “you are common . . . an’ you get your commonness 
from you’ brown mother, for you don’t get it from me. You sambo slut! it 
is a white man you want, eh?” (53). Rachel responds that she wants a white 
man because a white man is human while the maroon to whom her father 
wants to marry her in a bid to secure the rebellion’s victory is not. But while 
Revenge attaches the prohibition of racial mixing to a genocidal insurgency 
led by a savage and superstitious misogynist, it just as stridently ratifi es that 
prohibition in order to make an argument for deterrence as the basis of ne-
cessity. The mixing of races is articulated as contamination. Contamination 
occurs through acts of witnessing.
The episode freighted with the most evidence for implementing Finla-
son’s theory of necessity in the colonies relates how Carlton’s English fi an-
cée witnesses the conception of the rebellion, presented as a Myal ritual the 
novel calls “obeah” (41). The text warns that Afro-Creole religious practices 
create the conditions for moral, political, and economic catastrophe: a na-
tion where whiteness disappears. It issues this warning by showing how eas-
ily English womanhood can become compromised by atavistic forces once 
one leaves the metropole for the colony. In this episode’s attack on liberals’ 
charges against Eyre and the concept of necessity based in imminent threat, 
Revenge addresses English as well as Caribbean readers. The colonial set-
tlers, most of whom sided with Eyre and against the Jamaica Committee, 
insisted that those safely ensconced in England could not know the terror of 
being outnumbered in the colony.
By tightly focalizing on the English woman and charting her descent into 
a heart of darkness where she watches a ritual with Bogle as its “high priest” 
(27), the text turns the Morant Bay rebellion into an iteration of the Haitian 
revolution. It does so while elaborating the sexual conquest of English white 
femininity by superstitious black masculinity, a trauma Eyre, according to 
Carlyle, was able to prevent. Joyce leaves the security of the big house and 
rides into the woods with a black servant guide. The second she leaves the 
grounds, she becomes vulnerable to the infectious Jamaican landscape: “A 
wave of excitement fl owed through her; the weird, wild beauty of the night 
had thrown its spell upon her; she was in the throes of its fascination. . . . 
Then she came to a path which plunged into a wood on her left hand and 
seemed to lead into its innermost recesses” (38–39). She descends further 
into “semi-obscurity” until she hears a “cry that came stabbing through the 
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gloom,” which she recognizes as part of “a revival meeting. Her heart began 
to beat faster, her pulses quickened” (39). She is driven to descend still far-
ther inward, proceeding onto a trail that only natives, perhaps settlers, but 
certainly not an English woman, should be able to manage, for “no horse 
could go that way, but a human being used to such places, could scramble 
up and down it with no great diffi culty” (39). Comingling desire and fear are 
written onto Joyce’s body as she approaches a place from which to witness 
the meeting. This comingling produces a characterological break. Joyce 
transforms from an embodiment of English civility to a voyeur attracted to 
what is presented as a perverse primal scene. She travels through a narrow-
ing canal that opens onto a wider, hidden enclave from which she watches 
the conception of a monstrous birth. From her place high above the scene 
at Stony Gut, where, as her guide relates, “ ‘you can see from . . . an them 
can’t see you’ ” (39– 40), she witnesses the insemination of the spirit of rebel-
lion into the people that occurs through the movement of the black man’s 
wand. Bogle, “standing erect within the circle,” bears “a slender wand, and 
this he sometimes moved from side to side with a quick nervous jerk” (40), 
to which the members who circle him respond. They “followed the motion 
of the rod, rocking their bodies to and fro” and “thundered denunciations 
at times, shrieked agony, sobbed contrition, and surged upwards in frenzied 
supplications” (40). Joyce is not immune to the wand’s power.
Afro-Jamaican masculinity’s conquest of English femininity is represented 
as a trauma that portends a miscegenated future, a nation in which the white 
disappears under an encroaching black mass. Such is the image that justifi ed 
for Finlason, Carlyle, and Froude a defi nition of necessity based in deter-
rence. According to the young guide who accompanies her, Joyce is pro-
tected from the “arousal” Bogle’s rod inspires in him and others.
Charles was trembling with excitement. His superstitious fears and beliefs were 
fully aroused; he dreaded lest the woman and the man below should smell him 
out and hurl some deadly curse at him. His mistress, he thought, was safe; she 
was buckra, white, and above the black man’s evil. . . . From her presence, too, 
he drew a certain courage. . . . his young mistress could look calmly down upon 
a scene which even the principal actors regarded with secret awe.
(41)
Charles’s assumptions are false, however. Despite his confi dence that her 
race acts as a shield against contamination, the English woman, too, is in-
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seminated by the act of witnessing, and her body becomes part of the rebel 
body. Joyce’s body’s reactions to Bogle’s moving wand evince her “arousal.” 
The “fascination” and “shudders” that accompany her approach of the pri-
mal scene are followed by breathlessness after witnessing it: “gasped Joyce, ‘I 
have stayed here long enough’ ” (41). She exits the narrow trail and emerges 
onto “the open road” (42), but the damage is done: she now resembles the 
rebels. The act of penetration leaves her cold blooded like the insurgents, 
with a “ pallor” that would have “startled” her if she could see her refl ec-
tion, “shivering” while “nervous tremors ran through her” (42). Joyce can-
not bear witness to this contamination through insemination that will result 
in a monstrous birth—a mixed-race nation, where the white will continue to 
disappear as black “superstition” spreads. She tries and fails to tell Dick what 
has occurred: “ ‘I went on to Stony Gut, and I saw— O, it is too dreadful!’ 
She broke off sharply, fi ghting desperately the hysterical wave that surged 
through her” (42). Emphasizing that this event should not be passed on, 
the text orchestrates a thunderclap that prevents its transmission: “He knew 
that she was saying something, but heard no words” (42). de Lisser locates 
the rebels’ racial and sexual conquest of white femininity at the root of the 
rebellion and diagnoses these as traumas that only Eyre’s counterinsurgency 
and cognition of time can cure.
Revenge’s author, like its farsighted Eyre, looks with a dilated perspective 
into the future and past to grasp the rebellion. de Lisser shapes it anachro-
nistically by invoking the legal management of Obeah that occurs decades 
after the insurgency and attributes to Afro-Creole religion a role it did not 
play in Jamaica in 1865 but rather later, earlier, and elsewhere. Between 
1907 and 1920, as part of the civilizing mission and culture wars in Jamaica, 
a series of new laws were passed that regulated Obeah and denied it the 
legal status of a religion. Defi ned as superstition, it was now also codifi ed as 
fraud, which marked a shift from its legal designation as witchcraft during 
the pre-emancipation era.39 Obeah had its own literature in the 1900s, and 
this had to be outlawed because it was accessible to the middle classes of all 
colors, could be read by them, and thus culturally, and potentially juridi-
cally, legitimized.40 Diana Patton has shown that in Jamaica and throughout 
the Anglophone Caribbean “Obeah” was produced as a discursive formation 
through the interactions of transnational, colonial, and regional forces and 
had “locally differentiated meanings . . . that engage with, but are not deter-
mined by, the meanings produced by ruling groups both within and outside 
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the region.”41 In historical and critical analyses, Myal and Obeah have been 
treated as alternately interchangeable and oppositional;42 as noted, de Lis-
ser refers to a Myal ritual as “obeah” (41). de Lisser’s portrayal of Myal as 
Obeah is anachronistic because during the period of legal reforms in which 
de Lisser writes, Afro-Caribbean religions operated in a way that they did 
not during the Morant Bay rebellion, that is, as sites of social and legal con-
test over cultural and political autonomy.43 Also, not until after the 1860s 
does Myal become connected with the rituals Revenge describes, possession 
trances, circles, and dances.44 Calling Myal an “Africanization of Protestant-
ism,” Dale Bisnauth locates the aims of possession in individual spiritual 
growth,45 but other scholars claim that these serve the aims of a community, 
and one often struggling against an oppressive enemy, white or black.46 By 
naming Myal Obeah, de Lisser anachronistically identifi es the former with 
a practice that was being legally regulated in the twentieth century on the 
basis of its imputed destruction of community, the fraudulent use of “super-
stition” for individual gains at the cost of others’ losses.
Yet, paradoxically, it is precisely the communitarian character of an Afro-
Caribbean religion that de Lisser wants to highlight in order to support 
his argument for deterrence as the basis of necessity. The articulation of 
the rebellion’s conception through the ritual is anachronistic because it im-
poses a discourse of religion’s connection to anticolonial revolt that post-
dates the insurgency as well as to one that predates it and that occurs outside 
of Jamaica. The Myal ritual serves in the narrative to connect Morant Bay 
to Haiti, where Voudou, another religion used to galvanize a community, 
played an important role in the mounting of the revolution. While it is true 
that the creolization of the Moravian Baptist religion in Jamaica involved 
the revivalism that Bisnauth claims is another name for Myalism47 and that 
Native Baptist communities were key to the formation of black publics that 
resisted oppression, which culminated in the rebellion,48 the insurgency was 
not a revolution and attempted secession from the empire, as was the case 
in Saint Domingue. Moreover, although Myal “was a signifi cant spiritual 
resource for Afro-Jamaicans under stress,” historically, it “did not stage a 
successful revolution like the Haitian revolt, and its political role in the 
struggle against slavery and colonialism in Jamaica is not comparable to that 
of Vodou.”49
de Lisser confl ates them, but in actuality Myal was often a countermeasure 
to Obeah, a way of getting to the truth and resetting the moral balance by 
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reading the natural world. This required that one become infected. Nathan-
iel Murrell points out the feature with which Myal becomes most associated 
after the 1860s—“its spirit possession catalepsy,” which “is still referred to 
as ‘catching the Myal spirit.’ ”50 Catching the Myal spirit enables one to read 
signs and mediate between known and unknown worlds. Through posses-
sion, “Afro-Jamaicans believed Myal brought them revelations of the invis-
ible world: a state of mind that allowed the initiates to see Obeah works and 
to transmit messages from that other world to their community.”51 Murrell 
relates that “during the dance ritual, worshipers formed the famous circle to 
communicate with the divinity, who bestowed on the new shaman the pow-
ers to heal and to see unusual things in the sacred and profane worlds.”52
By invoking Afro-Creole religion while looking through the lenses of 
Morant Bay’s past and future, Revenge presents the rebellion as a genocidal 
secessionist movement. The chapter relating the Myal ritual, entitled “The 
Sign from Heaven,” enacts the disappearance of whiteness under blackness, 
but it also illustrates that in order to be able to read this disappearance as 
sign one must become infected. The multiple situations of infection that oc-
cur in the chapter’s central scene disclose that black femininity is as threat-
ening as black masculinity, if not more so.53 Here, again, Joyce becomes 
infected when she witnesses another act of witnessing: a black woman, a 
“crone” who is the “chief hierophant” (27), reads the night sky during the 
ritual over which Bogle presides. The Myal woman’s testimony to what she 
witnesses seems illegible at fi rst, for “Joyce heard the sounds that came from 
the woman; gibberish, it seemed, an incoherent meaningless sputtering from 
foaming lips” (41). Yet the “gibberish” becomes coherent speech. Through 
it, the novel relates that nature is a sign system that provides knowledge 
about future events once one is possessed by the spirit:
still the stream of meaningless sounds poured out of the woman’s foaming 
mouth, and still she whirled round the circle. Then the peninsular-like cloud 
which had been threatening the moon detached itself from the parent mass and 
drifted towards the now, dimmed, half-enshrouded orb. The woman stood 
stock-still and darted one arm toward it: “A sign!” she screamed, “de answer of 
de Spirit!”. . . . 
 . . . “the answer is coming!” thundered Paul Bogle. “We will know tonight 
whether black or white will win!”
Steadily the cloud moved forward, and after it came creeping the dense 
black mass that now covered half the sky. At this moment the moon struggled 
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out from beneath the veils of vapour that had dimmed it. Serenely it shone, as 
though conscious of its own triumph. A groan burst from Paul Bogle and was 
echoed by hundreds of the expectant crowd.
But still they stared, and inch by inch the darkness drew towards the light. 
Joyce, too, infected by the spirit of the people, watched the scene with intensest inter-
est. At last the cloud touched the edge of the moon, a moment after it had swept 
over most of it. Darker and darker grew the night, swiftly the light departed. 
Soon it was all gone. . . . 
Now there arose a wild cry of triumph, and high above it rang the voice of 
Paul Bogle—“A sign, the Spirit give us a sign!”
(41, my emphasis)
In this mise-en-abyme of infection, the hierophant and Bogle catch the Myal 
spirit, which allows them to read the sky’s prophecy that the Morant Bay 
rebellion will formally repeat the structure of insurgency in Haiti, a colony 
that attempted to “detach itself” from a “parent mass,” or empire. Joyce, 
“infected by the spirit of the people,” can read the sky as Bogle and the 
hierophant do and then warn Carlton of the necessity of deterring future 
events. And fi nally, the novel itself reveals how it is infected by a practice of 
witnessing it invokes in order to police while simultaneously obscuring this 
by generating a contradiction.
This scene expresses that nature is and is not readable as sign. This con-
tradiction is the consequence of spatial and temporal telescoping and can be 
explained by approaching the scene from multiple perspectives. The prob-
lem de Lisser confronts in his effort to vindicate law is this: nature must be a 
sign system, as the insurgents’ and Joyce’s reading of the sky imply, because 
then, according to narrative logic, a counterinsurgency based on the neces-
sity of deterrence can be justifi ed. But nature cannot be a sign system because 
if it is, Myal’s interpretive methods do not refl ect atavistic superstition but 
rather constitute a powerful epistemology that allows us to understand po-
liticoeconomic forces of modernity. From the perspective of Jamaica in late 
October 1865, Bogle’s interpretation of movements of darkness and light in 
the sky is based on superstition because what he names a sign is not in fact a 
sign—it does not correctly designate who will be victor and who vanquished 
at Morant Bay. The novel indicates, however, that we must also look from 
the perspective of those who witnessed the Haitian revolution, and from 
this angle, it is a sign. It is the sign of intent of secession and genocide. In this 
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way, the scene justifi es Eyre’s cognition of the temporality of necessity and 
asserts that those who defi ne necessity as imminent threat do not know how 
to read nature as signs. After Carlton’s fi ancée manages to relate “all that she 
had heard and seen the night before” (42), Carlton’s response illustrates that 
what is legible to Joyce, and to readers, is illegible through the framework 
that uses imminent threat as the basis for action. “We can only watch them” 
(42), Carlton says, because there is no evidence of pressing danger. Only 
by reading signs of intent by referencing the historical memory of Haiti 
was de Lisser’s (and Carlyle’s) Eyre able to prevent what Bogle interprets, 
that “black . . . will win.” But there is another angle of vision in play here 
that contradicts these fi rst two statements on the status of the sign. From 
Froude’s perspective in 1888 and de Lisser’s perspective in 1919, the sky 
does display a sign, and not merely of intent but of events that will actually 
occur in the future, decades after the rebellion takes place. This passage 
restates Froude’s argument and even uses the rhetoric Froude uses to makes 
it. In Froude’s formulation, changes in the natural world are anagogical to 
and refl ect population shifts, which are also moral, political, and economic 
shifts: “lands once under high cultivation are lapsing into jungle. . . . The 
white is relatively disappearing, the black is growing.”54 The sign Joyce and 
the insurgents gaze upon is also a warning addressed to readers outside and 
inside Jamaica. Anticolonial nationalism in the twentieth century is con-
fi rming that “black” is triumphing over “white.” Because the novel endorses 
the methods of witnessing and assumptions about the semiotic potential of 
nature it attributes to a superstitious insurgency to make this point, it reveals 
that it cannot vindicate law without breaking from its own value system.
The novel articulates that diasporic and indigenous cultural formations 
mobilize agitation for national economic and political independence in ways 
that threaten reason, order, and civilization. As a result, the text insists, law 
must be vindicated from charges of illegitimate violence when it suppresses 
agitation. The literary and formal strategies Revenge uses to make these 
claims, however, paradoxically endorse the epistemology and interpretive 
methods of the systems that it claims law must suppress. Like de Lisser’s 
Bogle, de Lisser himself treats nature and landscape as the means by which 
to assess future events throughout Revenge. In doing so he obstructs the 
novel’s attempts to reestablish a boundary that the process of witnessing 
the rebellion’s conception dismantled: that between European civilization, 
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which Joyce fi gures, and atavistic superstition, which the insurgents engaged 
in Afro-Creole ritual embody.
The novel’s treatment of nature and landscape illustrate that techniques 
European literary forms use to interpret social and political confl ict share 
with Afro-Creole religions premises about nature’s semiotic potential. Al-
though Revenge takes place entirely within Jamaica and therefore seems an 
example of national literature, the line between national and world litera-
ture blurs when we consider that efforts to manage crises of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency whose effects extend beyond a single nation and histori-
cal moment structure the novel. Through these efforts British literary aes-
thetics are creolized: The text’s literary techniques become doubles of and 
legitimize the hermeneutics of Myal, an Afro-Jamaican cultural system that 
was employed, the text shows, to produce effects in Jamaica that transform 
the places of England and the United States in the world system. On the 
one hand, de Lisser must insist that Myal has no epistemological purchase, 
which is why he calls it Obeah. To argue otherwise would be to repeal its 
codifi cation as fraud and treat it as a religion, a system with a truth value that 
inheres in its ability to mediate between transcendent and fi nite temporali-
ties and worlds. On the other hand, de Lisser is composing a literary work, 
and the methods Myal uses to make meaning are not so different from those 
of the literary genres de Lisser’s fi ction references. The author represents 
Jamaican history, as one critic notes, through the “literary models avail-
able to him in colonial Jamaica at the end of the last century. These models 
were British—eighteenth-century Gothic, and the Victorian ‘sensation’ 
writing.”55 These models treat nature and landscape as semiotic systems. 
They often do so in order to tell stories in which femininity is made vulner-
able by brutal masculinity and racial otherness. Because Revenge employs 
their aesthetic techniques to argue for the necessity of deterrence while si-
multaneously revealing that their interpretive principles overlap with those 
of Myal, he demonstrates how a supposedly atavistic process and a “modern” 
British literary tradition share techniques for making sense of social, eco-
nomic, and political phenomena.
Among the many fi gurations of landscape and nature as signs of black-
ness encroaching on whiteness, two tropes are particularly important in the 
novel: hurricanes and fi res. Hurricanes and fi res are analogous to the night 
sky whose cloud formations Bogle and the Myal women interpret as signs. 
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Hurricanes and fi res are signs of the future catastrophic storm and holocaust 
that is the Morant Bay rebellion; however, they are not legible as signs when 
viewed through the lens of necessity as imminent threat. The novel’s formal 
conduct suggests that de Lisser assumes that readers are conversant with the 
conventions of Gothic fi ction and Victorian sensation writing and therefore 
know to read landscape and natural events as signs of confl ict, strife, or di-
saster. Revenge shows that Dick Carlton does not know how to read this way. 
The text’s handling of fi res and hurricanes serve as reading lessons for him 
and the novel’s other liberal characters.
The text relies upon an understanding of nature and landscape as sign 
systems from the fi rst page in order to make its argument for deterrence 
and to criticize, through the use of dramatic irony, those who do not know 
how to read their signs. Chapter 1 opens with a question of how to interpret 
what is disclosed as a sign: fi res on the horizon outside the big house. Three 
possibilities are offered from three perspectives. The fi rst interpretation is 
scientifi c; they are nature’s evidence of the drought, a sign of “how severe 
it has been” (1). The second is that they are signs that the profane world is 
continuous with, and signs of, the sacred world. Dick Carlton claims the 
Jamaicans read the fi res and the drought as a “sign of God’s displeasure, and 
that they are called upon to purge the wickedness out of the land. Some of 
those fi res are lighted as a warning to the unrepentant” (2). The third pos-
sibility is that the fi res are not only “warnings” but “signals” sent between 
black Jamaicans to commit genocide, that “we [the white plantocracy] are 
the ‘wickedness’ to be purged out of the land” (2). Carlton’s mother offers 
this last reading. By rejecting it while assuring his fi ancée that “the danger is 
purely imaginary” (2), Carlton strengthens de Lisser’s argument for a con-
ceptualization of necessity based on deterrence. Carlton’s nearsightedness 
makes him incapable of protecting white femininity. His mother and fi ancée 
are captured by the rebels, and the only reason they are not raped and killed 
is that a planter who supports the argument for deterrence prevents this.56 
Linking Carlton’s failure to read the signs in the novel’s opening episode to 
his failure to protect white women in distress, Revenge uses gothic literary 
conventions while affi rming Myal’s premise that nature operates as signs of 
the supernatural world that also refl ect human desires.
Like fi re, the hurricane functions as a sign and signal that liberal colonial 
offi cials cannot recognize as such. At a dinner party on the eve of Joyce’s 
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return to England, the Custos describes hurricanes to the English woman, 
who has never seen one. He tells her that by October, hurricanes are gen-
erally “all over. There have been hurricanes in October though” (66), he 
admits. Joyce asks, “Hurricanes are almost as dangerous on land as at sea, 
aren’t they?” (66). The Custos responds, “Rather! They are terrible. Hun-
dreds of lives are sometimes lost in them; they are what we have most to 
fear in Jamaica. Take away our hurricanes and our droughts and we should 
go on our way rejoicing” (66). His response associates hurricanes with fi res 
by mentioning the droughts, which the opening episode’s scientifi c inter-
pretation mistakenly identifi es as the cause of the fi res. The novel therefore 
asks us to read the Custos’s words in the way he does not intend them to be 
read—through the hermeneutics of the Gothic tradition and Myal. Under-
scoring the novel’s prescription to replace a realistic or scientifi c reading of 
nature with one that follows the protocols established by Gothic literature 
and Myal, a passage in another chapter relates that “When the West Indian 
hurricane is approaching the atmosphere gives warning. . . . So too, before 
the bursting of the storm of human rage and passion, the wild expression of 
hate and anger and madness, there are signs and warnings which the clear-
sighted may plainly read,” and fi nishes with a rebuke: “in the month of Oc-
tober, 1865, such signs were not lacking” (43). Neither Carlton nor the Cus-
tos are clear sighted enough to read these signs. Both also fail to understand 
that signals operate as signs of the rebellion. When a planter warns that the 
conch shell’s signaling of a revival meeting “may herald a hurricane worse 
than any we have ever known in Jamaica,” the Custos replies, “it may and it 
may not . . . I prefer to think that it means nothing more than some fellow 
summoning his friends” (67).
The fi nal vindications of law occur at the novel’s conclusion, where de 
Lisser reduces the month-long emergency to two weeks, thus falsifying the 
detail that was at the center of accusations against Eyre, and exonerates law 
from its most naked instrumentalization of violence: the hanging of a wit-
ness following a hasty drumhead court. Like West, who detaches capital 
punishment from violence in her trial report by making the colonial subject 
a willing participant in his own death at the hands of the state, de Lisser pro-
tects English law from violence by enabling the death penalty to do its work 
without the colonial subject’s conscious resistance—indeed without her 
consciousness that it is even taking place. The character hanged is Rachael 
F6635.indb   150 9/23/15   9:24:52 AM
Vindicating the Law   151
Bogle, whom the spurned and vengeful maroon suitor has falsely accused of 
killing Dick Carlton. She is without an alibi and is starved to the point of 
madness because she has been hiding from the counterinsurgents search-
ing for her. Consequently, though her testimony to the court accurately 
describes events that should prove her innocence, it is dismissed as “hys-
terical raving” (95). de Lisser uses the statements and actions of the British 
soldiers charged with hanging her to vindicate law. The soldiers’ comments 
suggest that violence committed by the state during the counterinsurgency 
is exceptional—not typical in England—but also that colonial situations de-
mand that law be applied in the colonies in ways that it is not in England: “It 
might be harsh to hang a woman, but women were hanged every year in the 
colony for murder” (95). de Lisser has Rachael faint from mental and physi-
cal exhaustion on the eve of her hanging so that he can both commend the 
soldiers for their empathy and protect law from charges of violence, punitive 
actions infl icted against the will of a subject. “She was alive, but unless they 
restored her to consciousness, she would know nothing more, feel nothing 
more, on this earth,” the text assures readers, and the offi cer “was emphatic 
in his order that the woman should suffer no unnecessary torture” (96) by 
being brought to consciousness.
Critics have argued that by using the British literary models available to 
him, de Lisser’s prose suffers; his “style recaptures and amplifi es some of the 
sentimentality, repetition, indulgent explanations, and fl orid descriptions of 
British writers who are nowadays considered of less than fi rst rank.”57 The 
overwrought descriptions of landscape and nature are evidence of this. But 
through this “bad” style, Revenge illuminates connections between secular 
European discourses and Afro-Caribbean religious discourses and asserts 
the epistemological force of both. This style conveys that practices that are 
legally deemed fraudulent actually produce truth. The novel formally makes 
an argument its author rejects. It does so because it is contoured by the im-
peratives of Jamaica’s shifting place in the world system as much as by a his-
torical trauma of its national past. Revenge enacts a return of the repressed. It 
addresses a rebellion that destabilized social, political, and economic struc-
tures so as to argue for legal procedures that would prevent such distur-
bances from happening again. Its formal conduct relates, however, that such 
disturbances have not only continued to occur but that their effects have 
been amplifi ed and intensifi ed by the time the novel is composed.
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Revenge is a world text, but not because it has conquered the global liter-
ary market (which it hasn’t) or because it critiques models of community 
based on exclusionary categories such as race and nation (which it doesn’t), 
or, fi nally, because it is “locally infl ected, and translocally mobile”58 (the fact 
that, according to WorldCat, the only copy currently available in the world 
is located in the British library and not available for checkout, suggests in 
a very literal way that it’s not). Revenge is a world text because its use of 
diasporic and creolized cultural and aesthetic practices to bear witness to a 
historical trauma of imperial modernity demonstrates that contemporane-
ous pressures of a global economic system structure and destructure it as a 
literary work. These pressures, that is, both enable the work to come into 
being and mark the limits of its coherence. de Lisser’s text raises a ques-
tion that Simon Gikandi puts to us in light of Catherine Hall’s infl uential 
analysis of the postemancipation period in Jamaica, in which apparently op-
positional missionary and planter discourses in fact collude in disavowing 
the agency of black freedmen and women.59 Gikandi asks, “Where were the 
free villagers in themselves in this economy of debate? Could they as sub-
alterns speak or were they simultaneously silenced in the discourse of the 
planters and the missionaries alike? Were the new black subjects masters 
of their own technologies of self in the postemancipation order or inher-
ently overdetermined?”60 Revenge suggests that planter and missionary alike 
failed to hear the freed villagers’ voices— or rather, read their signs—to 
catastrophic effect. de Lisser, however, represents insurgents not as rational 
agents of change but as victims of what he would like to insist is an irrational 
system that confi rms the Afro-Jamaicans’ “unconsciousness”: The novel dra-
matizes the origin of the insurgency as the loss of consciousness that occurs 
when its leader catches the Myal spirit. Revenge endeavors to silence subal-
tern discourse, but it returns as a displaced force that disrupts the coherence 
of the novel’s argument for a particular legal codifi cation of necessity.
de Lisser addresses the rebellion to bulwark dominant forces under attack 
at least since 1865; Vic Reid addresses the rebellion to support the work-
ing classes in struggles toward Jamaican independence. Like Revenge, New 
Day and Sixty-Five have also fallen out of print, entering neither the canons 
of World Literature nor the canons of postcolonial literary studies, where 
focus on works of migrancy and exile still dominate. This seems to confi rm 
that Reid’s are decidedly national works. Both take as their subject key mo-
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ments of national history and take place within the nation, and New Day’s 
linguistic mode has even been referred to as “nation language”: It is the fi rst 
Anglophone Caribbean novel written entirely in a Creole vernacular.61 But 
as in Revenge, the techniques New Day and Sixty-Five use to bear witness to 
the rebellion challenge critical models that distinguish national from world 
literature. Reid’s works elaborate tensions between national and global 
forces and show how these tensions spark eruptions of anticolonial revolt 
throughout Jamaican history. His writings attempt to imagine a way to work 
through these traumatic eruptions, and they do so by vindicating English 
law from charges of violence. Thus, neither text entirely breaks with the 
responses to the rebellion and the counterinsurgency offered by de Lisser 
or the Victorians before him. New Day presents historical events through 
the perspectives of a middle-class brown family, and the young-adult novella 
Sixty-Five presents them through the perspectives of a poor black family. 
Whether Jamaicans were “masters of their own technologies of self or inher-
ently overdetermined,” as Gikandi put it, is the question each work raises 
through its vindications of law. Both writings suggest, in different ways, that 
while brown and black subjects harnessed some of these technologies of self, 
they are not masters of them but rather “conscripts of modernity.” Examin-
ing Reid’s portrayals of this condition enables us to see how the historical 
trauma of the Morant Bay rebellion generates literary testimonies that erode 
distinctions between national and world literatures.
Taking Time and Leaping Ahead: New Day as Modern Epic
Vic Reid described New Day as a corrective to the racism of de Lisser’s por-
trayals of Jamaican history, but by arguing for a specifi c cognition of tempo-
rality, it, too, vindicates English law and depicts the insurgency as the violent 
expression of politically unconscious subjects. Where de Lisser redefi nes the 
temporality of necessity to stall anticolonial nationalism, Reid advocates for 
the necessity of a certain temporality as the condition for achieving an au-
thentic national independence. The refrain that organizes New Day is “take 
time,” that is, wait for conditions to be favorable to make claims for politi-
cal independence. The novel maintains that English legal education teaches 
how to develop a cognition of time that will enable Jamaica to fl ourish and 
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compete in a global economy with England, under whose protection the 
novel asserts it should remain, though not as a Crown colony but as an en-
tity with “full representative government within the British empire.”62
That New Day expresses this tutelary cognition of time seems oddly 
anachronistic, considering that the novel is composed when anticolonial 
agendas were articulated through a rhetoric of urgency in the Caribbean and 
abroad. This ideology of temporality is all the more striking because it oc-
curs in what otherwise appears an exemplary work of its moment. Published 
in 1949, fi ve years after the lifting of Crown colony rule, New Day emerges 
out of 1930s and 1940s cultural nationalism. Literature of this period used 
the conventions and vernaculars of realism and portrayed local landscape, 
labor, and social practices of the peasantry and working classes to interrupt 
colonial imaginaries and forge a national consciousness. New Day features 
all of these elements. It depicts eighty years of postemancipation struggle 
beginning with the Morant Bay rebellion and concluding with the end of 
Crown colony rule. On the eve of the new constitution in 1944, the elderly 
narrator John Campbell spends the night looking backward in time, starting 
with early October 1865, and takes readers through major events in Jamai-
can history, which are given narrative shape as a family saga. This form’s 
genealogical thrust makes it particularly compelling for a writer confronting 
a newly reconfi gured nation because it enables him to imagine that nation 
as the result of a continuous development. The family saga smoothes over 
the discontinuities of the Morant Bay rebellion and other violent eruptions, 
such as the 1938 labor riots. Campbell’s older brother Davie is a confl icted 
insurgent at Morant Bay who, after the rebellion, fathers a son, James. James 
becomes a successful capitalist who cares only for business and has no inter-
est in anticolonial politics. He marries a white English woman, and both die 
soon after from infl uenza, leaving a young son, Garth, behind. New Day re-
places Revenge’s anxiety over miscegenation with delight: Garth displays the 
best aspects of his parents’ respective racial and national backgrounds and 
embodies a synthesis of his father’s business acumen and his grandfather’s 
anticolonial spirit.
Where the novel breaks from other works of its era is in its usage of a 
European model, that of Bildung, to confront what it criticizes as premature 
attempts at national independence. The third and fi nal part of the novel 
relates the effects of Garth Campbell’s education in England on the move-
ment of Jamaica toward independence. Garth’s personal development, or 
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Bildung, models an ideal national Bildung, which, as uninterrupted, rational, 
and nonviolent, does not refl ect the actual history of Jamaica. Because Eng-
lish law makes possible Garth’s development, it will make possible Jamaica’s 
development toward self-rule, the novel claims. This means that English law 
will redeem the Morant Bay rebellion.
The novel intimates that the rebellion was a necessary but false start in 
the movement toward national independence for two related reasons: fi rst, 
the rebels did not recognize that a nation that sees itself divided from a 
world system could not succeed, and second, the rebellion was an attempt 
at achieving national independence that used violence instead of law to try 
to accomplish its goal. Like Revenge, New Day misrepresents the rebellion 
as secession from England led by a fi gure who appears in Reid’s novel not 
unlike he does in de Lisser’s. A bloodthirsty Bogle demands, “Secession! 
Secession! Total freedom!” (16). When the spirit of rebellion enters Davie 
Campbell it transforms him into this predator: “Firecoals make his eyes, 
teeth are wild boar’s tearing down Warieka Mount. All of a sudden I see 
Davie is Deacon Bogle, and frighten comes on me” (32–33). The narrator 
fi gures Bogle as a persecutor of Christians, a “herring-Jew merchant” who 
extracts “the price of blood” (33). Condemning the minister’s disregard for 
all life (“who it runs over, it runs over!” [33]), the novel claims that Jamaicans 
died for his sins, sacrifi cing themselves to secession: “black was the cloud o’ 
singing that day piling up on Morant courthouse. Did they hope say rain 
would fall from it? All the same, rain did fall. Rain, like the rain from the 
side o’ Mas’r Gods Son, the Golgotha rain . . . and it drowned some o’ me 
brethren” (112–113). Bogle both demands and preys on sacrifi ce, for “Dea-
con is a hunter-dog quartering the hole o’ the German boar. Deacon is a 
cult shepherd in Yallahs Valley waiting for the sacrifi cial lamb. He will be a 
quartering John Crow, working up his appetite before he swoops for carrion 
meat” (139). By portraying the rebellion as sacrifi ce, the novel establishes 
that it is the task of history to redeem it.
English legal education redeems this sacrifi ce and provides the lesson 
the novel imparts: to “take time.” Belaboring this point, New Day issues the 
warning in multiple, seemingly unconnected contexts. Not until the fi nal 
section does it relate the refrain to the prescription of colonial tutelage:
“The scene is changing, Uncle. We are growing up. We are getting out of the 
chrysalis.”
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“We? We who?”
“The Colonial Empire. Once it was the British Empire, now it is the Brit-
ish Commonwealth and the Colonial Empire. Soon it will only be the British 
Commonwealth—each of us with our own pair of wings, but fl ying together.”
“And how will we get our wings?”
“We will ask for them, but fi rst we must learn how to use them . . . 
“We had them once, you know, Uncle.”
I nod me head, “Yes, true that.”
“We lost them. We fl apped too heavily, so mother bird clipped them. For our 
own good, she said. She was probably right. They would have fl apped us into 
trouble.”
(338–339)
The loss of self-representation through Crown colony rule, the result of the 
rebellion, is deemed necessary because Jamaicans did not know not to leap 
ahead. The demand for immediate sovereignty (which of course in historical 
terms was not made during the rebellion or leading up to it) only proved 
that Jamaicans required more tutoring. A hasty secession from the empire 
would only have resulted in the incapacity to manage the world system. A 
nation that cannot suture itself into that system, Garth and the novel assure 
us, is a nation that is not truly independent, “mature,” and free.
Garth Campbell’s legal education in England enables him to help Ja-
maica cope with pressure of multinationals like United Fruit and WISCO, 
effectively deal with the rise of trade unionism, and forecast and exploit the 
changing role of the sugar industry in the global economy during World 
War II. Garth understands Jamaica as part of a world that is necessarily one 
and stitched together into a system of economic dependency: “Mr. Hitler 
is determined that Germany should expand, and in this close-fi tting world, 
expansion by any one nation means somewhere there will be a tear. Wher-
ever this tear occurs there will be resentment, and there you will have your 
war and a terrifi c demand for our sugar” (333). He is able to acquit himself 
and hundreds of workers in a trial following a trade union meeting that 
turns violent. He can do this because, our narrator regularly reminds us, 
he learned to “talk strong but with reason before the King’s bench” (273). 
“This boy . . . whom many learned men ha’ taught how to speak before the 
King’s bench” (329) also resolves disputes between capital and labor and 
secures a thriving economy on the Campbell estate and in the parish, which 
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becomes a utopic, parallel colony in miniature, a foreign body enveloped in 
a colony plagued with poverty and violent labor disputes. As Thomas Holt 
writes, 1938 “was a year as violent and consequential as 1831–32 and 1865,” 
and in the decade following the strike, “new forces emerged—some benefi -
cial, some sinister—that would reshape the political, economic, and social 
futures not only of Jamaica but of the entire colonial empire.”63 By establish-
ing conditions of rational discussion and consensus among the plantocracy, 
Garth prevents a violent uprising by estate workers, which the novel identi-
fi es as potentially another Morant Bay rebellion. Persuading parish planters 
to join with the Campbells in raising wages and in teaching their workers 
how to lobby for rights and privileges, he warns, “in some countries union-
ism was born in blood; in others, wise heads who saw the inevitableness of 
the birth took steps to prevent violence” (334). The novel draws a connec-
tion between political independence and business acumen by stating that 
both require a correct cognition of time. Garth preaches, “In doing business 
you know there is one cardinal rule, never act in haste” (329). When Crown 
colony rule is fi nally lifted as a consequence of Garth’s mediation between 
the colony and his legal connections in England, to whom he petitions, John 
Campbell declares that the sacrifi ces of the Morant Bay rebellion have been 
redeemed. His comments assert that Garth’s Bildung parallels that of Ja-
maica. Redemption happens as the result of an organic process of personal 
and national development, the ripening of a seed: “Aie, what a fruit our seed 
has borne . . . Glad, I am glad that Naomi and me had sent Davie’s offspring 
to learn of the law in England” (365). Jamaica has fi nally “reached our age 
of reason” (271) because now “men can march with the banner o’ the law 
waving over them ’stead o’ shells talking of blood and fi re” (366). The novel 
equates this age of reason or enlightenment in which law enables Jamaica to 
manage effectively the demands of the world system with modernity: “Get 
rid of those horse-and-buggy concepts, Mother England, before the rest of 
the world speeds out of sight leaving you wallowing in the mire of preju-
diced tradition” (367).
In its staging of history as an uninterrupted dialectical progression that 
redeems an initial sacrifi ce and that is guided by a future horizon of hope in 
recent gains toward national independence, New Day seems at fi rst glance 
to typify what David Scott calls “the mythos of Romance” he claims orga-
nizes anticolonial revolutionary discourse as well as postcolonial criticism. 
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Through his reading of The Black Jacobins, C. L. R. James’s classic study of 
the revolution in Haiti, Scott argues that this future horizon determines a 
shaping of the past through epic romance, a genre of the quest that is, in 
Northrop Frye’s words, “nearest of all literary forms to the wish fulfi llment 
dream.” Scott explains:
the protagonists (invariably associated with the new, with Light, with order) 
undertake a perilous journey; there are encounters with antagonists or enemies 
(invariably associated with the old, with Darkness, with disorder); the inevitable 
confl ict ensues between these irreconcilable principles; there are heightened 
moments when Darkness seems poised to vanquish Light; and fi nally the vic-
torious deliverance or overcoming from bondage, from evil, comes: what Frye 
calls “the point of epiphany.”64
Published just eleven years after James’s text, New Day refl ects the rhythm 
and pacing of epic romance as Scott describes it, but its vindication of Eng-
lish law also distinguishes it from The Black Jacobins. The novel eschews 
and even criticizes two defi ning features of the anticolonial mythos of ro-
mance—the employment of a form of vindicationalism and the longing for 
total revolution. Vindicationalism here is a narrative mode, often a tone of 
“moral indignation” or outrage devoted to redeeming wrongs under slav-
ery and colonialism, which it characterizes as processes of total dehuman-
ization and victimization.65 Vindicationalism accompanies the demand for 
“total revolution,” a complete and immediate break from an empire to be 
orchestrated by an autonomous subject, an epic romantic hero.66 Later anti-
colonial movements and criticism take up this “unequivocal demand for im-
mediate sovereignty.”67 Instead of rehearsing vindicationalism, an outrage 
over the besmirching of the dignity and humanity of black subjects under 
colonialism, New Day vindicates English law. Instead of presenting as heroic 
a fi gure who redeems wrongs suffered under colonialism by initiating total 
revolution, as James presents Toussaint, New Day portrays as a predator the 
historical fi gure it misrepresents as an initiator of total revolution whose 
sacrifi ces must be redeemed by law. Instead of demanding immediate sover-
eignty, New Day demands that colonial subjects “take time.”
Reid’s work depicts colonialism not as a totalizing process of victimiza-
tion but as an epistemic violence that also enabled the emergence of agents 
who could help bring it to crisis. These “conscripts of modernity” were not 
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autonomous masters of their destiny. They were subjects who harnessed 
technologies imposed by colonialism to resist it. Garth Campbell is the 
conscript the text privileges. Although the novel interrupts the mythos of 
romance by rejecting the notion of colonialism as totalizing victimization 
that demands total revolution, it also enacts this mythos by plotting a prog-
ress narrative that molds a brown middle-class subject into the novel’s, and 
Jamaican history’s, hero. By making Garth the singular hero, Reid ignores 
how black subjects of lower economic status, including Paul Bogle, were 
conscripts of modernity whose resistance tactics challenged colonial power 
and did so without calling for total revolution. These men and women rede-
ployed Moravian Baptist missionary discourse to create new counterpublics 
and bypass the colonial government to appeal to the Queen for economic 
and political justice. They also formed their own justice systems to confront 
the widespread injustices produced by the plantocracy.68 Moreover, New Day 
renders Enlightenment thought—English legal thought—the pathway to 
organic, national Bildung but does not show, as James does in his appended 
comments on tragedy in The Black Jacobins, what Scott calls “the inevitable 
costs that accompany relentless and unheeding enlightenment thinking.”69 
A brutal counterinsurgency was the result of Enlightenment codifi cations 
of race, gender, and sexuality, of the human and the inhuman. Enlighten-
ment thought shaped the arguments of jurists such as Finlason, who as-
serted the need for the redefi nition of English constitutional principles on 
the basis of colonial exception, proposing that emergency law could not be 
transferred from domestic to colonial space without the concept of neces-
sity being transformed to refl ect racial difference. Carlyle’s defense of the 
counterinsurgency on the grounds that Eyre had safeguarded white femi-
ninity was the product of Enlightenment thought. Even among the Jamaica 
Committee, Enlightenment thought determined the initial response to the 
insurgency. Mill and Buxton argued the rebellion was a spontaneous riot 
because they could not imagine that Jamaicans were capable of organizing 
and planning anything like a widespread, coherent act of anticolonial resis-
tance.70 By advocating the tutelary cognition of time without showing what 
Scott calls the “paradoxes and reversals” that interrupt the progress narra-
tive of history, New Day seems more like a colonial than an anticolonial or 
a postcolonial work, if the “post-” refers to a critical mode and not only a 
historical period.71
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But although the novel challenges the rhetoric of nationalism shared by so 
many anticolonial works of its time and after, it also illustrates that it has dif-
fi culty rejecting the unequivocal demand for immediate sovereignty without 
equivocation. In tension with the plotting of the epic as romantic discourse 
is its formal staging as something like what Franco Moretti calls the modern 
epic. This form confi gures a relation between past, present, and future in 
ways that are sharply distinct from the linear trajectory of romance. As this 
epic form, the text incessantly presses against the ideology of tutelage; the 
novel refuses, structurally, to “take time.” In refusing to take time, New Day 
also challenges oppositions between world text and national saga.
Moretti distinguishes the modern epic from what he calls the “premod-
ern” epic as well as from the national saga in a number of ways. First and 
foremost, the modern epic, unlike the other two, formally testifi es to the 
fact that the world system has taken hold. “The construction of national 
identity—henceforth required of the novel—is thus replaced, for the epic, 
by a far larger geographical ambition: a global ambition.”72 According to the 
classifi cation Moretti devises, New Day is a national work or a “premodern” 
epic. In the latter, we fi nd “the weight of the past . . . the epic is not just in-
herited from the past, but also dominated by it . . . imposing on author and 
readers alike ‘the reverent point of view of a descendant.’ ”73 The modern 
epic fi nds the present invaded by the past, too, but does not approach that 
past with reverence or position itself as a descendant. This form is defi ned by 
geographical expansion and temporal contraction. By contrast, the national 
saga is defi ned by spatial contraction and temporal expansion, a tightening 
of space and lengthening of history. And in a reversal of the Bakhtinian the-
sis that the epic is monologic while the novel is polyphonic, Moretti claims 
that polyphony reigns in the modern epic. In place of an intelligent ordering 
of many voices, however, is cacophony because “in the expanding universe 
of modernity, many things are as yet unclear; and it is necessary to learn to 
live with noise.”74 The expansion of time rather than space, the monologic 
narration, the focus on the Campbells’ parish, the retelling of the historical 
past as family saga, which places hope for the future in the descendents—all 
of this puts Reid’s text on the other side of the modern epic, suggesting it is 
a thoroughly national work, not a world text. Critics assert that this is the 
case, some arguing that the novel supports Fredric Jameson’s controversial 
claim that third-world texts are national allegories.75 Yet when Moretti turns 
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his attention away from the works of Western Europe to analyze a postcolo-
nial novel of the Americas, he offers a reading of epic form that suggests the 
division between world and national text is not so rigid.
Deploying Moretti’s close readings to examine New Day means redirect-
ing the work of the advocate of a world literature studies constituted by 
distanced reading.76 Those close readings, which explore One Hundred Years 
of Solitude’s depiction of colonial space, its staging of time, and its plotting 
of history, expand the category of modern epic and bring us closer to seeing 
New Day as something other than “premodern” and “national.” In Moretti’s 
reading, these three narrative elements of Márquez’s text disclose that what 
seems a national work, a family saga focused on the House of Buendia, is 
in fact a world text. In family sagas such as Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks, 
focalization “is like a zoom shot: from the world to the nation-state to the 
city to the house. Spaces ever more tightly defi ned, ever more smaller and 
more homogenous.”77 Márquez’s novel, too, is focused on a tighter space 
than the world and never migrates out of Macondo, “yet Macondo is, as it 
were, larger than Lübeck: because more open to the world . . . [Márquez’s 
novel is] the story of Buddenbrooks—in the context of the world-system.”78 
Within Macondo appear people and objects from the farthest-fl ung parts of 
the globe, and the narrative tracks the varied effects of the world system in 
its plotting and in its staging of time. This staging of time, an interplay of 
prolepses and analepses that has the narrative traveling repeatedly, in each 
episode, from the future, to the past, and then back to the future is what 
gives the work its “epic grandeur,” Moretti explains, citing Vargas Lhosa, 
who describes the “basic narrative cell” of the novel:
At the start of an episode, the main fact in the narrative unit is mentioned: it is 
usually the last, in chronological terms. In other words, the episode begins with 
a leap towards the future. . . . The narrative then jumps to the remotest past of 
the fact mentioned, whence it follows a linear chronological account of events, 
until it reaches the future fact that has been displaced and reported at the start 
of the episode: in this way the circle is closed, and the episode ends where it began, 
just as it had begun where it would end.79
This description of narrative time as a leap toward the future, a jump back 
to the remotest past, and return to the future fact that has been displaced 
and reported at the episode’s beginning describes almost exactly the struc-
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ture of New Day. Two important aspects distinguish Reid’s text’s staging of 
time from Márquez’s text’s. In the latter, the circular temporal motion of 
the novel is often sparked as a consequence of processes that begin outside 
of the nation and that produce decisive and lasting effects on its plot, trans-
forming it into a “Buddenbrooks in the context of the world-system.” The 
world system also produces decisive and lasting effects in New Day’s plot, 
but what sparks the temporal motion of each episode is not portrayed by the 
plot as economic processes that begin outside of the nation. What organizes 
the proleptic and analeptic epic structure and creates its temporal motion 
is something else: the syntactical structure of its vernacular. The novel’s 
temporality rehearses the rhythm of its linguistic code. This code is the 
crystallization of national as well as transnational forces and histories and 
also irreducible to them.
While New Day advises to “take time” in order to manage best the pro-
cesses it plots that begin outside the nation, from the beginning, the narra-
tive continuously leaps ahead and disobeys the order that vindicates law’s 
cognition of time as well as the concept of time underwriting the novel 
form as a nation form. The novel’s other refrain is “Is remember I remem-
ber,” which occurs in each episode. This refrain rehearses in miniature the 
almost circular temporal motion of the narrative that occurs in each of the 
novel’s episodes. “Is remember” is a comment delivered in each episode by 
the narrator from a point in the future; its utterance signifi es that the nar-
rative has leapt forward, jumped over a time that the text will then proceed 
to recount in the episode that follows so as to try to catch up with the point 
from which this account begins. Rather than progress immediately into its 
account of the past that has been leapt over, however, the text fi rst turns 
backward as the narrator repeats the phrase, yet with a difference: “I re-
member.” Just as the phrase begins with two words and travels backward, 
repeating the words with a difference (“Is remember I remember”), so too 
does the novel as a whole follow this structure. Every episode moves from 
a future to a past that has been leapt over, and then, instead of bringing 
us back to that exact moment from which the episode’s narration began, it 
leaps ahead, past events leading up to that moment and lands on a future 
moment from which the utterance “Is remember, I remember” will be is-
sued. The leap forward at the end of each episode spurs the cycle to begin 
again in the next episode. The narrative “circle” is never closed, therefore; 
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there is always a disjuncture, a leap forward, a refusal to “take time” that 
leaves each episode open.
The novel’s proleptic and recursive structure marks a departure from the 
novelistic structures that create the effect of an imagined national commu-
nity. Novels “take time,” we might say, and in doing so, they interpellate 
their readers and depict their characters in ways that Benedict Anderson 
argues distinguish it from the epic. The novel does not leap forward and 
backward through a limited perspective as the epic does, a form that histori-
cally precedes the development of nations and nationalisms. Simultaneity, a 
“meanwhile” that suggests temporal coincidence and an omniscient, “bird’s 
eye” view are the defi ning features of the novel form as nation form, Ander-
son maintains. The novel shows characters that might never interact or even 
meet progressing though an empty, homogenous time, and thus it simulates 
the nation as imagination of serialized, anonymous subjects both within the 
text and “in the minds of the omniscient readers.”80 By contrast, Reid’s novel 
does not take time and therefore does not generate this notion of the nation 
as serialized, anonymous subjects in either characters’ or readers’ minds. 
Rather than enact an omniscient perspective or the linear progression of ho-
mogenous empty time that facilitates national identifi cation and address—a 
concept of time on which the vindication of law is propped—New Day re-
hearses time as prefi guration and fulfi llment whose rhythm is forward, back-
ward, and forward again. Because of its epic form, then, it would seem this 
text is not even “modern” enough to be considered a “national” work, much 
less a world text. The novel’s epic form, however, enacts its connection to 
the nation and to the world beyond it because its temporality obeys the 
structure and rhythm of its “nation language”—a national language which, 
it turns out, is not one.
New Day’s narrative structure is modeled on the structure of its vernacular, 
a reworked mesolect of Jamaican Creole and British and American English. 
Reid provides a glossary of Creole terms and a note on Jamaican vernacular 
in which he underlines a particular feature of the grammar, the repetitions 
of words for emphasis and rhythm, and says this is what “give[s] the dialect 
its uniquely poetic character” (374). This repetition is evident in the refrain 
that triggers the “circle” that gives the work its “epic grandeur,” “Is remem-
ber I remember.” This spacing rhythm of a step forward and backward and 
then forward again structures the phrasing of memory as well as that of 
F6635.indb   163 9/23/15   9:24:52 AM
164   Vindicating the Law
textual temporality, as the text returns to 1865, then returns to 1944, then 
returns to 1882, then returns to 1944, and so forth, while never coinciding 
with its previous moment. Less of a circle, time is more of a spiral, which 
is itself, as Nico Israel argues, an aesthetic and politico-philosophical fea-
ture of global modernity that questions the closures of national discourse.81 
New Day’s temporal spiral does not imagine the nation in terms of serial-
ized subjects in empty time but does manifest the desire to reappropriate 
what had been devalued under antinationalist cultural programs—Jamaican 
Creole. By deploying Jamaican Creole’s rhythm as the basis for its temporal 
structure of leaping ahead and turning backward, Reid’s novel undercuts the 
ideology of tutelage expressed in the economic-political phrasing of “take 
time” and rejects the colonial models of acculturation that insisted that Brit-
ish English must replace Jamaican English and Creole.82 This epic tempo-
rality also stalls the progress narrative that vindicates law, as it continually 
transgresses the law of that law.
If it seems that New Day’s deployment of the linguistic mode simply re-
places its romantic hero’s global outlook by reasserting a concept of the 
nation as a Volk naturally connected to a language untouched by imperial 
modernity, this is not the case for a number of reasons. First, as discussed, 
the narrative time provided by the linguistic mode refuses the logic of se-
riality and temporal homogeneity associated with a literary imagination of 
nation form. Second, this “nation language” in fact belongs to no particular 
nation. Finally, Reid operates as a bricoleur, reappropriating linguistic mate-
rial of the past in order to denaturalize nation, language, and the connection 
between them and to address audiences both within and outside of the na-
tion. The apparent monologism of New Day is internally constituted by a 
multilingual bricolage. The glossary does seem to suggest that what we are 
reading is a language at once premodern and confi ned to Jamaica, though 
certainly also the result of extranational forces: “the dialectic spoken in Ja-
maica derives in part from the English of an earlier day and in part from 
Welsh. It is characterized by repetitions of words and by the use of forms 
that have gone out of fashion in England and the United States” (374). But 
the language of New Day is neither “premodern” nor a national language. 
This is not only for the more obvious reasons that, fi rst, there is no Jamaican 
monolinguilism because many dialects, mesolects, acrolects, and basolects 
are spoken, and, second, as a combination of Creole and Anglo-English, the 
F6635.indb   164 9/23/15   9:24:52 AM
Vindicating the Law   165
novel’s form of expression is also the result of a history of migrations and 
movements of peoples and languages shaped by the forces of imperialism 
and capitalism as well as resistance to these. Less obviously, this is because 
Reid employs a “vernacular” that is not spoken by anyone, anywhere. In an 
interview, Reid asserts that the novel’s language was an attempt to counter 
colonialist depictions of Jamaican history that served antinationalist agen-
das. His example is de Lisser, “one of the old fashioned brown imperial-
ists who thought people should be kept in their places,” whose novels put 
Jamaicans “in the worst light possible. . . . And so I thought the thing to 
do would be to write a book in the dialect, in the Jamaican vernacular.”83 
Although this statement seems to indicate that the novel, and specifi cally its 
language, serves a cultural nationalist program, Reid goes on to explain that 
the novel’s counter to colonialist representations of culture is not guided by 
an attempt to restore a true national language of the Volk nor to address a 
national audience alone, but a transnational one. Reid does not pretend that 
an anticolonial transnational address is divorced from economics, the pres-
sures of a transnational literary market, and he represents fi ction writing as 
a form of labor that deserves a livable wage:
The trouble was of course that being slightly commercial in my outlook, and 
also I think quite sensible, I saw no reason why the writer should really not 
make a living from his work. And so I decided that if I’m going to use the dia-
lect, it must be used so that it can be read by people all over the world, who can 
read English. And I went to work to style the language, the English language 
and the Jamaican vernacular . . . into the sort of language that people could read 
and understand, always bearing in mind very deliberately, that the rhythms, the 
beautiful rhythm of all the West Indian English-speaking people would be in 
the book as far as Jamaican rhythm and nuances were concerned.84
Moreover, rather than address English speakers within and outside of Ja-
maica in a familiar language, he sought to defamiliarize the language for 
them: “I devised this way of using some of the old Elizabethan styles but 
bringing in the atmosphere of the Jamaican language all set in a rhythm . . . 
and they’d understand the language although it was rather exotic to most 
of them, also to my own people.”85 Reid’s description of language as defa-
miliarizing, invented, and aimed beyond a single nation challenges George 
Lamming’s reading of Reid’s (and Sam Selvon’s) works’ language as pure, 
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unmediated “peasant tongue . . . no artifi ce of techniques, no sophisticated 
gimmicks.”86 It also troubles Lamming’s position that Reid’s ability to ren-
der this “organic music of the earth”87 is the result of his being more closely 
tied to the nation because he did not emigrate like so many other Caribbean 
writers. As Sylvia Wynter points out, Reid’s novel practices a psychic emi-
gration and return, if not a physical one.88
Rejecting a natural connection between nation and language through 
what Reid calls this “devised language,” New Day delivers a rejoinder to 
“take time” by practicing the temporality that underwrites demands for 
immediate sovereignty while detaching this temporality from ethnicist 
concepts of the nation as a demos rooted in language and shared tradition. 
Internally heterogeneous, this mode was a practical strategy that allowed 
Reid to address both Jamaican people and people who could read English 
all over the world, but without addressing them in the idioms of the domi-
nant and through the antinationalist cultural systems of de Lisser’s work. 
New Day therefore questions the ideology that vindicates English law and 
the progressive movement toward Enlightenment and modernity through a 
temporality modeled on the subnational discourse that is also transnational. 
This language forces readers to learn to engage with a language unfamiliar 
or defamiliarized that is not of the dominant. As the North American re-
viewer in the Sewanee Review noted in 1950, the novel forced readers “to re-
adjust . . . linguistic expectations.”89
Another way that New Day troubles the relationship between mono-
logism and polyphony, thereby challenging the vindication of British law 
and disturbing the conception of time as a progressive unfolding, occurs 
in a crucial scene. This scene elaborates the staging of testimony before 
the JRC. Rather than defi ning modernity as what gives rise to many voices, 
“cacophony,” or noise, as Moretti claims, New Day defi nes modernity as 
what silences many voices through colonial conquest and consolidation. The 
novel choreographs a scene of endeavoring to convoke those many voices in 
order to bear witness to a history of violence that challenges England’s legal 
response to the rebellion. This depiction refuses the idea that underwrote 
the concept of necessity—that the rebellion was a traumatic rupture that 
provoked an exceptional manifestation of British violence. The rebellion is a 
trauma that silences witnesses, the novel maintains, but also insists that the 
rebellion is not a rupture and that the violence practiced by the colonial state 
during the counterinsurgency is not exceptional.
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When Davie Campbell bears witness before the commissioners, his tes-
timony is orchestrated not simply as his own voice but as prosopopeia: as 
spectral witnessing. Davie asks the commissioners, “Do you know how we 
came these last three years? Or how we come before that?” (207). In other 
words, he asks them do they know how and when the rebellion originated. 
Their reaction is “Just what do you mean, Campbell?” (207). His response 
is presented not as his testimony but as an effort to speak for those who can-
not, without guarantee that he can speak for them. “That now I would speak 
for the dead ones!” (207), he responds. The conditional tense is crucial because 
it expresses the act of speaking for others as a necessary betrayal. It acknowl-
edges that this witness cannot stand in for all those others who were de-
prived of the capacity to bear witness as a consequence of historical traumas 
of imperial modernity that precede the rebellion. Through this testimonial 
act—a speech act presented here as neither verifi able or even rigorously 
possible—the novel acknowledges the limits of using a single heroic fi gure 
as the conscript of modernity and recognizes that a brown middle-class wit-
ness cannot speak for all those who have lived and died under slavery and 
colonialism. This testimony passes through that impasse by translating col-
lective damages into wrongs before the JRC, breaking the protocols of this 
inquiry, which was based on individual eyewitness accounts of events that 
transpired during October 1865. “I would speak for such as do no’ speak any 
more! I would tell you that for two hundred years before October gone, men 
were a-march on Morant Bay courthouse. Say it was not from Stony Gut 
they marched, nor Bath Town, nor Port Morant, nor Cuna Cuna Mountain. 
Say that they marched from all over the island and ha’ been marching for 
two hundred years!” (208, my emphasis).
This insurgent testimony presents history as a steady destruction under 
British power and situates the Morant Bay rebellion not as the exceptional 
event that shamed English law and required its vindication but rather as 
the rule of British law’s “shaming” of labor. “For these two hundred years 
they saw the shaming of man’s highest calling—the calling o’ labor with the 
hands” (208), Davie testifi es. The rebellion is another effect of the culmina-
tion of events that began in Jamaica with chattel slavery and, most recently, 
with the postemancipation government’s withholding of lands for Jamaicans 
to work. After emancipation, black and brown Jamaicans obtain their own 
lands and can leave the white landowner’s estates, but by “that time, then, 
there is no labor, and there is new laws in the House o’ Assembly which 
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will prevent people getting good lands to buy, so they will return to buckra 
estates. There is even talk among the plantermen of bringing indentured 
labor from India and China” (211). By attempting to bear witness for those 
who do not share the witness’s privileged economic and racial status, Davie 
presents the representatives of English law with a portrayal of the Morant 
Bay rebellion not as an exception, “an interruption in the otherwise smooth 
functioning of lawful politics,”90 which forms the basis of the legal concept 
of necessity, but as business as usual in the longue durée of imperial political 
economy whose networks are ever expanding and globalizing.
As such, the rebellion exceeds resolution by English law even as it de-
mands a response in the form of an offi cial inquiry. Testimony in the novel 
therefore exposes the failures of England’s response to the crisis. As the legal 
scholar Rande W. Kostal notes, “to the modern observer, to many con-
temporaries, the Government’s obsession with things legal was more than 
passing strange. After all, in the 1860s Jamaica faced profound economic 
and social crises. The sugar economy had collapsed, and nothing viable had 
taken its place. The colony was densely populated but desperately poor. 
Race relations were hopelessly poisoned,” yet “the leaders of the imperial 
state in London either did not want— or did not know how—to respond to 
the Jamaican crisis at the level of political economy. What it thought to do . 
. . was consult lawyers and mount a series of legal initiatives.”91 The govern-
ment attempts to remedy what it mistakes as a rupture through law.
Ultimately, however, New Day, too, puts its faith in English law to re-
deem the rebellion. Although the prosopopeia before the JRC and the tem-
porality and address of the linguistic code intercept the relentless unfolding 
of the dialectic that vindicates law, the progress narrative triumphs in the 
end. Davie is reborn and improved in the lawyer Garth, and by the third 
section of the novel, the British English spoken by this romantic hero is 
far more dominant than the devised language that organizes the entire fi rst 
section but that slowly retreats as the novel continues.92 Reid attributes this 
disappearance to the fact that the “foreign editors” liked the idea because it 
would give those outside of Jamaica a chance to “catch their breath.”93 It is 
diffi cult, however, not to read the shift from one linguistic code to another 
also as another indication of the tension the novel conveys between taking 
time and leaping ahead. This tension manifests an ambivalence toward its 
vindications of English law. For these reasons, New Day is not a total rupture 
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from the literary history to which it reacts, and it remains attached to the 
models from which Reid attempts to break, specifi cally de Lisser’s. Not until 
a decade after New Day is published will Reid move closer to acknowledging 
in literary form the violence of English law, which again occurs through the 
interruption of testimony.
Story of the Eye: Sixty-Five’s Pedagogy of Perception
It is not surprising that Reid would revisit the Morant Bay rebellion in 1960, 
two years before Jamaica achieves full national independence. During this 
era, the rebellion became the site of renewed interest in culture and politics, 
and it was reinvented as the origin of the new nation.94 Also not surprising 
is that Reid would revisit the rebellion in the form of a young-adult novella. 
Reid’s commitment to intervening in colonial constructions of Jamaican his-
tory extended beyond his novel writing; he also wrote books for schoolchil-
dren, including The Young Warriors, which tells the story of the Maroons, 
and Peter of Mount Ephraim, which examines the Sam Sharpe rebellion. Like 
New Day, Sixty-Five presents history as a family saga, though here narrative 
time is linear and spans only a short period before, during, and after the 
rebellion. Paralleling the middle-class brown family the Campbells are the 
Murrays, a black family of lesser means whose father and son also clash over 
the insurgency. Like New Day, this novel places hope for the future in the 
grandson, who, like Garth Campbell, represents a synthesis of the father 
and grandfather’s confl icting perspectives. Twelve-year-old Japheth is not 
only the narrator but also the novel’s main focalizer, and the narrative con-
sistently highlights his and others’ acts of looking to carry out its pedagogic 
mission. That mission is to train its readers to fi nd the correct angle of vision 
through which to view the past in order to judge the best way to proceed 
toward the future.
Whereas the confl ict that centers New Day pivots on a cognition of 
time—whether to leap forward immediately or wait to confront colonial 
power—the central confl ict of Sixty-Five is fi gured in terms of a cognition 
of space: whether to advance and attack or “fall back” from colonial power. 
By advocating the latter and deploying it as a refrain, Sixty-Five, like New 
Day, endeavors to vindicate English law. But as is also the case in the earlier 
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novel, in the later one this vindication is interrupted. Here, the interruption 
occurs through the novel’s elaboration of double vision, a critical strategy 
about which the work says little but regularly puts on display through its 
handling of focalization.
This critical strategy discloses an orchestration of British legal violence 
in imperial history that the novel will not express through the voices of 
its characters—indeed, that its most privileged character will deny. The 
disclosure articulates history as structured by paradoxes and reversals and 
demonstrates that it conscripts subjects into complicity with colonial sub-
jectifi cations, both their own and those of others. This is history as tragedy 
rather than epic romance. In tragedy, as Scott asserts, “the relation between 
past, present, and future is never a Romantic one in which history rides a 
triumphant and seamlessly progressive rhythm, but a broken series of para-
doxes and reversals in which human action is ever open to unaccountable 
contingencies.”95
Sixty-Five provides two different testimonies to the Morant Bay rebellion, 
one through voice and another through vision, reminding us of the distinc-
tion between focalization, the narrative act of looking, and the broader term 
narrative perspective, which can include voice.96 The story told through 
voice is complicated through the story told through acts of looking. This 
story of the eye does not contradict the novel’s order to fall back vocalized 
by the grandfather, “an old servant of the Crown”97 who served in the West 
Indian regiment. It does, however, reconfi gure the meaning of those words 
to reject his claim that the counterinsurgency is an act of exceptional vio-
lence. “Never have I beheld the Crown dragged through the mud the way 
Governor Eyre has done. The Queen will be ashamed” (99), Joe Murray 
complains. The novel’s drama of focalization challenges both of Murray’s 
statements.
Sixty-Five calls attention to characters’ eyes on almost every page, usually 
multiple times, detailing how characters see, the angles from which they 
direct their gazes, and assessing whether they possess suitable distance from 
the objects of their regard. At times the book’s illustrations’ constructions 
of focalization depart from the narrative’s verbal focalization of the scene 
represented; at other times they overlap. Readers are sutured to different 
perspectives by each illustration so they “see” events from different angles, 
through the eyes of different characters. The novel fi rst introduces a drama 
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of looking through text and image in an episode that also underlines a dis-
tinction between voice and vision. Here, both text and illustration make 
readers aware of the importance of looking. The narrator relates that “when 
I entered the hall and blinked the glare from my eyes, what I saw sent me 
quietly to my stool near the window. . . . I turned my rounded eyes toward 
[Queenie],” and he asks his sister about the meaning of the conference oc-
curring between their father and grandfather. “Be quiet,” Queenie responds, 
“you should be seen and not heard” (7). An illustration following this text 
places Grandpa Joe in the foreground. His most striking feature, his one 
good eye, squints critically at his rebel son and at the novel’s readers, who 
are sutured to the latter’s point of view and positioned at a 180-degree angle 
from the narrator, who watches the drama unfold from the background. 
Grandpa Murray was “always telling his friends about my ‘sharp black eyes,’ ” 
the narrator boasts; “he always said there was nothing I missed” (8).
The novel implies that gaining control over the rebellion requires that 
one see clearly. Before Japheth schools Queenie on recent events leading up 
to the rebellion, the Queen’s advice and the Underhill meetings, the novel 
relates twice that he “cleared the shreds of cerosee bush from [his] eyes” 
(31). Seeing clearly is a problem for the rebels. One insurgent is twice noted 
to be “near-sighted” (15, 17), and Bogle himself is blindsided by the coun-
terinsurgency. Sixty-Five’s Bogle is not a secessionist but a loyal subject of 
the Queen. Neither a persecutor nor vulture, as in New Day, Bogle comes 
under assault here for his ways of looking, which prevent him from heed-
ing the old soldier Murray’s advice to fall back. When we fi rst encounter 
the Minister, his eyes are “fl ashing like swords around him, thrusting into 
the crowd” (18). When he speaks of preparing to march on the Morant Bay 
courthouse his eyes are not wide open but “half-closed like Queenie’s, when 
she daydreamed that she was a great lady in silks and satins” (72). Surprised 
by the immediate launching of a counterinsurgency, Bogle’s “eyes closed to 
mere slits” (75) when he hears the news.
What of the single eye of the grandfather who has fought for the empire 
“all his youthful days” (10)? Using “the one good eye an Indian spearman 
left him with when he campaigned in Central America” (10), Murray teaches 
Japheth the best angle from which to view the current confl ict, that is, from 
a distance instead of in its midst. On the day of the rebellion, the two leave 
the square in front of the Morant Bay courthouse for a place “a bit up the 
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side of the gorge. We had the gorge below us and we could see everything 
as if they were on the stage and we were in the gallery” (46). This com-
ment instructs readers that remaining outside the fray, falling back, allows 
a better vantage point from which to perceive the entire situation. Murray 
scrutinizes the colonial government’s militiamen, “his one eye tearing into 
[them], seeing all their faults” (48). This scene fi guratively criticizes anti-
colonial violence as lexis talionis, an eye for an eye. Of the crowd, Japheth 
relates, “There were scores of others perched on the scaffolding, looking 
down like huge birds. Maybe, I thought, they will take wings and fl y down 
to peck out the small eyes of the lieutenant peering out below the peak of 
his cap” (50). After the lieutenant prohibits the rebels from crossing into the 
vestry, Murray remarks, “A good man, that” (51). The power of Murray’s 
“one sharp eye,” which can access the future by looking toward the past, 
contrasts with the nearsighted and cloudy vision of the rebels. Because they 
are unprepared for the force of the counterinsurgency, their response proves 
disorganized, foolhardy, and futile.
By making a servant of the crown and the critic of the rebellion the voice 
of reason with the best view of events, and having him condemn the coun-
terinsurgency as exceptional violence that will shame the Queen, Sixty-Five, 
like New Day and Revenge before it, also appears to vindicate British law. But 
appearances are deceiving, and things not always clear in this novel. The 
deployment of two trompe l’oeil challenges the distinction between law and 
violence that subtends the grandfather’s baffl ement at the brutality of the 
counterinsurgency. Only by learning to recognize a trompe l’oeil for what it 
is— only by seeing double—can readers view what the novel refuses to state: 
As long as it has operated in the service of quashing anticolonial resistance, 
British law has been violent.
Two overdetermined emblems teach that having one’s eyes deceive one 
can lead to unexpected and violent consequences. The fi rst emblem is the 
Murrays’ donkey. The opening chapter describes how “one morning the 
soft brown eyes had fooled us” (4 –5) and assures readers “none of us would 
ever forget that morning” (4 –5). The unforgettable event is a show of force 
and violent disruption that is the result of thinking that things are as they 
appear. It is a result of being fooled by the eyes—both by one’s own and 
by those of others who appear nonviolent. The donkey’s “soft brown eyes” 
indicate that she is securely tied down, intends no resistance, and poses no 
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threat. “We had put on the harness and hampers and stepped away from her. 
And before you could yell ‘Look out!’—forward had gone her forefeet, in-
ward had shot her hindlegs, and she had slipped to the ground, trying to kick 
in the air, while carrots and cassavas and sweet potatoes and tomatoes were 
smashed and tumbled all over the yard” (4 –5). This cautionary tale seems 
to cast the animal as Morant Bay rebel, an interpretation strengthened when 
in subsequent chapters she is twice identifi ed with the narrator’s insurgent 
father. But she is also fi gured as the ostensible opposite of a rebel: “She was 
big and strong, with a head on her shoulders that she must have stolen from 
a Morant Bay lawyer” (3), and in fact, “Grandpa said [she] was smarter than 
a lawyer” (4). This fi gure not only fools the narrator but also fools readers if 
their perspectives separate law from the disruption of law. Law and its vio-
lent suspension must be seen as inhabiting a single image. This trompe l’oeil 
intimates the violence structuring law in Jamaica and suggests it is “illegiti-
mate” or at least ungrounded, by connecting it to insurgency and rebellion 
that challenge offi cial law. The other trompe l’oeil, the weapon used in the 
West Indian regiment, expands this disclosure of violence and ungrounded-
ness to include British law.
Like that of the donkey, the meaning of the grandfather’s gun is over-
determined, but recognizing this fi gure as a trompe l’oeil proves far more 
diffi cult. This diffi culty suggests that not only the grandfather but also Reid 
does and does not want to disclose the truth this fetish conceals and reveals: 
that whenever British law operates in territories of colonial contestation it 
is caught up in a history that resembles the tragedy, not epic romance, of 
Enlightenment reason. The gun, like the donkey, serves pedagogical pur-
poses. Murray uses it to educate and discipline the narrator and his sister 
by calling them to attention and chronicling the past. The musket that ac-
companied the grandfather on military campaigns is a precious object in the 
narrative. He keeps it “glistening with care. He called it Beelzebub because, 
he said, it had done the Devil’s work in its time” (10). Readers might wonder 
why a critic of anticolonial revolt and a “strong Church of England man” 
(30) would expend so much energy on such a profane object. It is, however, 
precisely the paradoxical character of this situation that makes the gun an 
important teaching tool, one whose effects extend beyond the purposes to 
which the character, and even perhaps the author, put it. At one point, Mur-
ray uses the musket to educate and discipline Bogle and the rebels. Here the 
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novel resists what it simultaneously avows about the relation between British 
law, violence, and history.
An episode that rehearses the musket’s concealment and revelation shows 
how it fools the rebels’ eyes. “Nobody could know that beneath that blue 
coat was the musket that had won for England the war in Haiti . . . and 
had quelled the mutiny at Fort Augusta” (25), the narrator relates. Murray 
waits for Bogle to approach and then confronts him and his men. The novel 
makes much of the revelation: “ ‘A great Israelite,’ Grandpa said, his voice 
wrathful. ‘A man of peace, a singer of psalms who believes in this!’ Down he 
swooped to brush aside the coat and sweep Beelzebub into his hand. There 
was a long-drawn aaah from the men as the afternoon light spoke of beauty 
in the oiled stock and shining iron of the gun” (27). But exactly what has 
been revealed? Despite this elaborate spectacle of unveiling, is it at all clear 
that once the concealed weapon has been made visible, its meaning has also 
been made known? The use of the pronoun “this!” is a symptom of the 
novel’s diffi culty in naming a referent.
The rebels’ enthrallment with the shiny surface indicates that the gun is 
a fetish whose surface masks another meaning. The gun indexes a history 
that is itself overdetermined. The four military theaters in which the mus-
ket has seen action condense complicity and reversals between colonial and 
anticolonial forces, muddying clear lines between colonial and anticolonial 
projects. By referencing “the war in Haiti,” the War of 1812, the battles over 
the Mosquito Coast, and the slave mutiny at Fort Augusta as events in which 
the colonial subject has been conscripted, Sixty-Five’s articulation of history 
departs from the model of progressive history articulated in New Day. This 
novel edges closer toward acknowledging the paradoxes and inversions that 
attend conscription. In each of the fi rst three examples named, the British 
have aided anticolonial resistance but have done so in support of colonial in-
terests. The British aligned with Toussaint not from a moral commitment to 
a free Haiti but because of economic interests and battles with the French. 
The War of 1812 pits former colonizers against former colonized, but the 
once-colonized are also colonizers. Britain’s alliances with Native Americans 
obstruct U.S. settler colonialism, but again, these alliances were motivated 
by British interests. In Central America, the British aided the Miskite Indi-
ans in resisting other regional forces but did so to safeguard their economic 
interests in the mahogany trade. The complicity of the subjects of empire 
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with British imperial violence is crystallized in the events at Fort Augusta, 
where the slaves who were taken to Jamaica to become part of the West In-
dian regiment revolted, and the mutiny was put down brutally not only by 
the British but by other soldiers in the regiment.
Each event named, therefore, bears witness to the doubling of anticolo-
nial and colonial force, reminding us how one slides into the other, how one 
uses the techniques of the other. To be a conscript of modernity is not only, 
as New Day relates, to use the techniques of colonial education to generate 
a successful anticolonial resistance. It is also to use these techniques to sup-
port the systems of slavery and colonial subjection that constitute imperial 
modernity. Sixty-Five portrays the history of conscription less as romance 
and more as tragedy, or even trauma. It suggests “the past is a wound, it is 
one that may not heal; it cannot be evaded or cleanly overcome. It doesn’t 
go away by an act of heroic agency. . . . History, in short, is not a series of 
neat resolutions; the future does not grow triumphantly out of the wicked 
turmoil of the past.”98
The novel cannot state this, however; it can only perform it. The his-
torical condition of conscription is a trauma the text (dis)avows through 
a fetish that disrupts the coherence of the pedagogical scene in which it 
is called upon to offer up its truth. The trauma of conscription is avowed 
and disavowed in the pronoun “this!” whose exclamatory force registers at 
once the desire and failure to say what the text never does utter aloud—that 
anticolonial and British law are both violent, neither “legitimate” in them-
selves. Reid’s text thus performs both an acknowledgment, and the diffi culty 
of acknowledging the character of law, which West’s trial report also per-
formed. “This!” is a testimony, a call to investigate what its referent might 
be. The pronoun is a sign that the novel cannot decide whether to vindicate 
British law or to accuse it, and this failure to decide destroys the coherence 
of Murray’s accusation. When Murray insists Bogle believes in “this,” what 
the gun signifi es, the implication is that he believes in using violence toward 
anticolonial ends. But as the examples above relate, the gun condenses the 
long history of British violence as well and collusions and slippages between 
colonizer and colonized. Because it choreographs this scene as the revela-
tion of a trompe l’oeil, the novel implies that Murray brandishes the gun to 
show Bogle that his eyes deceive him and thus to convince Bogle to fall back. 
The pedagogical aim of the gun, therefore, is similar to that of the donkey, 
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that is, to warn of a disruptive violence to come that one cannot see if one 
fails to recognize the coexistence of violence and law. Therefore, the gun 
represents not (only) what Bogle believes in but what he does not believe in, 
what he cannot see: that imminent anticolonial violence is inextricable from 
imminent British state violence. The incoherence of the accusation discloses 
that Eyre’s counterinsurgency is not an example of exceptional violence, as 
the grandfather claims. The advice to “fall back” is issued not, as is “take 
time” in New Day, as a call to use law rather than rebellion against law to 
ground resistance. It is issued as a warning that imperial responses to revolt 
are brutal, and this violence operates in the name of reestablishing British 
law, which is thus precarious, always on shaky ground.
New Day insisted that rebellion could not found an independent Jamaica 
because only by “marching under the banner of the law” can a nation be-
come free, but Sixty-Five is far less clear on this point. The novel’s own 
double vision, its connecting of British law to violence in these two trompe 
l’oeil, leaves undecided whether law should dominate and control rebellion 
or rebellion should challenge law. The novel’s conclusion has Murray teach 
his grandson “Discipline—knowing how to obey orders—that is the rule 
for victory, Japheth . . . you cannot win battles if you have no discipline” 
(108). What follows is another instance of the paradoxes and reversals that 
compose the history embedded within and fi gured by the gun. Murray uses 
the weapon that served British power to stall it: “Grandpa’s hands were busy 
as he loaded like lightning and the musket spoke again and again” (109). 
In New Day, the conscript harnesses British legal tutelage to redeem the 
violence of rebellion. In Sixty-Five, the conscript marshals British military 
tutelage to repel what the novel implies is inextricable from British law—
violence. The novel’s fi nal words are doubled and overdetermined and can 
be read as a compromise formation that both connects and disconnects this 
novel from Reid’s earlier work. Murray and Japheth head into the mountains 
to wait out the counterinsurgency; “I jerked the rope which was her bridle 
and turned her head up the mountain. . . . Theresa went willingly, with the 
butt of Grandpa’s musket persuading her in the rear” (110). Because both 
emblems are doubled, rebel and law, anticolonial and British force, they are 
doubles of each other. The novel leaves undecided whether rebellion should 
master law or law master rebellion. This undecidability indicates that even 
on the brink of full Jamaican independence, Sixty-Five does not, or cannot, 
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entirely break from the desire to vindicate British law. Unlike New Day, 
however, it acknowledges this inability to do so as part of the trauma of the 
history of conscription in imperial modernity.
Emergency increasingly became the rule rather than the exception as the 
empire grew and as it declined. Hussain writes, “In the colonies martial law 
was frequently resorted to throughout the nineteenth-century: Barbados in 
1805 and 1816; Demerera in 1823; Jamaica in 1831–32 and 1865; Canada 
in 1837–38; Ceylon in 1817 and 1848; Cephalonia in 1848; Cape of Good 
Hope in 1834 and 1849–51; and the Island of St. Vincent in 1863. All of these 
instances . . . produced debate, controversy, and an effort at justifi cation.”99 
In the twentieth century, in response to imperialism’s decline, Emergency is 
declared in colonies such as India and Kenya. We discussed the situation of 
the emergency in India in the introduction’s analysis of A Passage to India. I 
turn in the next and fi nal chapter to a work that approaches the Emergency 
in Kenya. It is written soon after Kenyan independence, when the history 
of conscription, its paradoxes and reversals, have emerged in the form of a 
system of global capitalism and a neocolonial government that has betrayed 
the hopes of the nation by repressing traumas that occurred under the emer-
gency. Ngũgi wa Thiong’o’s A Grain of Wheat makes no attempt to vindicate 
law. Instead it elaborates a struggle to fi nd a language with which to speak 
to and of the past that does not repeat the silencing that occurs under fi rst 
British, and then Kenyan, law. Through this elaboration, the work questions 
the boundaries between modernist and postcolonial literatures.
F6635.indb   177 9/23/15   9:24:53 AM
178
f o u r
Testimony and the Crisis of the Juridical Order in Ngũgi wa 
Thiong’o’s A Grain of Wheat
African literature, even that in European languages, starts with that 
rejection of the master’s narrative of history.
— n g ũ g i  w a  t h i o n g ’ o ,  Globalectics
The previous chapter sought to enrich a postcolonial studies dominated by 
the cultural problematic of migrancy and deterritorialization by analyzing 
writings of colonial and postcolonial authors that were not migration nar-
ratives but that instead bore witness from within the nation to law’s disrup-
tion of it. This fi nal chapter also focuses on a work that eschews a narra-
tive of movement out of the nation for one of detention inside it. Like the 
Jamaicans Reid and de Lisser, the Kenyan Ngũgi wa Thiong’o elaborates 
how traumas of a colonial past under Emergency threaten the transition 
from colony to postcolony. Ngũgi’s postindependence 1967 novel A Grain of 
Wheat rewrites Under Western Eyes, Joseph Conrad’s novel from 1911, which 
Chapter 1 explored. Scholars once censured Ngũgi for using the work of 
the novelist of European imperialism as a template for representing African 
history under colonialism, but more recent studies argue that Ngũgi is criti-
cal of Conrad’s modernist depiction of revolution even as he uses it to warn 
against the dangers of an emerging neocolonial state in Kenya.1
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Like Conrad’s novel, Ngũgi’s is directed toward its protagonist’s con-
fession of betrayal. Featuring fl ashbacks and diversions into 150 years of 
Kenyan history, but focusing most prominently on the Mau Mau uprising 
and counterinsurgency, A Grain of Wheat takes place four days before Inde-
pendence in 1963 and leads toward a commemorative event, the honoring 
of fallen freedom fi ghters at the Uhuru celebrations. “Let it never be said 
Thabai dragged to shame the names of the sons she lost in war. No. We 
must raise them—even from the dead—to share it with us,”2 Warui, a vil-
lage elder insists. Mugo has been called upon to make the dead speak, not 
least of all the heroic insurgent Kihika, whom the community does not know 
Mugo betrayed to the colonial authorities. Mugo’s testimony on indepen-
dence day is not the prosopopeia of insurgents, however, but a confession to 
his betrayal of the movement’s leader.
Mugo’s confession is always read as the textual act that most clearly ex-
presses Ngũgi’s wish to halt the compulsive repetition of betrayals the novel 
claims defi nes colonial, and newly postcolonial, Kenya. The text tells us, 
repeatedly, that “life was only a constant repetition of what happened yes-
terday and the day before” (269), from its most mundane to spectacular 
aspects: Mugo “liked porridge in the morning. But whenever he took it, he 
remembered the half-cooked porridge he ate in detention . . . everything 
repeats itself . . . the day ahead would be just like yesterday and the day 
before” (4). Betrayals reconsolidate colonial structures after eruptions of an-
ticolonial resistance seem about to destroy them once and for all. The most 
recent at the time of writing occurs under Jomo Kenyatta’s rule. The novel 
refers to it by having characters imagine what does in fact come to pass after 
Kenyatta is tried for insurgency in The Queen against Kenyatta and others. 
“They avoided talking about Jomo or speculating about the outcome of the 
case in Kapenguria,” the novel relates. “Long ago, young Harry [Thuku] 
had also been detained, and sentenced to live alone. . . . He had come back 
a broken man, who promised eternal co-operation with his oppressors, de-
nouncing the Party he had helped to build. What happened yesterday could 
happen today. The same thing, over and over again, through history” (122). 
Kenyatta betrayed the independence movement by ordering a compulsory 
forgetting of the Emergency and establishing the conditions for a compra-
dor state. He described Mau Mau as “a disease that needed to be eradicated, 
and must never be remembered again”; as one historian notes, “Kenyatta’s 
F6635.indb   179 9/23/15   9:24:53 AM
180   Testimony and the Crisis of the Juridical Order
use of criminal analogies and disease metaphors directly recalled the British 
discourse on Mau Mau.”3 Critics contend that Mugo’s confession speaks 
directly to Kenyatta’s betrayals of the community, exposing and condemn-
ing the ethos of individualism underwriting economic and political policies 
that organize the neocolonial state.4 As Byron Caminero-Santangelo argues, 
this confession dispels irony, which in the novel perpetuates deception and 
trust in individuals as false heroes. Mugo shares “his true history, with the 
community,” and his confession is “also an act of self-sacrifi ce for the good 
of that community.”5 The narrative seems to support this reading of confes-
sion as sacrifi cial when it relates immediately after the confession occurs 
that “a few other elders remained behind to complete the sacrifi ce before 
the storm” (253).
Throughout the text, however, practices of witnessing push against the 
dominant assessment of Mugo’s confession; they also constitute a signifi -
cant, unexpected, and unexplored departure from those of Conrad’s novel. 
Whether readers criticize or commend Ngũgi’s adaptation of Under Western 
Eyes, they have neglected a major formal contrast between the works: the 
treatment of confession. While Conrad’s novel multiplies confessions end-
lessly, A Grain of Wheat withholds them. It is surprising that formal tactics 
would differentiate two works that share a plot of revolution and its betrayal 
because form is what connects these writers while perspectives toward revo-
lution set them apart. Ngũgi explains the attraction Conrad held for him in 
his early career as a novelist. He admired Conrad in part because here was a 
colonial subject who wrote in, and thus had to negotiate with, a language that 
was not his fi rst (or even second): English.6 Also, although Ngũgi remained 
critical of what he calls Conrad’s liberal humanist support of imperialism, he 
found the formal procedures of Conrad’s work “tantalising” and employed 
them to compose what he names the Afro-European novel.7 This “hybrid 
form” arises in the midst of the worldwide postwar anti-imperialist upheav-
als, continues after the postindependence betrayal of national liberations, and 
attempts to represent, address, and touch the peasantry and working classes. 
But this genre is still confi ned within European languages and can only reach 
the petty bourgeoisie, Ngũgi acknowledges. Because A Grain of Wheat is such 
a novel, it must therefore make all the more effort to work against its limiting 
condition in order to loosen itself from the colonial legacy it bears and risks 
perpetuating through its linguistic expression.8 As Ngũgi famously argued 
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in Decolonizing the Mind, “the domination of a people’s language by the lan-
guages of the colonizing nations was crucial to the domination of the mental 
universe of the colonized.”9 The tactics Ngũgi employs in A Grain of Wheat, 
however, are frequently associated with an aesthetic discourse thought to 
convey colonialist mindsets—European modernism. Ngũgi explained why 
these tactics, rather than conventions of realism and naturalism that shape so 
much colonial and postcolonial African literature, were useful for compos-
ing the story of Kenyan history and people. “The story-within-a-story was 
part and parcel of the conversational norms of the peasantry,” he relates. 
“The linear/biographical unfolding of a story was more removed from ac-
tual social practice than the narrative of Conrad.”10 Given his admiration for 
Conrad’s use of form, it is notable that Ngũgi modifi es, even jettisons, the 
organizing formal strategy of the particular Conrad novel he selects to tell 
the story of Kenya on the brink of independence.
We should consider, then, what it is about the specifi c historical and 
literary-historical situation that encourages or even demands this formal 
change. Not only does A Grain of Wheat take as its focus a turning point in 
Kenyan history, the transition from colony to postcolony; it is also written 
in a moment of limbo. It is composed after what Ngũgi identifi es as the 
fi rst period of African literature, which manifests “self-assuredness, a confi -
dence . . . optimism” in the emergent nation,11 and before the third period, 
those works that were to “reveal what really had been happening in the six-
ties: the transition from the colonial to the neocolonial stage.”12 During the 
intermediary period of independence, the structural shifts in national and 
global forces have not yet become clear:
The writer in this period was still limited by his inadequate grasp of the full 
dimension of what was really happening in the sixties: the international and 
national realignment of class forces and class alliances. What the writer often 
reacted to was the visible lack of moral fi bre of the new leadership and not 
necessarily the structural basis of that lack of a national moral fi bre . . . although 
the literature produced was incisive in its description, it was nevertheless char-
acterized by a sense of despair. The writer in this period often retreated into 
individualism, cynicism or into empty moral appeals for a change of heart.13
Ngũgi is not discussing his own work here (at least not directly), but his 
remarks might pertain to A Grain of Wheat. In contrast to his later fi ction’s 
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foregrounding of the structural basis of the nation’s turmoil, the effects of 
global capitalism and internal class struggle, this work foregrounds the psy-
chology of betrayal— of Mugo’s and of many other characters. The novel’s 
examination of a pivotal moment in Kenya through characterological dra-
mas of betrayal suggests that it believes that historical confl icts can be ex-
plained by individual moral shortcomings and psychological motivations. 
It would seem, therefore, that this work is “characterized by a sense of de-
spair.” Readers have indeed argued that this is the case.14 Yet the text’s man-
agement of silence and speech around the novel’s betrayals indicates, on the 
contrary, that problems emerging in the new nation cannot be understood 
this way—that they possess a structural basis. That structure is the deploy-
ment of state power during colonial modernity, which reaches a crisis point 
during the Emergency: it creates an impasse of witnessing, making confes-
sions to the past at once necessary and diffi cult, if not impossible.
In both demonstrating and negotiating this impasse while confronting 
its underlying conditions—a suspension of law under a state of exception, 
whose brutalities the English state only began to address legally in 2011—
the novel replaces cynicism or despair, the responses of a literature unaware 
of structural conditions shaping the nation-state, with a modernist response 
that questions traditional and revised defi nitions of modernism. This re-
sponse challenges the perceived rupture between modernism and African 
postcolonial literature as well as the notion that A Grain of Wheat is a copy 
of a modernist source text. Because formal elements distinct from, as well 
as those that overlap with, Conrad’s novel are harnessed to different ends in 
the Kenyan work, the latter cannot be understood as a “belated” modern-
ism. This harnessing also pressures Eurocentric tendencies in global mod-
ernist studies to approach modernism as an enlightened aesthetic discourse 
that exposes nationalism as a retrograde ideology of a residual political form 
while articulating alternative—diasporic and cosmopolitan—identities 
and commitments. Postcolonial scholars have highlighted the differences 
between Anglo-European modernism and that of African writers and have 
sought to reconfi gure the category modernism from the perspective of the 
latter. Neil Lazarus maintains that African literature requires an expansion 
of the term modernism that also replaces the fetishization of particular aes-
thetic techniques with attention to the political work such techniques per-
form.15 Simon Gikandi describes that work as giving symbolic form to the 
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nation. “While their Western counterparts sought to use the ideology of 
modernism to undo nationalism, African artists adopted the same ideology 
to imagine and to will into being new nations,” Gikandi writes, and he re-
marks that “nationalism has become a dirty word in some circles, but for the 
colonized it was a redemptive project that needed an aesthetic dimension in 
order to fulfi ll its mandate.”16 Ngũgi writes A Grain of Wheat when confi -
dence in the nation-state is eroding under the weight of global capitalism, 
with which national elites collude, yet when the nation-state also remains 
a form many still hope can be marshaled to resist the depredations of an 
expanding neoimperial world system. The novel strives to address the past 
in ways that would bolster the nation against a future shaped by historical 
amnesia imposed by a neocolonial regime complicit with contemporaneous 
globalization but also strives to detach a national imagination from a history 
of colonial thought and language that authorizes practices of exceptional 
violence. The orchestration of testimonial speech, and testimonial silence, is 
the vehicle of this striving.
Ellipses
As many have noted, A Grain of Wheat is replete with silences, a fact that 
seems strange when we consider that the novel is written to give voice to the 
Emergency. British colonial and postindependence Kenyan governments 
both attempted to foreclose the possibility of bearing witness to this period of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency that lasted from 1952 to 1960. The novel 
relates the effects of foreclosed attestation when it describes insurgents
abandoned in a desert where not even a straying voice from the world of men 
could reach them. This frightened Gikonyo, for who, then, would come to 
rescue them? The sun would scorch them dead and they would be buried in the 
hot sand where the traces of their graves would be lost forever . . . that his iden-
tity even in death would be wiped from the surface of the earth was a recurring 
thought that often brought him into a cold sweat on cold nights.
(123)
This fear of silencing in turn silences, for “at such times, words formed 
in prayer would not leave his throat” (123). If it is crucial that being bur-
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ied without a grave, trace, or remainder, left unmourned and forgotten, 
not occur, then the novel’s central rhetorical strategy poses a conundrum. 
That strategy is ellipses, the repeated imposition of silence where speech is 
anticipated.
Although the work’s “excessive silences”17 have been noticed, unacknowl-
edged is that these silences are systematic: they emerge wherever confessions 
are anticipated, and they are created by ellipses. This device thus insists on 
the importance of confessions, paradoxically by preventing them. “Ellipsis” 
derives from the Greek ellipsis, “a falling short, defect, ellipse,” from elleipein, 
“to fall short, leave out,” from en- in + leipein, “to leave.” Embedded in its 
etymology are two senses of leaving: leaving out and moving away from. 
The novel exploits both tendencies in its uses of this fi gure. Ellipsis calls 
attention to itself as device, not only enacting incompletion and substitu-
tion but emphasizing that it does so. Whatever the content around which, 
or through which, it appears, ellipsis simultaneously signifi es “I point else-
where,” whether to a passage of time between thoughts, omitted words, or 
any number of affects it creates—anxiety, confusion, the desire to narrate, 
the desire not to narrate, the failure to narrate. Ellipses convey that whatever 
is stated is haunted by what is not stated. By frustrating confessions of virtu-
ally all the characters at some point, this strategy formally challenges oppo-
sitions between colonizers and colonized, insurgents and counterinsurgents, 
and public and private spheres.
The novel’s elliptical style might represent Ngũgi’s nod to Conrad’s work 
in general, though not Under Western Eyes specifi cally. Conrad was famous 
for creating meaning through “sudden holes in space time,” but while he 
does so in his “Russian novel” by keeping confessions behind closed doors, 
he nevertheless portrays characters engaged in confessional acts, however 
interrupted. Ngũgi, on the other hand, regularly withholds such satisfaction 
from readers as well as characters. Ellipses stress the connotative rather than 
denotative meaning of a passage and often also play upon the interactive 
quality of a text, its interpellation of readers. The fi rst ellipsis in the novel is 
directed at readers, from whom it withholds a confession of Mugo:
There was, for him, then, solace in the very act of breaking the soil: to bury 
seeds and watch the green leaves heave and thrust themselves out of the ground, 
to tend the plants to ripeness and then harvest, these were all part of the world 
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he had created for himself and which formed the background against which his 
dreams soared to the sky. But then Kihika had come into his life.
(11)
Although the passage ends with a single period rather than three, the former 
functions in the same way as the latter. The fi nal sentence raises an expecta-
tion (the signifi cance of Kihika’s interruption of Mugo’s “dreams”), but what 
follows it typographically is a literal gap, a blank line space and section break 
that does not proceed to a completion of the thought in the section that fol-
lows and that turns the fi nal sentence into a dangling phrase that trails off 
into silence. This doubled utterance emphasizes that the passage’s primary 
meaning is not what is said but rather that there is more to say and that it is 
being withheld. Creating the effect of a subject driven to confess but unable 
to do so, ellipses multiply after Mugo receives a visit from Gikonyo:
Suppose I had told him . . . suppose I had suddenly told him . . . Everything 
would have been all over . . . all over . . . the knowledge . . . the burden . . . 
fears . . . and hopes. . . . I could have told him . . . and maybe . . . maybe . . . Or is 
that why he told me his own story? At this thought he abruptly stopped pacing 
and leaned against the bed. A man does not go to a stranger and tear his heart 
open . . . I see everything . . . everything . . . he pretended not to look at me . . . 
yet kept on stealing eyes at me . . . see if I was frightened . . . see . . . if . . . 
(142)
When Mugo fi nally approaches Kihika’s sister Mumbi to confess his betrayal 
of her brother, an ellipsis suspends the confession. After Mumbi asks, “What 
is it Mugo? What is wrong?” (211), the novel jumps into the future instead 
of proceeding to Mugo’s confession. Leapt over, it occurs in a hole in nar-
rative space and time and is narrated belatedly: “Suddenly at her question, 
he had removed his hands from her body. He knelt before her, a broken, 
submissive penitent” (236), and confesses. The use of past tense underlines 
that readers cannot witness the confession when it actually occurs. Thus, 
in various ways, the novel censors an act to which critics impute so much 
critical weight.
While the prevalence of ellipses might seem unremarkable, even cliché, 
Ngũgi handles the device in unconventional ways that indicate its func-
tion is more than aesthetic, that its primary role is to express the need for 
confession so as to refuse it. Common in detective fi ction, a genre Ngũgi 
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references in this novel and others, ellipses are typically used to generate 
narrative tension; although in the fi rst appearance of ellipses, which is cited 
above, they are used this way, in the vast majority of instances, they are not. 
This is because the “secrets” ellipses hide or interrupt are always in fact dis-
closed, but elsewhere and outside of the confessional frame the novel erects 
only to have the device leave empty. The most striking proof that the ellipses 
are not employed to generate narrative tension is that the novel discloses its 
organizing secret, Mugo’s betrayal of Kihika, less than a third of the way in, 
thus making elliptical evasions excessive to plot fomentation or suspense. 
But just as important is how that secret is disclosed—in an offhanded aside 
in the middle of a chapter that nearly begs readers to overlook its revelatory 
status: “Unless they had suspected him could General R. have asked those 
pointed questions? Meeting somebody after a week? Karanja? Yes, could 
they really have asked him to carve his place in society by singing tributes 
to the man he had so treacherously betrayed?” (77–78). The ways ellipses 
structure multiple situations involving many other characters confi rms that 
it serves an alternative function to the production of suspense.
Through the elliptical strategy, confession is constantly proposed as a 
way to reveal betrayals, only for their disclosure to readers and other charac-
ters to occur otherwise, if at all. This pattern of anticipation and frustration 
repeats three times within one chapter that details betrayals in the domestic 
sphere. While engaged in an extramarital affair, the colonial administrator 
John Thompson’s wife, Margery, felt “the impulsive desire to confess, to 
clean her breast, was very strong” (60), but the novel replaces confession 
with ellipsis. The weak rationale for such silence is a contrived missed op-
portunity: the sudden death of the lover allegedly makes the confession to 
the husband unnecessary. This is no explanation, however. Guilt rather than 
fear of being caught was shown to have motivated the desire to confess. This 
scene proposing and then thwarting the wife’s confession of infi delity also 
includes her determination to “compel” (61) her husband to confess his feel-
ing about the couple’s imminent return to England on the eve of indepen-
dence, for “Uhuru had brought their lives into a crisis and he behaved as if 
nothing was happening” (52):
Yes, she would compel him to talk, tonight, she resolved, and stopped wiping the 
dishes, walking back to the sitting-room with determination. John was peering 
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into the mass of notebooks and papers before him, occasionally scribbling some-
thing with a hand that appeared to be shaking. She bent behind him, put her 
arm around his neck, and lightly touched the lobe of his left ear with her lips. 
She was surprised at herself, since she had not done this for years. Suddenly her 
grim determination to force their relationship into the open crisis subsided.
(61)
The desire to make Thompson confess “suddenly” subsides without ex-
planation, and the fi nal sentence reads as a dangling thought, ellipsis again 
“leaving” or moving away from confession. Margery’s plan to confess is cou-
pled with Thompson’s plan to confess to Margery why they must return to 
England. The reason, that Kenya has betrayed him by unseating him from 
power, is provided to readers through free indirect discourse: “why should 
people wait and go through the indignity of being ejected from their beds 
and seats by their houseboys?” (65):
He braced himself for the effort. His heart livened with hope and fear as he went 
into the bathroom to prepare himself for the great confession.
He opened the door to the bedroom cautiously and stepped in. He did not put 
on the lights, feeling that darkness would create the right atmosphere. A man 
was born to die continually and start afresh. His hands were shaking, slightly, 
and he felt darkness creep towards him, as he reached for the bed. But Margery 
was already asleep. Thompson saw this and felt enormous relief and gratitude. 
He got into bed but for a long time he could not sleep.
(65–66)
The passage elliptically leaves off again, the fi nal sentence highlighting not 
only the failure but the persisting need for confession.
The struggle to confess extends beyond the home and civilian life to the 
military sphere, the borders between which the Emergency collapses. The 
specter of the Emergency chases both British and Kikuyu characters toward 
confessions. An episode involving Thompson, who is the former district 
offi cer at Rira camp, implies that confession alone can cure the compulsive 
returns of the “Rira disaster,” which is based on actual events that occurred 
at Hola camp. Years later, on the verge of Uhuru, the specter of this disaster 
reemerges in civilian space. Thompson watches from his offi ce window at 
Githima library as the dog belonging to his colleague Dr. Lynd prepares to 
attack the black Kenyan workers, who arm themselves with stones in self-
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 defense. Lynd appears and restrains the animal, but, Thompson muses, “what 
would have happened if the bull-mastif had jumped on Karanja and torn his 
fl esh? The hostility he saw in the men’s eyes as he approached them. The si-
lence. Sudden. Like Rira” (53). We learn that “at Rira, the tragedy of his life 
occurred. A hunger strike, a little beating and eleven detainees died” (54). 
Consequently, “he was whisked off to Githima . . . But the wound had never 
healed. Touch it, and it brought back all the humiliation he had felt at the 
time” (54). Thompson attempts to confess to Lynd to heal the wound. “Ev-
erything seemed a visitation from the past: Rira and the dog” (50) and even 
the setting seems to evoke elements of the camp, “a big tree-nursery sur-
rounded by a wire fence” (51). Confession is continually called upon to stop 
the past from reemerging: “He wanted to tell her about the dog but some-
how found it diffi cult” (50); he “wanted to tell her the truth—but he would 
have to tell her about his own paralysis—how he had stood fascinated by an 
anticipation of blood” (51). The episode builds to a confession—“he tried 
to tell Dr Lynd what had happened—the diffi culty lay in separating what 
had occurred outside his offi ce on the grass— only tell her that—from what 
had gone on inside him” (51–52), but it concludes with abrupt silence: “He 
fi dgeted on the grass, felt his ridiculous position in relation to this woman 
from whom he wanted to get away now that the urge to tell her about the 
dog had faded” (52). The novel declines to explain why the desire to confess 
vanishes, why the text elliptically moves away from the testimonial act the 
return of a spectral past seems to require. In another episode, that spectral 
past literally chases the character Gikonyo toward a confession:
He seemed to hear, in the distance, steps on a pavement. The steps approached 
him. He walked faster and faster, away from the steps. But the faster he walked, 
the louder the steps became. . . . The steps on the pavement, so near now, 
rhymed with his pounding heart. He had to talk to someone. He must hear 
another human voice. Mugo. But what were mere human voices? Had he not 
lived with them for six years? In various detention camps? Perhaps he wanted 
the voice of a man who would understand. Mugo. Abruptly he stopped running. 
The steps on the pavement receded into a distance. They would come again, he 
knew they would come to plague him. I must talk to Mugo. The words Mugo 
had spoken at a meeting two years before had touched Gikonyo. Lord, Mugo 
would know.
(33–34)
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The next sentence frustrates expectations: “But by the time he reached Mu-
go’s hut, the heat of his resolution had cooled” (34). This inconclusive con-
cluding remark, yet another ellipsis, denies resolution.
How, then, to explain the consistent, inexplicable fall into silence when 
confession is demanded? The abrupt fading of Thompson’s desire to confess, 
the sudden loss of Margery’s desire to compel Thompson to confess, the 
“cooling” of Gikonyo’s need to confess, the censorship of Mugo’s confession 
to Mumbi—not one is accounted for through either character psychology 
or plotting. While it is tempting to read the climactic delivery of Mugo’s 
public confession as the novel’s telos, the organizing elliptical strategy pres-
sures this reading. What also pressures the privileging of this confession are 
its effects in the narrative. Rather than an act of self-sacrifi ce that unifi es the 
community, Mugo’s confession disperses those gathered at the Uhuru cel-
ebrations: “Then they rose and started talking, moving away in different di-
rections, as if the meeting ended with Mugo’s confession” (253). Moreover, 
after he confesses, Mugo disappears from the novel. This might of course be 
a sign that the narrative no longer needs the protagonist once he has fulfi lled 
his catalytic function by confessing; however, given the resistance to confes-
sions peppered across the entire work, the confessant’s disappearance might 
also be a sign of ambivalence toward his testimonial act. After all, Mugo’s 
confession does not halt the cycle of violence that characterizes colonial and 
postcolonial Kenya but rather inspires yet another instance of it, if, as the 
novel implies, he is executed without witnesses or the consent of the village 
judge who tries him for his crime.
The novel guides us most clearly toward a reason for its elliptical strat-
egy when it connects confession to a history that has only recently come 
to light in offi cial British archives and is still suppressed in Kenya—that 
of indefi nite detention under the Emergency. Detained for years at Yala 
camp, Gikonyo desperately confesses to having taken the Mau Mau oath. 
The novel elliptically censors the act that precipitates his release from the 
concentration camp:
Gikonyo fi xed his mind on Mumbi, fearing that strength would leave his knees 
under the silent stare of all the other detainees. He walked on and the sound of 
his feet on the pavement leading to the offi ce where screening, interrogations, 
and confessions were made, seemed, in the absence of other noise, unnecessar-
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ily loud. The door closed behind him. The other detainees walked back to their 
rooms to wait for another journey to the quarry . . . 
* * *
As Gikonyo left the road and took a path into the fi elds, he could still hear 
the echo of his steps on the pavement four years back. The steps had followed 
him all through the pipe-line, for in spite of the confession, Gikonyo was not 
released immediately.
(130)
Examining the novel’s portrayal of state power and detention under the 
Emergency and imperial nationalist principles guiding colonial consoli-
dation suggests why A Grain of Wheat refuses to deploy confessions, even 
though this refusal seems only to perpetuate the silencing and amnesia Ke-
nyatta’s rule enforced.
States of Exception
A Grain of Wheat details an insurgency and counterinsurgency whose role in 
distinguishing its ethics and politics of witnessing from that of Under Western 
Eyes has been overlooked in criticism on the novel; this history has also been 
overlooked in theories of trauma, sovereignty, and biopolitics. Confront-
ing scholarship long focused on European histories, theorists have begun to 
consider how colonial situations might shift analyses of trauma and even oc-
casion what Michael Rothberg calls “multidirectional memory.” A compara-
tive approach that “draws attention to the dynamic transfers that take place 
between diverse places and times during the act of remembrance,”18 such 
a practice would, in this case, challenge Giorgio Agamben’s claim that the 
only situation to which indefi nite detention in Guantanamo Bay after Sep-
tember 11, 2001, “could possibly be compared is the legal situation of the 
Jews in the Nazi Lager [camps], who, along with their citizenship had lost 
every legal identity, but at least retained their identity as Jews.”19 By con-
fronting another world of the concentration camp, which Ngũgi reminds 
us were “named detention camps for the world outside Kenya,”20 A Grain 
of Wheat invites us to “posit collective memory as partially disengaged from 
exclusive versions of cultural identity and acknowledge how remembrance 
both cuts across and binds together diverse spatial, temporal, and cultural 
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sites.”21 Multidirectional memory is “partial” in the sense that it struggles 
to maintain singularities while searching for points of connection; its goal is 
not synthesis. Placing Ngũgi’s novel in conversation with studies of sover-
eignty and biopolitics that take other historical events as their focus eluci-
dates how the novel relates that the Emergency was a crisis of the juridical 
order in which states of exception create the impasse of witnessing that the 
elliptical strategy manifests.
The novel’s representation of the anticolonial movement’s aims and the 
rhetoric of nationhood it deploys, however, obscures the nature and extent 
of this crisis and the mechanisms of imperial power it battles. Critics, his-
torians, and Ngũgi himself at times describe the insurgency as a reaction 
to two specifi c losses at the hands of colonialism: land and freedom. In-
deed, the name the resistance movement gave itself was the Kenya Land and 
Freedom Army (not Mau Mau). The many references to intimacy with the 
land convey that it defi nes Kenyan character and operates as the rhetorical 
base of claims for political independence.22 “Is he a man who lets another 
take away his land and freedom?” (112), Kihika asks. “Whether the land was 
stolen from Gikuyu, Ukabi or Nandi, it does not belong to the whiteman. 
And even if it did, shouldn’t everyone have a share in the common shamba, 
our Kenya?” (113). Kenya is regularly defi ned as fertile land from which its 
people are biologically descended, from Kihika’s statement that “with us, 
Kenya is our Mother” (103), to the depiction of Mumbi as substitute for 
one of the founders of the Kikuyu, a mother who, according to the novel’s 
conclusion, metaphorically gives birth to a new nation,23 to the myth of the 
warrior Waiyaki, who took arms against the fi rst European settlers because 
“the white man had imperceptibly acquired more land to meet the growing 
needs of his position” (15). Waiyaki is challenged by the white man, whose 
“menacing laughter remained echoing in the hearts of the people, long after 
Waiyaki had been arrested and taken to the coast, bound hands and feet” 
(15). The story of Waiyaki’s resistance is elevated to myth through rumor. 
“Later, so it is said, Waiyaki was buried alive at Kibwezi with his head facing 
into the centre of the earth, a living warning to those who, in after years, 
might challenge the hand of the christian woman whose protecting shadow 
now bestrode both land and sea” (15). The next sentence transforms this 
rumor into an epic event that enables transgenerational memory, mediated 
through Kenyans’ natural connection to the land: “Then nobody noticed it; 
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but looking back we can see that Waiyaki’s blood contained within it a seed, 
a grain, which gave birth to a political party whose main strength thereafter 
sprang from a bond with the soil” (15). The foundation on which anticolo-
nial nationalism is erected posits the autochthon as the legitimate inheritor 
of Kenyan earth and identifi es two concrete losses that must be recovered.
The novel’s portrayal of the Emergency, however, and of the image of im-
perialism the Emergency threatens indicates that more than land and con-
trol of the polity have been lost. This portrayal also illustrates that the terms 
the anticolonial movement uses to justify its aims—seeds, birth, “natural” 
life—are what drive colonial power in its various forms. According to the 
novel, a supposedly universally shared biological life becomes the contested 
site of, and justifi cation for, earliest imperial rule and then, later, exceptional 
state violence in Kenya. A Grain of Wheat relates that what Giorgio Agam-
ben calls the metaphysical “fracture” between an imputed “bare” or natural 
life and political life that shapes modernity leads to a situation in Kenya in 
which witnesses are silenced but also forced to speak in ways that will make 
attestation to this period a complicated affair.
The novel casts open the abyss of law24 generated through what Agam-
ben theorizes as the paradox of sovereignty in modernity. In Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life, which is launched from Michel Foucault’s and 
Hannah Arendt’s studies of biopolitics, Agamben analyzes how “natural life 
begins to be included in the mechanisms and calculations of State power, 
and politics turns into biopolitics.”25 This process is an “inclusive exclusion” 
in the polis of biological or bare life, what the ancients called zoe, as distinct 
from bios, or good life. “The peculiar phrase ‘born with regard to life, but 
existing essentially with regard to the good life’ can be read . . . as an inclu-
sive exclusion (an exceptio) of zoe in the polis, almost as if politics were the 
place in which life had to transform itself into good life and in which what 
had to be politicized were always already bare life,”26 Agamben writes. Bare 
life is not only excluded but also maintained as exclusion for the production 
of (politicized) existence. Once located at the margins of the domain of the 
political, in modernity, bare life comes to coincide with the political realm 
in totalitarian and parliamentary democratic regimes alike—indeed, “the 
only real question to be decided was which form of organization would be 
best suited to the task of assuring the care, control, and use of bare life.”27 
In modern managements of bare life, distinctions between inclusion and 
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exclusion and right and fact dissolve through a paradox enacted in the state 
of exception.
To account for what Agamben describes as the twentieth century’s un-
precedented orchestrations of state violence, which he claims are typifi ed in 
the Nazi concentration camp, he focuses on what Foucault’s studies of bio-
power allegedly neglected, the “hidden intersection between the juridico-
institutional and the biopolitical modes of power.” Arguing that “the pro-
duction of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power,”28 
Agamben contends that that power’s paradox is enacted in a state of excep-
tion that creates homo sacer, a subject suspended between life and death who 
is both inside and outside of law. The sovereign who decides on the state 
of exception is also inside and outside of law, but this is because he or she 
suspends the juridical order of which he or she is also a part. This situation 
institutes a threshold of indistinction
between [right and fact]. It is not a fact, since it is only created through the 
suspension of the rule. But for the same reason it is not even a juridical case in 
point, even if it opens the possibility of the force of law. . . . What is at issue in 
the sovereign exception is not so much the control or neutralization of an excess 
as the creation and defi nition of the very space in which the juridico-political 
order can have validity. . . . The “ordering of space” that is, according to [the 
jurist Carl] Schmitt, constitutive of the sovereign nomos is therefore not only a 
“taking of land”—the determination of a juridical and territorial ordering—but above 
all a “taking of the outside,” an exception.29
Once exceptional, the state of exception becomes normalized throughout 
the twentieth century and into the twenty-fi rst. (Although, as our discus-
sion in the previous chapter indicates, we could counter that emergency law 
was increasingly invoked by the British empire throughout the nineteenth 
century and was also legally coded as “exceptional.”) Agamben argues that 
the Nazi camp is the pure topological expression of the breakdown between 
inside and outside and right and fact under sovereign exception. There, the 
detainee is transformed into homo sacer, both outside and inside the law, de-
prived of law’s protection yet subject to it. The camp therefore makes visible 
“the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity.”30
A Grain of Wheat suggests that the paradox of sovereignty that produces 
and maintains bare life fi nds a different manifestation in Kenya under British 
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rule. The novel articulates that the sovereign ordering of space under colo-
nialism was more than a “taking of land,” in the words of both Carl Schmitt 
and the anticolonial movement; it was also a “taking of the outside.” The 
inclusive exclusion of bare life is presented as central to imperial aims across 
history in Kenya. It shapes the discourse of rehabilitation that initiates con-
quest and colonial consolidation under the mantle of imperial nationalism 
as well as the discourse of contamination and elimination that defi ned the 
totalitarian Emergency state.
The text relates that as a civilizing mission, British imperialism creates 
a fracture between bare life and good life that it unsuccessfully attempts to 
repair through the process of “rehabilitation.” This drama of metaphysi-
cal fracture and attempted reparation is scripted in a treatise attributed to 
Thompson, whose political trajectory in some ways parallels that of Con-
rad’s Kurtz and who will later lose faith in the civilizing mission he articu-
lates in Prospero in Africa. This manuscript presents the colonial project as 
the inclusive exclusion of the bare life of the African in the polis of the 
British empire-as-one-nation. Imperial nationalism’s goal of “stretching the 
short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire”31 fi nds 
expression in the novel through Thompson’s treatise. The treatise main-
tains that although the African is atavistic and animalistic, these aspects can 
be excluded so she (or he, more exactly; the African woman’s capacity for 
rehabilitation would be less visible to the imperial focalizer here) can be 
included as a British subject, a member of the far-fl ung “British nation” 
(62). What must be politicized is bare life. Upon discovering “two Africans 
who in dress, speech, and in intellectual power were no different from the 
British,” and in which “the irrationality, inconsistency, and superstition so 
characteristic of the African and Oriental races” has been replaced by “the 
three principles basic to the Western mind: ie, the principle of Reason, of 
Order, and of Measure” (62), Thompson has an epiphany. “In a fl ash I was 
convinced that the growth of the British Empire was the development of a 
great moral idea: it means, it must surely lead to the creation of one Brit-
ish nation, embracing peoples of all colours and creeds, based on the just 
proposition that all men were created equal” (62). The great equivalent of 
all peoples is life as such, which can be transformed into the good life, here 
British subjecthood. Prospero in Africa argues “to be English was basically 
an attitude of mind: it was a way of looking at life, at human relationship, at 
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the just ordering of human society. Was it not possible to reorientate people 
into this way of life by altering their social and cultural environment” (63)? 
That the posited bare life of an entire people must be separated from and 
opposed to it is clear from the way Thompson distinguishes British from 
French imperialism:
He was infl uenced by the French policy of Assimilation, but was critical of the 
French as he was of what he called Lugard’s retrograde concept of Indirect Rule. 
“We must avoid the French mistake of assimilating only the educated few. The 
peasant in Asia and Africa must be included in this moral scheme for rehabilita-
tion. In Great Britain we have had our peasant, and now our worker, and they 
are no less an integral part of our society.”
(63)
By disagreeing with Lugard, Thompson declares a continuity between Afri-
can and British peoples based on the capacity to be transformed from bare 
life through “rehabilitation,” by which Africans will be administered souls, 
be given that certain British “attitude toward life.” One sentence summarizes 
concisely the biopolitical project: “his faith in British Imperialism had once 
made him declare: To administer a people is to administer a soul” (63).
Thompson uses the African soldier during World War II as an example to 
distinguish British imperial nationalism also from Hitler’s German nation-
alism: “Transform the British Empire into one nation: didn’t this explain 
so many things, why, for instance, so many Africans had offered themselves 
up to die in the war against Hitler?” (63). The world of detention under 
the Emergency that the novel constructs, however, creates parallels between 
British and Nazi power over bare life. The terms with which Prospero in 
Africa sets an agenda for managing bare life, “assimilation” and “rehabilita-
tion,” appear to belong to civil and cultural orders, but during the Emer-
gency they belong to the order of the state. These words are hinges connect-
ing Britain’s civilizing mission to the colonial totalitarian regime created 
through a state of exception that compromises the empire’s self-image as a 
benevolent liberal democracy.
In recent years, historians have exposed the violence underpinning the 
British “counterinsurgency myth,” the myth that British policy in the colo-
nies was guided by the goal of winning hearts and minds.32 In her extensive 
study of the period, the historian Caroline Elkins argues that lacunae in 
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the offi cial archives enabled the British to maintain the myth of the Emer-
gency, a myth that continues into the twenty-fi rst century. That myth is that 
Britain carried out a liberal democratic mission of rehabilitation of civilian 
Kikuyu society allegedly torn apart by the military wing, Mau Mau. Elkins 
reveals that this announced aim of rescue or rehabilitation was a justifi cation 
and cover for wide-scale eliminationist policies, which were expunged from 
Britain’s historical records—it was only in 2011, in fact, that Britain began 
to release the documents to the High Court under pressure from the Ke-
nyan government. By reconstructing these years from the other side of of-
fi cial history through interviews, archival fragments, and fi eldwork, Elkins 
establishes that eliminationist policies were executed through the capricious 
screening of hundreds of thousands of civilians and indefi nite detention 
without trial of tens of thousands of suspects in concentration camps, where 
torture and other breaches of human rights regularly occurred. Screened 
civilians moved through transit camps, then were sent to detention villages 
enclosed by barbed-wire fences overseen by homeguards; these were popu-
lated mostly by women and children. An extralegal act under General Lieu-
tenant Baring, what we can call (though Elkins does not) the implementation 
of a state of exception, institutes all this. “Before Baring and his government 
were prepared to embark on the campaign for Kikuyu hearts and minds, 
they needed fi rst to contain and control the entire oath-taking population,” 
Elkins explains. “To this end, the government armed itself with a series 
of wide-ranging Emergency regulations. Between January and April 1953, 
Nairobi transformed itself into a totalitarian state.”33
Although they were certainly sites of torture, and although, as scholars 
from Hannah Arendt to Enzo Traverso to Achille Mbembe have argued, 
imperial techniques in Africa and throughout the world predated and pro-
vided templates for Nazi orchestrations of power,34 the camps in Kenya were 
not deployed in the same ways as the camps in Nazi Germany. The latter 
were implemented to constitute a pure, uncontaminated German national 
body through the liquidation of part of that body, the systematic extermi-
nating of peoples who were fi rst systematically stripped of citizenship and 
all rights. Yet A Grain of Wheat suggests that a fear of contamination that 
drives biopolitics to the center of state politics and transforms the detainee 
into bare life also inhabits British policy in Kenya. The colonial government 
attempted to eliminate what it posited as animal, biological life contained 
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within human beings, which was fi gured by the Mau Mau. “Mau Mau ad-
herents were scarcely part of humanity’s continuum . . . had to be gotten 
rid of, regardless of how it was done,” Elkins asserts.35 Thompson’s notes 
on the insurgency and chants of “eliminate the vermin” (a translation of 
Kurtz’s “exterminate all the brutes!”) refl ect these sentiments while express-
ing fear that the imperial-national body will be contaminated by the African 
insurgent:
One must use a stick. No government can tolerate anarchy, no civilization can be built 
on this violence and savagery. Mau Mau is evil: a movement which if not checked will 
mean complete destruction of all the values on which our civilization has thriven.
“Every whiteman is continually in danger of gradual moral ruin in this daily and 
hourly contest with the African.” Dr. Albert Schweitzer.
(64 –65)
Thompson plans to “incorporate” these notes so as to produce a “coher-
ent philosophy in Prospero in Africa” (64). By having them contend that the 
African as “savage” threatens the “white man’s” regression from politicized 
life (“civilization”) into bare life after having shown that Prospero in Africa 
also articulates the colonial mission as the inclusive inclusion of bare life 
through assimilation and rehabilitation, the novel suggests that Thomp-
son’s two seemingly oppositional positions can be synthesized into a single 
colonial treatise because between democratic and totalitarian regimes, “the 
only real question to be decided was which form of organization would be 
best suited to the task of assuring the care, control, and use of bare life.”36 
Because they illuminated the precarious boundary between civilization and 
violence, the effects of anticolonial struggle also provoked a fear of con-
tamination in England, where many worried that clashes with Mau Mau 
were compromising the empire’s (mythic) image. Some English newspapers 
portrayed the counterinsurgency as a manifestation of regressive savagery; 
others projected these images back onto the insurgents.37
Ngũgi writes against the colonialist claims that bare life is the de facto de-
fi ning feature of the African by exposing that it is a de jure result of the state 
of exception. The text depicts the detention camp as the place where law and 
fact enter into a zone of indistinction, creating homo sacer, a detainee neither 
living nor existing as a political animal, nor dead and therefore outside the 
law. In the camp, “the possibility of deciding on which founds sovereign 
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power . . . is realized normally”38 because the sovereign no longer refers 
back to legal codes in order to apply them to a fact. The colonial authorities, 
however, disavow that they suspend law and fact by invoking the language 
of law: “They took us to the roads and to the quarries even those who had 
never done anything,” Mugo comments. “They called us criminals. But not 
because we had stolen anything or killed anyone” (76). Referencing breaches 
of human rights under the Geneva Convention such as Article 5, which pro-
hibits detention without trial,39 Gikonyo asks, “Do you know what it was like 
to live in detention? It was easier, perhaps, with those of us not labeled hard-
core, but Mugo was. So he was beaten, and yet would not confess the oath. 
It was not like prison. . . . In prison, you know your crime. You know your 
terms. So many years, one, ten, thirty—after that you get out” (32–33). A 
scene focalized on Gikonyo at Yala camp dramatizes the emergence of homo 
sacer, a subject suspended between life and death:
He blankly stared into the wire one evening. . . . Slowly and deliberately (he 
stood outside himself and watched his actions as if from a distance) he pushed 
his right hand into the wire and pressed his fl esh into the sharp metallic thorns. 
Gikonyo felt the prick into the fl esh, but not the pain. He withdrew the hand 
and watched the blood ooze. . . . In his cell, Gikonyo found that everything—
the barbed wire, Yala camp, Thabai—was dissolved into a colourless mist. He 
struggled to recall the outline of Mumbi’s face without success. Was he dead? 
He put his hand on his chest, felt the heart-beat and knew he was alive. Why, 
then, couldn’t he fi x a permanent outline of Mumbi in his mind? . . . He tried 
to relive the scene in the wood and was surprised to see he could not experience 
anything; the desire, the full manhood, the haunting voice of Mumbi, the explo-
sion, no feeling came even as a thing of the past. And all this time, Gikonyo 
watched himself act—his every gesture, his fl ow of thought. He was both inside 
and outside himself.
(128–129)
The dissolution of boundaries between inside and outside that the camps 
spatialize and engender are elucidated as the passage narrativizes the pro-
gressive fragmentation of the detainee, the splitting of biological life from 
social/political life. “Hands” and “blood” are minimally integrated with the 
subject through use of the possessive pronoun “his” in the fi rst sentence; by 
the third sentence, the replacement of the pronoun with the article “the” 
stages a subject separated from his body, to which he relates as detached 
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objects. His failure to recall his wife and their fi rst sexual encounter shows 
his disconnections from history, desire, and social existence. The interroga-
tive “was he dead?” indexes this social death. By detailing the splitting and 
suspension between social life and death as a process that unfolds in time in 
the camp, the passage undermines the colonialist axiom that the detainee 
is always fi rst bare life, a “fact” that justifi es either her forced entry into 
politicized life through rehabilitation or her exclusion from it. The trans-
formation of the traitor-homeguard Karanja displays the mirror image of 
this process that occurs in the camp, demonstrating that the constitution 
of politicized life relies upon the simultaneous positing of bare, or animal, 
life: “When he shot them [‘the many men, terrorists’] they seemed less like 
human beings and more like animals” (260), an experience that “thrilled 
Karanja and made him feel a new man, a part of an invisible might whose 
symbol was the whiteman” (260). Violently creating bare life while trying to 
eliminate it enables the Kikuyu collaborators to transcend what is portrayed 
here as the materiality of the animal or biological lifeworld—they accede to 
British politicized life, “invisible might.”
The novel’s depiction of the administration of this “invisible might,” 
however, also marks the limits of Agamben’s theory of sovereignty for un-
derstanding how power operates in the colonial state. A Grain of Wheat does 
portray imperial power as sovereign and exceptional, often by highlighting 
its mysticism in ways that also echo Conrad’s descriptions of the mystical 
character of Russian autocracy in Under Western Eyes. The Mahee police 
station, for example, is “a symbol of that might which dominated Kenya to 
the door of every hut” (111); in the camps, “some detainees were beaten, all 
of them were rigorously questioned by the government agents whose might 
lay in the very mystery of their title—Special Branch” (121). But the novel 
also demonstrates that sovereign power is actually entangled with its appar-
ent other: a Kafkaesque bureaucracy. The relationship between sovereignty, 
power centered and localized in the One, and bureaucracy, power diffused 
and decentered, is not addressed by Agamben in Homo Sacer, but it is by 
Judith Butler.
Butler argues that in specifi c situations of counterinsurgency, sovereign 
power operates through what Foucault calls tactics of governmentality. Fou-
cault asserted that an episteme of governmentality, “understood as the way 
in which political power manages and regulates populations and goods,”40 
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historically replaces that of sovereignty. Agamben, by contrast, locates a re-
newal of sovereignty in modernity. Revising both positions in her analysis of 
indefi nite detention at Guantanamo Bay after September 11, 2001, Butler 
proposes that sovereignty and governmentality coexist and reinforce each 
other: sovereignty reemerges within governmentality to manage bare life. 
“The suspension of the life of a political animal, the suspension of standing 
before the law, is itself a tactical exercise, and must be understood in terms of 
the larger aims of power,” she contends. “Governmentality operates through 
state and non-state institutions and discourses that are legitimated neither 
by direct elections nor through established authority. . . . Governmentality 
gains its meaning and purpose from no single source, no unifi ed sovereign 
subject . . . the tactics operate diffusely . . . in relation to specifi c policy 
aims.”41 In the case of the U.S. counterinsurgency, sovereignty reemerges 
within governmentality under a state of exception primarily in the exercise 
of prerogative power. Prerogative power is reserved either for the executive 
branch of government or given to managerial offi cials with no clear claim 
to legitimacy, and the policy codeword that often defi nes this kind of power 
is “deeming.” Deeming refers to discretionary judgments, which take the 
place of legal protocols requiring the burden of proof. These “procedures 
of governmentality, which are irreducible to law, are invoked to extend and 
fortify forms of sovereignty that are equally irreducible to law.”42
The novel’s staging of the British response to resistance during the Ke-
nyan Emergency elaborates how sovereignty and governmentality reinforce 
each other. Policing and law enforcement in Africa in general was decen-
tralized. This governing model was shorthanded as “always trust the man 
on the spot.” During the Emergency, this model afforded enormous pre-
rogative power to diffuse functionaries.43 The novel’s handling of the impe-
rial response to the detainees’ hunger strike at Rira conveys the diffusion of 
sovereign power. It clarifi es that it is not the sovereign Lieutenant Baring 
whose decides on life and death, and it indicates that it might not even be 
the ersatz sovereign, Thompson, who decides. At Rira, the detainees “came 
together and wrote a collective letter listing complaints. . . . They wanted to 
be treated as political prisoners not criminals. Food rations should be raised. 
Unless these things were done, they would go on hunger-strike. And indeed 
on the third day, all the detainees, to a man, sat down on strike” (152). Co-
lonial authorities confront the detainees’ use of legal language and demands 
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to occupy the space of law by suspending international law, creating the 
“Rira disaster.” Textual ambiguities make locating the precise source of this 
suspension challenging if not impossible, however. Although we know that 
Thompson “set the white offi cers and warders on the men” (152) in response 
to the strike, we don’t know exactly what this means. What makes things 
more confusing is that the novel implies this initial response was not the 
same as the response to the “riot,” which causes the deaths:
Thompson was on the edge of madness. Eliminate the vermin, he would grind 
his teeth at night. He set the white offi cers and warders on the men. Yes—
eliminate the vermin. But the thing that sparked off the now famous deaths, 
was a near-riot act that took place on the third day of the strike. As some of the 
warders brought food to the detainees, a stone was hurled at them and struck 
one of them on the head. They let go the food and ran away howling murder! 
Riot! The detainees laughed and let fl y more stones. What occurred next is now 
known to the world. The men were rounded up and locked in their cells. The 
now famous beating went on day and night. Eleven men died.
(152)
Here and previously, the text suggests that when “the fact leaked out” (46) 
this bureaucrat might have been scapegoated for force he did not authorize: 
“Because he was the offi cer in charge, Thompson’s name was bandied about in 
the House of Commons and the world press. . . . He was whisked off to Gi-
thima, an exile from the public administration he loved” (54, my emphasis). 
The orchestration of the event through the use of passive constructions when 
the novel fi rst mentions it—“a hunger strike, a little beating, and eleven de-
tainees died” (54)—and again in the later scene cited above further allows 
for the possibility that the warders and white offi cers acted as sovereigns. 
The novel also relates elsewhere that power in Kenya is defi ned by discre-
tionary judgments that consolidate sovereign exception: “What’s power? A 
judge is powerful: he can send a man to death, without anyone questioning 
his authority, judgment, or harming his body in return. Yes—to be great 
you must stand in such a place that you can dispense pain and death to others 
without anyone asking questions. Like a headmaster, a judge, a Governor” 
(224). During the Emergency, the most widely used practice of prerogative 
power was the process of screening. This process was a quintessential act of 
“deeming” as Butler describes it.
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The novel’s representation of screening leads to an explanation for why 
the text employs the elliptical strategy. The work relates that not only was 
the Emergency a crisis of the juridical order, the norming of sovereign ex-
ception and management of bare life through tactics of governmentality, 
but that it was impelled by, and in turn generated, a crisis of testimonial 
language. Though A Grain of Wheat has inspired many debates about its 
fi ctional renderings of history, its rendering of the historical deployment of 
testimony has not been a focus of any.44 Yet this deployment was a driving 
force of both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency. The Gikuyu oath 
founded, bound, and sustained the anticolonial movement; confession to 
having taken that oath was what the British used to break the insurgency. 
Screening was the theater in which the confl ict between these testimonial 
modes was dramatized. “Screening” is an English abscess in Gikuyu, an inas-
similable term; the Kikuyu never attempt to translate the word.45 The ab-
sence of accountability to rule of law and normative procedures that charac-
terizes prerogative power is strikingly fi gured in the novel’s choreography of 
screening, where a hidden subject deems whether or not one is an insurgent 
under no burden of proof: Karanja’s “fi rst job was in a hood. The hood—a 
white sack—covered all his body except the eyes. During the screening op-
erations, people would pass in queues in front of the hooded man. By a nod 
of the head, the hooded man picked out those involved in Mau Mau” (261). 
Once screened, the Kikuyu were directed to confess to having taken the 
Mau Mau oath. Their willingness to do so often determined whether they 
went to detention villages or to camps and to which type of camp they would 
be sent. Confessing determined whether they were candidates for rehabilita-
tion or elimination. As Elkins points out, confession was the main technique 
through which the fate of insurgents was decided. Because the extracting of 
confession is a central tactic of the counterinsurgency, the elliptical strategy, 
which asks us to notice that the novel refuses to allow information to be 
framed this way, can be read as a textual and political act of resistance.
In Detained: A Writer’s Prison Diary, Ngũgi analyzes the history of deten-
tion in Kenya while refl ecting on his own detention during the 1970s. He 
comments on the mysticism the scene of Karanja’s hooded screening evokes, 
arguing that detention shared much in common with Christian ritual, spe-
cifi cally, its use of confession as a pathway to salvation. “It was precisely to 
deal a blow to the infectious role of those patriotic Kenyans who had re-
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jected a slave consciousness that detention without trial was fi rst introduced 
in Kenya by the colonial authorities,”46 he maintains, and he notes that it 
persists after colonial rule ends. “Unfortunately it is the repressive features 
of colonial culture . . . that seem to have most attracted the unqualifi ed 
admiration of the compradors,” he writes. “How else can it be explained 
that the 1966 laws of detention, sedition, and treason, reproduce, almost 
word for word, those in practice between 1951 and 1961 during the high 
noon of colonial culture.”47 The “high noon of colonial culture” includes 
the Emergency, of course. “Detention without trial is not only a punitive 
act of physical and mental torture of a few patriotic individuals, but it is 
also a calculated act of psychological terror against the struggling of mil-
lions,” Ngũgi explains. “It is a terrorist programme for the psychological 
siege of the whole nation. That is why the practice of detention from the 
time of arrest to the time of release is deliberately invested with mystifying 
ritualism.”48 Throughout, A Grain of Wheat comments upon this mysticism 
to criticize confession, which, in Detained, Ngũgi confi rms was crucial to 
breaking the anticolonial movement:
Political detention, not disregarding its punitive aspects, serves a deeper, exem-
plary ritual symbolism. If they can break such a patriot, if they can make him 
come out of detention crying, “I am sorry for all my sins,” such an unprincipled 
about-turn would confi rm the wisdom of the ruling clique in its division of the 
populace into the passive innocent millions and the disgruntled subversive few. 
The “confession” and its corollary, “Father, forgive us for our sins,” becomes a 
cleaning ritual for all the past and current repressive deeds of such a neocolonial 
regime. . . . such an ex-detainee might even happily play the role of a consci-
entious messenger from purgatory sent back to earth by a father fi gure more 
benevolent than Lazarus’s Abraham, “that he may testify unto them (them that 
dare to struggle), lest they also come into this place of torment.”49
The depiction of detention under the state of exception is one way the novel 
accounts for its elliptical strategy. There are two other ways it does so. It re-
lates that not only does confession fail to save one from, or redeem, the past, 
but that it is also incapable of translating into meaningful terms what the 
counterinsurgency demands it provide. How the novel makes these points 
illustrates that confession does not dispel irony in the narrative, as critics 
maintain it does, but rather is the object of irony.
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The Irony of Salvation and the Case of the Differend
A Grain of Wheat emphasizes that confession is wedded to a discourse of 
salvation that operates not only in secular but religious domains to crush 
anticolonial resistance throughout Kenyan history. The text is ambivalent 
toward Christianity; for example, it endorses the language of Christian sac-
rifi ce because it forms an alternative to individualism: “In Kenya we want a 
death which will change things . . . we want a true sacrifi ce. But fi rst we have 
to be ready to carry the cross. . . . I die for you, you die for me, we become 
a sacrifi ce for one another. . . . Everybody who takes the Oath of Unity to 
change things in Kenya is a Christ” (110), Kihika claims. Yet the Christian 
logic of confession comes under attack in various ways. The goal of the re-
vivalist movement, “the only organization allowed to fl ourish in Kenya by 
the government during the Emergency” (99) is conversion through confes-
sion; “by publically confessing their sins, they became the saved ones” (98). 
The transformation of its leader in the novel, Reverend Jackson Kigondu, 
from respected to reviled after he “confessed how he used to minister unto 
the devil: by eating, drinking and laughing with sinners; by being too soft 
with the village elders and those who had rejected Christ” (98) suggests 
that not only is it impossible to separate confession from politics but that 
attempting to do so only serves imperialism’s ends. The insurgents kill this 
“Christian soldier, marching as to war,” who solicits them to confess and 
see “the light”—that “politics was dirty, worldly wealth a sin” (98). In De-
tained, Ngũgi comments on the legacy of Christianity in Kenya, asserting, 
“all these eruptions of brutality between the introduction of colonial culture 
in 1895 and its fl owering with blood in the 1950s were not aberrations of 
an otherwise humane Christian culture,” but rather, “they were its very es-
sence, its law, its logic, and the Kenyan settler with his sjambok, his dog, his 
horse, his rickshaw, his sword, his bullet, was the true embodiment of British 
imperialism.”50 The novel ironizes the proposition that confession saves in 
a series of passages that lead to Mugo’s revelation of Kihika’s whereabouts 
to Thompson:
In bed that night, he dreamed that he was back in Rira. A group of detainees 
were lined up against the wall, naked to the waist. Githua and Gikonyo were 
among them. From another corner, John Thompson came holding a machine-
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gun at the unfortunate men against the wall. He was going to shoot them—un-
less they told what they knew about Kihika. All at once, Githua shouted: Mugo 
save us. The cry was taken by the others: Mugo save us. The suppliant voices 
rose to a chanting thunder: Mugo save us. And John Thompson had joined the 
condemned men and he was crying louder than all the others: Mugo save us. 
How could he refuse, that agonized cry. Here I am, Lord. I am coming, coming, 
coming, and riding in a cloud of thunder. And the men with one voice wept and 
cried: Amen.
(146)
While the dream projects that confessing to Thompson will save others, 
later we learn that Mugo actually believes it will save him from the “burden” 
of Kihika. In the instant following his confession to Thompson, Mugo feels 
freed: “This confession was his fi rst contact with another man. He felt deep 
gratitude to the whiteman, a patient listener, who had lifted his burden from 
Mugo’s heart, who had extricated him from the nightmare” (199). The re-
sults are not what Mugo expected, however. Thompson is not a patient lis-
tener who can extricate Mugo from this nightmare; he responds to Mugo’s 
confession by spitting in Mugo’s face, slapping him, and accusing him of 
giving false information. The scene concludes with a fearful Mugo regret-
ting having confessed to knowing Kihika’s location, for “he did not want to 
know what he had done” (227). The “burden” of Kihika not only remains 
but becomes heavier as a consequence of Mugo’s confession to Thompson. 
This is evinced by the fact that Mugo is compelled to confess his betrayal to 
Mumbi and the village.
The novel also ironizes Mugo’s supposedly sacrifi cial act of confession at 
the Uhuru celebrations that it claims “saves” Karanja, whom many suspect 
as Kihika’s betrayer. After “the traitor” is called upon to reveal himself, fear 
prevents Karanja from publicly denying his guilt. He is about to be killed for 
keeping silent, when suddenly Mugo “had appeared with a confession which 
relieved Karanja. Mwaura turned to Karanja with eyes tense with malice. 
‘He has saved you,’ Mwaura said” (260). But the salvation Mugo’s confes-
sion provides is more curse than gift, for Karanja no longer holds the power 
he held during the Emergency, possesses no family, nor the love of Mumbi. 
“For what, then, had Mugo saved Karanja? . . . Life was empty and dark like 
the mist that enclosed the earth” (261). The salvation it promises Mugo is 
equally deceptive: “as soon as the fi rst words were out, Mugo felt light. A 
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load of many years was lifted from his shoulders. He was free, sure, confi -
dent. Only for a minute” (267). Afterward, the novel implies, Mugo is killed 
by General R. and Lieutenant Koinandu, but even if he is not, he disappears 
from the community and social existence following his confession.
While other confessions do not result in actual death, they iterate the 
fracturing experiences of social death in detention. Rather than saving de-
tainees from this past under the Emergency, these “confessions”—never 
represented in uninterrupted form—make it reemerge. The interrupted and 
censored treatment of these speech acts, and the fi gurations of the confes-
sors, emphasize their coercive dimensions and traumatic effects. By eliciting 
Mugo’s confession when she asks “what is wrong?”, Mumbi, to whom Mugo 
confesses as “a submissive penitent,” becomes one with the world of deten-
tion: “That night he hardly closed his eyes. The picture of Mumbi merged 
with that of the village and the detention camps” (266). Gikonyo’s confes-
sion to Mugo that he confessed the oath in the camp also summons the scene 
it should save him from having to relive: “Gikonyo searched Mugo’s face. 
He could not discern anything. The silence made him uncomfortable. It 
seemed as if the whole thing was a repetition of a familiar scene” (141). The 
shame caused by confessing the oath is reactivated and strengthened when 
Gikonyo confesses to having confessed:
The weight had been lifted. But guilt of another kind was creeping in. He had 
laid himself bare, naked, before Mugo. Mugo must be judging him. Gikonyo felt 
the discomfort of a man standing before a puritan priest. Suddenly he wanted 
to go, get away from Mugo, and cry his shame in the dark. . . . Mugo’s purity, 
Mumbi’s unfaithfulness, everything had conspired to undermine his manhood, 
his faith in himself, and accentuate his shame at being the fi rst to confess the 
oath in Yala camp.
(141)
That the passages fi gure the confessor Mugo alternately as colonial offi cer 
and priest insinuates that Christian discourse parallels, and is even com-
plicit with, the Emergency state that harnesses confession to break the in-
surgency. Moreover, when quasi-confessions are claimed to have occurred, 
whether Dr. Lynd’s recounting of assault and rape to Thompson, Gikonyo’s 
recounting of his anger at the betrayals of Karanja and Mumbi to Mugo, or 
Mugo’s recounting of betraying Kihika to Mumbi, the reaction each time 
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is identical. A single word is used to describe it: a “recoiling” (53, 141, 236, 
266) from the confessant, which makes Mugo cave in on himself in turn, 
“coil with dread” (266).
Confession does not only make the past return rather than unburden one 
from it while repelling others instead of drawing them closer. It also fails to 
render the specifi c experience it must bring forth in order for the confessant 
to achieve salvation, in the form of release from—and “rehabilitation” by—
the colonial state. That experience is embodied in the Mau Mau oath. The 
demand to confess the oath produces an instance of what Jean-François Lyo-
tard calls the differend, a “case where the plaintiff is divested of the means 
to argue and for that reason becomes a victim.”51 Lyotard elaborates: “A 
case of the differend between two parties takes place when the ‘regulation’ 
of the confl ict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties 
while the wrong suffered by the other is not signifi ed in that idiom.”52 A 
Grain of Wheat articulates that a differend is generated in the juridico-legal 
spaces of Emergency, its screening centers, camps, and detention villages. 
This is because there the confl ict opposing the colonial government and 
the Kikuyu is regulated in the idiom of the former, who demand testimony 
to colonial experience in the form of confession, while for the Kikuyu, the 
wrongs suffered under colonialism are expressed in another, insurgent idiom 
incompatible with confession.
By eliciting confessions, the state aims to capture and translate into sup-
posedly rational discourse the supposedly irrational behavior of the Kikuyu 
and enable them to be saved from Mau Mau and themselves, “rehabilitated.” 
The irrationality of the Kikuyu was thought to be crystallized in the Mau 
Mau oath, derided by the British as “barbaric mumbo jumbo.”53 But while 
the state claimed the oath was more evidence of “backwardness and savagery 
of the Kikuyu, the practice had logic and purpose,” Elkins explains. “It was 
the rational response of a rural people seeking to understand the enormous 
socio-economic and political changes taking place around them while at-
tempting to respond collectively to new and unjust realities.”54 Yet the oath 
remains shrouded in mystery, in part because what is pledged went beyond 
the stated goals of the movement: “For those Kikuyu who pledged them-
selves to Mau Mau, the meanings of land and freedom were less defi ned and 
much more complex than merely tossing off the British yoke and reclaiming 
the land of their ancestors.”55 Indeed, “it was as much the ambiguity as the 
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specifi city of Mau Mau’s demand for land and freedom that made it so ap-
pealing to the Kikuyu masses and such a powerful and diffi cult movement 
for the British to suppress.”56 The oath is mysterious also because, although 
it is not “barbaric,” its force defi es logic, or, more precisely, it defi es the 
logic underlying the colonial deployment of testimony, which assumes that 
witnesses control their speech and not vice versa. Many who underwent the 
oathing ritual and thereby swore allegiance to the insurgency in fact were 
perjuring themselves: they felt and intended no commitment to the move-
ment. Yet they were still bound by the oath. Oathing was often not chosen 
but forced, and even brutally so, but “forced oathing did not make the pledge 
less binding, and in fact the bind of the oath often prevented them—even 
under torture or threat of death—from betraying the movement.”57 Testi-
monial discourse here does not obey the laws that the colonial state assumes 
it does. Committing witnesses beyond and even against their will, the oath 
relates that this testimony is uncontainable by conscious intention.
The novel demonstrates that the oath cannot be translated into the idiom 
of colonial regulation of the confl ict. Its complexity makes it exceed the 
frame of confession the state insists it must appear within: “The detainees 
had agreed not to confess the oath, or give any details about Mau Mau: 
how could anybody reveal the binding force of the Agikuyu in their call for 
African freedom?” (121). Delivering this point as a question suggests that 
it might very well be impossible to reveal this force, that the oath remains 
outside of the control of anyone who might try to do so. A Grain of Wheat 
not only describes the differend, however. Because it does not offer a single 
scene in which a confession of oath taking to colonial authorities is repre-
sented in narrative time or space, the novel critically enacts the effects of the 
differend—the impossibility of translating wrongs suffered under colonial-
ism into the terms in which the confl ict was regulated.
Together, the elliptical strategy, the exposure of sovereign exception and 
tactics of governmentality, the ironization of salvation, and the illustration 
and enactment of the differend challenge received ideas about the novel. 
Considered in the context of these textual features, ellipsis is not, as some 
argue, an unmediated refl ection of the world of the concentration camp and 
its silencing of witnesses. But nor is it true that “it is one of the unconscious 
ironies of A Grain of Wheat that its vision of Kenyan national identity relies 
upon the same confessional logic as that of the colonial torture chamber in 
F6635.indb   208 9/23/15   9:24:54 AM
Testimony and the Crisis of the Juridical Order   209
the detention camps.”58 The silences that ellipses produce should not be 
understood exclusively as repressive.59 By replacing confession, these si-
lences constitute an active critique of imperial law and discourse under the 
Emergency. This same discourse recurs postindependence when the neo-
colonial state creates “laws of detention, sedition, and treason [that] repro-
duce, almost word for word, those in practice between 1951 and 1961”60 and 
equally invests detention with “mystifying ritualism” of which confession is 
a crucial part.61
Because the experiences of colonial struggle cannot fi t within the dis-
cursive frame the dominant establishes and through which it regulates the 
confl ict, it would seem that these experiences are destined to be left unrep-
resented. The novel, however, passes through the impasse of witnessing it 
stages. It rejects confession for other formal tactics that it levers against the 
repressions that create collective amnesia, foment endless cycles of betrayal, 
and prevent the nation from learning from the past. These tactics attempt to 
“give the differend its due,” as Lyotard puts it. Lyotard asserts that “what is 
at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, in a politics perhaps . . . is to bear wit-
ness to differends by fi nding idioms for them.”62 Through this alternative, 
insurgent idiom, the textured and uneven experience of Emergency breaks 
through the structural containments that organize confessional discourse.
Uncanny Rhetoric and Orature
Writing against the neocolonial policy of national amnesia and the colonial 
and Christian deployments of confessions, A Grain of Wheat illustrates why 
the Emergency cannot be accessed through the main formal tactic Conrad 
uses in Under Western Eyes. Ngũgi does, however, employ other strategies he 
attributes to Conrad to address and coax it into narrative. These strategies 
include “shifting points of view in time and space; the multiplicity of nar-
rative voices; the narrative-within-a-narration; the delayed information that 
helps the revision of previous judgments so that only at the end with the full 
assemblage of evidence, information and points of view can the reader make 
a full judgment.”63 The replacement of a single, unifi ed narrative perspective 
with multiple perspectives has stood out to readers,64 but another, less obvi-
ous strategy does a different kind of work. What distinguishes this strategy 
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from the well-documented polylogic structure of the novel is that it maps 
a criticism of violence, both colonial and anticolonial, onto an elaboration 
of uneven gendering under colonialism and decolonization. This strategy, 
which I will call uncanny rhetoric, also exposes the limits of confessional 
discourse for addressing the Emergency.
This textual strategy launches the novel. The opening scene indicates that 
the history the novel addresses will not lend itself easily to confessional dis-
course. The events the fi rst paragraph relates resist temporal distinctions 
between past, present, and future and displace boundaries between fi ction 
and reality and between fi gural and literal speech—all determinations con-
fession requires if it is to function according to the ends to which Christian-
ity and the colonial state put it.
Mugo felt nervous. He was lying on his back and looking at the roof. Sooty 
locks hung from the fern and grass thatch and all pointed at his heart, a clear 
drop of water was delicately suspended above him. A drop fattened and grew 
dirtier as it absorbed grains of soot. Then it started drawing towards him. He 
tried to shut his eyes. They would not close. He tried to move his head: it was 
fi rmly chained to the bed-frame. The drop grew larger and larger as it drew 
closer and closer to his eyes. He wanted to cover his eyes with his palms; but his 
hands, his feet, everything refused to obey his will. In despair, Mugo gathered 
himself for a fi nal heave and woke up.
(3)
This passage trembles between past and present, dream and reality, literal 
and fi gural dimensions of language, even after the fi nal sentence seems to 
clear things up. The use of the preterite without additional framing suggests 
that the events described occur in the narrative present, which the imagery 
indicates is the time of the Emergency and the space of the detention camp: 
The drop of water and the chains that fasten Mugo to his bed evoke a cell 
or even torture chamber, his paralysis the aftereffects of a beating by camp 
guards. When the passage eventually relates that we are witnessing sleep 
rather than waking life, it raises more questions. First, are these “literal” 
dream references to a cell in which Mugo was detained in the past or fi gura-
tions of the hut while he is sleeping—is sleep what “chains” him to the bed 
and “paralyzes” him as he semiconsciously registers water dropping from 
the ceiling before the “fi nal heave” that pulls him out of the last vestiges of 
F6635.indb   210 9/23/15   9:24:54 AM
Testimony and the Crisis of the Juridical Order   211
sleep? Second, did the violent scene the literal reading of chains, paralysis, 
and water evokes actually occur in the past, or is it a fi gure created by dream-
work, a condensation or displacement of a moment that never was? Finally, 
should we jettison this either/or logic altogether and read the episode as a 
double staging in which past and present and literal and fi gural and dream 
and reality coincide: sleep (fi guratively) chains him to the bed because chains 
once also (literally) chained him to the bed, and he fears the drop of water in 
his semiconscious state because it mimics the waterboarding he experienced 
in a cell? That “he remained unsettled fearing, as in the dream, that a drop 
of cold water would suddenly pierce his eyes” (3) and that “he knew that it 
was only a dream: yet he kept on chilling at the thought of a cold drop falling 
into his eyes” (4) does not resolve the uncertainty. It does not tell us what to 
read as literal and what as fi gural because we do not know quite what “it,” 
the dream, encompasses, beyond the drop of water. Because this passage 
vacillates between literal and fi gural, reality and fi ction, and various tem-
poralities while settling into none, its referent overfl ows grammatical and 
logical constraints imposed by confession as it is deployed in governmental 
and Christian contexts.
This scene does not merely indicate that confession is inadequate to the 
task of portraying the history A Grain of Wheat addresses; it establishes an 
idiom through which obscured events will erupt throughout. This idiom is 
an uncanny rhetoric, a double staging of repression under colonialism and 
a textual insurgency that breaks through it. I take the defi nition of rhetoric 
here from Paul de Man, who defi nes it as expression that produces an ir-
reducible undecidability between literal and fi gural dimensions of language 
and therefore preserves what is said from any single or exhaustive interpre-
tation, any logic that opposes truth with falsity.65 I take the defi nition of the 
uncanny from Freud, who asserts that “this uncanny is in reality nothing 
new or alien, but which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which 
has become alienated from it only through the process of repression.”66 This 
novel’s opening scene is uncanny not only because it might describe the 
return of a repressed in Mugo’s mind but, more importantly, because, when 
the novel rhetorically disarticulates limits between the fi gural and literal, 
it both indexes an act of repression under colonialism and translates such 
events as the defamiliarized familiar. By maintaining events’ resistance to 
chronological time even as it places them into the narrative, formally locat-
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ing them between past, present, and future and as displacing the limits sepa-
rating these, uncanny rhetoric preserves the alterity of these unexperienced 
or not fully experienced moments as it texts them. Rather than “recovering” 
the “true history,” therefore, uncanny rhetoric shows that this history defi es 
the logic of truth recovery and portrays it instead as disrupting dominant 
processes such as confession, which would claim to recover it but instead 
reduces its complexity and its alterity.
The uncanny also functions as a theme, however, and one that is regularly 
associated with women in the novel, who operate as portals to a past discon-
tinuous with reason. By thematizing women as objects that mediate compul-
sive returns of the repressed, the text enforces colonialist, patriarchal narra-
tives of modernity and the psyche even while it motivates uncanny rhetoric 
toward a critique of the cultural logic of imperial modernity.67 The Unheim-
lich, as Freud describes it, is a feeling that overtakes reason by which the 
familiar or homey becomes unhomey, defamiliarized. This happens when a 
past never experienced in the strict sense “reemerges.” In Freud’s narrative, 
the privileged example of the theater of the uncanny is the mother’s vagina, 
“the entrance to the former Heim of all human beings.” While in Freud’s 
case, as in Conrad’s and others, the uncanny is aligned with woman-as-
mother, Gayatri Spivak has demonstrated that the uncanny’s morphology as 
an othering of the familiar exceeds normative, and norming, narratives that 
embed it. It can be lifted from such narratives to function as a critical tool 
that delinks it from patriarchal and colonial axiomatics.68 The novel both 
expresses these colonialist and patriarchal narratives of the uncanny and, 
through rhetoric, delinks its morphology of the defamiliarized familiar from 
them, providing a countermode to colonial forms of attestation that allows 
repressed, unauthorized histories to fulminate as narrative ruptures.
The uncanny as a thematic (rather than as an enactment of rhetoric) sub-
jects characters to a compulsive return of a history outside of their control. 
This is especially true of Mugo, who “allowed himself to drift into things 
or be pushed into them by an uncanny demon; he rode on the wave of 
circumstance and lay against the crest, fearing but fascinated by fate” (24). 
By making women the vehicles of these returns, as well as “uncanny de-
mons” themselves, the novel, as Brendon Nicholls asserts, “articulates Mau 
Mau at the expense of female articulation and gender-political agency.”69 As 
sites and midwives of the uncanny, women activate and perpetuate charac-
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terological trauma. The old woman of Thabai, Gitogo’s mother, occasions 
Mugo’s fi rst encounter with the uncanny. She is at once outside of time yet 
familiar: “Nobody knew her age: she had always been there, a familiar part 
of the old and the new village” (6). The text dramatizes the defamiliarization 
of the familiar by positioning her as mother/not mother to Mugo, whom 
she mistakes for the ghost of her son, a young man shot when he is misrec-
ognized as an insurgent. Her portrayal invokes the Freudian narrative of 
the maternal become frightening, Unheimlich, “ ‘the name for everything 
that which ought to have remained secret and hidden . . . but has come 
to light’ (Schelling).”70 Freud-via-Schelling’s sentiment is paraphrased by a 
proverb voiced through Warui after the alleged return of the old woman’s 
dead son: “those buried in the earth should remain in the earth. Things of 
yesterday should remain with yesterday” (198). It is the mother, however, 
not the son, who is the catalyst for disinterment of Mugo’s past, for “it was 
her eyes that most disturbed Mugo. He always felt naked, seen. . . . Mugo 
felt the woman fi x him with her eyes, which glinted with recognition. Sud-
denly he shivered at the thought that the woman might touch him. He ran 
out, revolted” (8). Condensing this particularly Freudian formulation of 
the uncanny as revulsion inspired by contact with the maternal genitals, 
here metonymized as the eyes, is the equally Freudian formulation of it as 
confusion of repression for fate: “Perhaps there was something fateful in his 
contact with the old woman” (8). This “fateful” contact disturbs Mugo “in a 
way he could not explain. He wandered through the streets thinking about 
the old woman and that thrilling bond he felt existed between them. Then 
he tried to dismiss the incident. But as he went on, he found himself starting 
at the thought of meeting a dead apparition” (198). When Mugo seeks out 
the old woman for shelter after he confesses to the community, she “claims 
him” (269) as her own but then transforms into another woman, his dead 
aunt, also a mother surrogate from Mugo’s past: “Suddenly her face had 
changed. Mugo looked straight into the eyes of his aunt. A new rage moved 
him. Life was only a constant repetition of what happened yesterday and 
the day before” (269). The buried past raised through Mugo’s encounter 
with the old woman, along with a past Mumbi raises by recounting it to 
Mugo, results in madness. “Mugo saw thick blood dripping from the mud 
walls of his hut . . . he walked to his hut, resolved to fi nd out if the blood 
was really there” and discovers that “he saw nothing on the walls. . . . Was 
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he cracking in the head? He started at the thought and again looked at the 
walls” (199).
The novel thematizes women as the return of the repressed in wider, 
historical terms, to castigate political arrangements in precolonial Kenya as 
anachronistic instances of British imperialism. Queen Elizabeth is the un-
canny repetition of Kikuyu precolonial matriarchs. In both cases, the Law of 
the Mother is castrating. The earliest missionaries tell of “another country 
beyond the sea where a powerful woman sat on the throne,” whose “shadow 
of . . . authority and benevolence” (13–14) will soon cover the Agikuyu. 
The words of the missionary “echoed something in the heart, deep down 
in their history. It was many, many years ago. The women ruled the land of 
the Agikuyu. Men had no property, they were only there to serve the whims 
and needs of the women” (14). The novel places a narrative of female sexual 
dominance over men onto a narrative of colonial dominance over Africa in 
order to justify biopolitical domination through the phallus as a form of 
political resistance. “They waited for women to go to war, they plotted a 
revolt, taking an oath of secrecy to keep them bound to each in the common 
pursuit of freedom. They would sleep with all the women at once, for didn’t 
they know the heroines would return hungry for love and relaxation” (14)? 
The reference to oath-taking in the name of freedom also fi gures the matri-
archy not merely as precursor to, but earlier versions of, imperialism. The 
plan works, for “Fate did the rest; women were pregnant; the takeover met 
with little resistance” (14). That matriarchy is traumatic and thus returns is 
articulated in the next sentence, when it is revealed that “that was not the 
end of a woman as a power in the land” nor the end of a threatening power. 
“Years later a woman became a leader and ruled over a large section in Mu-
ranga. She was beautiful” (14) and uses her beauty to maintain power. In 
the fi rst bid for “freedom,” men dethrone women by deploying sex toward 
reproductive ends, and in the second bid, a woman is dethroned for deploy-
ing sex toward nonpatriarchal ends—to seduce, rather than reproduce, her 
male subjects. At one of the dances, the leader disrobes; “for a moment, men 
were moved by the power of a woman’s naked body. The moon played on 
her: an ecstasy, a mixture of agony and joy hovered on the woman’s face . . . 
a woman never walked or danced naked in public. Wangu Makeri, the last of 
the great Gikuyu women, was removed from the throne” (14 –15). The next 
manifestation of this ruler will be Queen Elizabeth, who will also castrate 
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her male (colonial) subjects. The Emergency “was all because of a wom-
an—a new Wangu—in England—had been crowned: what good ever came 
from a woman’s rule?” (160), the men ask. When the women retort that, 
after all, “Governor Baring, who rules Kenya, has a penis” (161), the men 
have the last word. Colonial domination is once again rewritten as perverse 
sexuality, an unholy marriage that subverts the Law of the Father by putting 
the wife in control. “Ah, it’s still the woman’s shauri. See how all you women 
have sent the men to detention for their penises to rot there, unwilling hus-
bands to Queen Elizabeth?” (161). The women capitulate to the masculin-
ist interpretation of history: “ ‘And to the forests, too,’ the women would 
burst out, the raillery turning into bitterness” (161). Critics’ commendation 
of the novel’s positive depiction of women based on strong female charac-
ters71 must therefore be measured against this thematization of the uncanny, 
through which women re-present historical trauma and characterological 
trauma, both coded as the castrating of the African man.
In counterpoint to this repressive thematization of women and the un-
canny is uncanny rhetoric, a mode through which women become subjects 
of attestation and historical change rather than objects of compulsive repeti-
tions that create silences. In a crucial episode, the novel transforms Mumbi 
from a would-be confessant into a disruptive force whose testimony gener-
ates what confessing cannot. The story that interrupts Mumbi’s long quasi-
confession to Mugo of her marital infi delity—a disclosure that replaces dec-
larations of responsibility with questions and uses a passive verb to displace 
agency (“I let Karanja make love to me” [171])—forces the impossible to oc-
cur. Mumbi relates to Mugo what happens after he is arrested for attempting 
to save the villager Wambuku from being beaten to death by homeguards as 
the villagers build a trench. “Mumbi had stopped her narrative to hum the 
tunes for Mugo” (164), songs the villagers sang defi antly at the trench to re-
ject conditions under the Emergency. The songs inspire the homeguards to 
beat the Kikuyu with more force. The songs are not only an interruption in 
Mumbi’s process of “confessing” without confessing but produce an inter-
ruption in homogenous temporality: “Mugo was rooted to his seat, painfully 
reliving a scene he never saw, for by that time he had been detained” (164). 
The oxymoron of the fi nal sentence states precisely the need for what the 
novel relates confession cannot give: the capacity to “re-live” a past never 
lived the fi rst time as a future yet to come.
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Mumbi’s attestation crystallizes what Ngũgi theorizes elsewhere as ora-
ture. It performs a collective past as living in self-differentiation rather than 
frozen into a moment in a linear historical trajectory. The novel’s treatment 
of Gikuyu song does not imply, however, that only “traditional” Gikuyu 
orality can translate the trauma of the Emergency. Rather than fetishizing 
custom as culture and divorcing precolonial discursive practices from their 
endless reworkings throughout time—gestures of the colonized intellectual 
Fanon famously criticized in The Wretched of the Earth72— orature performs 
culture as what attacks constructed barriers between aesthetics and politics 
as well as between tradition and modernity. In Globalectics, Ngũgi explains,
Performance is the central feature of orature. . . . Performance involves the per-
former and audience, and in orature, the performer and audience interact. . . . 
Anywhere from the fi reside, village square, and market place to the shrine can 
serve as the performance space and mise-en-scène. . . . 
Orature is not pure metaphysics or a zombie that comes alive only when 
inhabiting the body of the written and other recorded forms. It is a dynamic 
living presence in all cultures. In the case of Africa, the authors of the “On the 
Abolition of the English Department” stressed the fact that “the art did not end 
yesterday; it is a living tradition,” is a presence in religious functions, births, fu-
nerals. . . . In the anti-colonial resistance, song and dance played a pivotal role in 
recruiting, rallying, and coding the social vision. The colonial authorities feared 
orature more than they did literature.73
As orature, Mumbi’s performance bears witness to the impossible time of 
a trauma whose force erupts into an already disrupted quasi “confession” 
to Mugo. Because it has Mumbi occupy the role of a witness that makes 
the Emergency signify in a way that interrupts the compulsive returns that 
victimize Mugo and others, the novel’s deployment of orature intercepts the 
thematic staging of the uncanny that denies both women and men agency 
to create a future nation that can reverse the social, political, and economic 
stratifi cations that structured its past.
Mumbi’s performance spurs the staging of uncanny rhetoric, forcing into 
the narrative what has been repressed—an irreducible bond to others, at-
tachments to the socius of the present and past, which confession fails to 
illuminate or create. The effects of Mumbi’s performance rejects the atom-
istic and individualist ethos of neocolonial Kenya, for “before Mumbi told 
her story” Mugo had “seen these huts as objects that had nothing to do with 
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him. . . . Now they were different: the huts, the dust, the trench, Wam-
buku, Kihika, Karanja, detention-camps, the white fence” (195). Although 
Mugo “wanted to resume that state, a limbo, in which he was before he heard 
Mumbi’s story and looked into her eyes” (197), orature refuses Mugo’s, and 
Kenyatta’s, desires to suppress that past and those connections. The novel 
relates that “Mumbi’s story had cracked open his dulled inside and released 
imprisoned thought and feelings. . . . Previously, he liked to see events in his 
life as isolated. Things had been fated to happen at different moments. One 
had no choice in anything as surely as one had no choice in one’s birth. . . . 
Numbed, he ran without thinking of the road, its origin or its end” (195). 
This episode and another that follows enact the comingling of past and pres-
ent, literal and fi gural dimensions of language shaping the novel’s opening 
scene. Here, it is unclear whether the “road” is literal or a fi gure for time 
and history. This turning of time into space and vice versa continues as a to-
pography of mixed temporalities makes it increasingly diffi cult to determine 
literal descriptions of the external landscape in the present from fi gural stag-
ings of mental theaters and the past.
Mugo abruptly stopped in the middle of the main village street, surprised that 
he had been walking deeper and deeper into the village. Incidents tumbled on 
him. He stirred himself with diffi culty, to cut a path through the heap. He was 
again drawn to the trench and seemed impotent to resist this return to yesterday. 
The walls of the trench were now battered: soil had fallen to the bottom. . . . 
The whole scene again became alive and vivid. He worked a few yards from the 
woman. He had worked in the same place for three days. Now a homeguard 
jumped into the trench and lashed the woman with a whip. Mugo felt the whip 
eat into his fl esh, and her pained whimper was like a cry from his own heart. Yet 
he did not know her, had for three days refused to recognize those around him 
as fellow sufferers. Now he only saw the woman, the whip, and the homeguard. 
Most people continued digging, pretending not to hear the woman’s screams, and 
fearing to meet a similar fate. . . . In terror, Mugo pushed forward and held the 
whip before the homeguard could hit the woman a fi fth time.
(196)
Mumbi’s performance coaxes the repressed event to light, which a com-
pelled confession to the colonial offi cers immediately following the episode 
in the ditch fails to accomplish: “To Mugo the scene remained a nightmare 
whose broken and blurred edges he could not pick or reconstruct during the 
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secret screening that later followed” (196). Just as important is how orature 
summons this event. Neither fully past nor present, it emerges a struggle 
between two times. Although the passage is delivered in the past tense, the 
regular interruption of “nows” demonstrates the past fi ghting to erupt into 
the present.
Women fi gure as potentiates of historical change not only because they 
force a confrontation with history in crisis while answering the demands 
of the insurgency in various ways but also because they expose and disrupt 
the repetition of colonial violence haunting anticolonial struggle. The novel 
departs from ways that Ngũgi claims Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth has 
been misread and misappropriated.74 “The violence which governed the or-
dering of the colonial world, which tirelessly punctuated the destruction of 
the indigenous social fabric, and demolished unchecked the systems of refer-
ence of the country’s economy, lifestyles, and modes of dress,” Fanon writes, 
“this same violence will be vindicated and appropriated when taking his-
tory into their own hands, the colonized swarm into the forbidden cities.”75 
Both the plotting of women and their fi guration through uncanny rhetoric 
insinuate that retributive violence connects the anticolonial movement too 
closely to the orders it opposes and reject violence as a method with which 
to manage betrayals.
By demanding one speak in the idioms of law, confessions, and trials, the 
Mau Mau justify retributive violence by attaching its orchestration to the 
legal process, thereby raising the specter of British deployments of law and 
violence under the Emergency. Women highlight, question, and interrupt 
acts of retributive violence in response to betrayal. Mumbi, for example, 
warns her enemy Karanja to stay away from the Uhuru celebration where 
his life will be threatened unless he confesses (and if he confesses), and she 
also declines to publicize Mugo’s confession in an attempt to stop the cycle 
of violence: “I did not want anything to happen. I never knew that he would 
later come to the meeting” (275). Mugo’s trial at the end of the novel also 
functions as means of retribution, and as such, it invokes the trial of Jomo 
Kenyatta.76 Like confessions throughout the work, the trial is replaced by an 
ellipsis. After General R. and Lieutenant Koinandu announce the “trial will 
be held tonight” and assure Mugo, “your deeds alone will condemn you” 
(270), as they lead him out of the hut, the next we hear of the trial is after 
Mugo has gone missing. Only General R. and Lieutenant Koinandu are 
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said to have been present at the trial over which the elder woman Wambui 
presides. This judge, whose “fi ghting spirit” (204) is legendary for maintain-
ing that “women had to act. Women had to force the issue” (204), and for 
unifying the workers at the party meeting for the worker’s strike in 1950, 
questions whether the trial should have taken place at all, in light of Mugo’s 
subsequent disappearance and probable execution. Wambui was “lost in a 
solid consciousness of a terrible anti-climax to her activities in the fi ght for 
freedom. Perhaps we should not have tried him, she muttered” (275–276). 
By suggesting that the protocols of law provide a cover or even justifi cation 
for killing, Wambui’s statement connects the violence of the anticolonial 
movement to that of the Emergency state.
While the original version of the novel warns against the repetition of co-
lonial violence in the future in various ways, the revised version makes heavy 
changes to two successive passages, which suggests that Ngũgi responded to 
criticism of his initial portrayal of Mau Mau while maintaining and high-
lighting a critique of violence against women the original version delivers. 
These changes make these passages refl ect on each other, and in so doing, 
they hold colonialism as well as anticolonial movements accountable for vio-
lence and indicate that the new nation must interrupt this cycle of violence 
to cast off a colonial legacy. In the 1967 text, General R., whose real name is 
Muhoya, defended his mother from beatings by his father, “a petty tyrant” 
(241), but his mother “took a stick and fought on her husband’s side” (241), 
insisting that patriarchal order must be maintained: “He is your father, and 
my husband” (241). Changes to three sentences connect African patriarchal 
violence to colonial violence against an entire people. In the revised edition 
of the novel, Muyoha’s father “graduated from an ordinary colonial messen-
ger into petty assistant chief” (211), and when they are locked in battle, he 
is described not as a “petty tyrant” but “a petty colonial tyrant” (212). The 
fi nal sentence Ngũgi adds to this paragraph picks up on the reconfi gured de-
scriptions of the father, conveying that that instance of submission to patri-
archy, depicted as pathological, becomes an allegory of colonial submission: 
“It was only later when he saw how so many Kenyans could proudly defend 
their slavery that he understood his mother’s reaction.”77 Read as a response 
to criticisms of Ngũgi’s exaggeration of excessive Mau Mau violence, these 
amendments indicate that there is a structural nature to it, and its source is 
colonialism. Turning violence toward women into the privileged metaphor 
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through which to represent both colonial violence and the stymieing of the 
anticolonial spirit insinuates an ironic critique of the episode that follows. 
That episode justifi es anticolonial violence expressed specifi cally in terms of 
violence against women and imagines the postcolony’s new order as African 
patriarchy.
Here, the uncanny operates not within the patriarchal and colonial nar-
rative but as a rhetorical defamiliarization of the familiar that indicates 
that anticolonial violence reinstates colonialism as patriarchy. Lieutenant 
Koinandu refl ects with satisfaction on his assaults on his former employer 
Dr. Lynd, the white woman he rapes and whose beloved dog he hacks to 
death after leading insurgents into her house to steal her guns. The revised 
version of the novel suggests again that Ngũgi responds to critics by rewrit-
ing the scene in a way that leaves unclear whether a rape occurs, although 
most read this rape as entirely absent.78 But both versions’ treatments of 
this episode suggest that Mau Mau violence refl ects Kikuyu patriarchal 
 violence against women, itself a refl ection of colonial power, as the pre-
ceding episode cited above relates. The revised version adds a staging of 
uncanny rhetoric that substitutes for the rape scene in the original. After 
adding into the text Koinandu’s claim that “Independence, when fi nally 
won, would right all the wrongs, would drive the likes of Dr. Lynd and 
her dogs from the country. Kenya after all was a black man’s country . . . 
he was going to enter the forest in triumph over Dr. Lynd” (213), in order 
to substitute for the rape, the revised version also troubles this vision of a 
patriarchal future by establishing that it conditions the compulsive repeti-
tion of the past.
In the years of hardships and deaths on the battlefi eld he had almost forgot-
ten the incident, until the other day when he went to Githima to see Mawaura 
about plans to lure Karanja into attending Uhuru celebrations. And there in 
front of him was Dr. Lynd and her dog. She stood there as if mocking him: See 
me, I have still got the big house, and my property has even multiplied. Githima 
had not in fact changed much. The exclusive white settlement seemed to have 
grown bigger instead. . . . Why were all these whites still in Kenya despite the 
ringing of the Uhuru bells? Would Uhuru really change things for the likes of 
him and General R? . . . Dr. Lynd’s unyielding presence became an obsession. It 
fi lled him with fear, a kind of premonition. He had tried to share those thoughts 
with General R. but he could not fi nd the words. . . . Even now, as he ran, the 
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thought of the unexpected encounter made him shudder. The ghost had come 
to eat into his life.
(214)
This scene, like the others, oscillates between literal and fi gural, past and 
present, memory and delusion. We cannot determine if Lynd’s “unyielding 
presence” is literal or fi gural and whether Lynd literally appeared before 
Koinandu with her dog in Githima or fi guratively appears in his mind as 
a “ghost.” For it is disclosed earlier in the revised version of the novel that 
Koinandu killed the dog and that Lynd has a new pet. Mau Mau violence 
against Lynd, and the colonizer generally, seems only to have strengthened 
the latter’s control and increased their domains. Uncanny rhetoric, the 
spectral return of Dr. Lynd, enables these fears to be represented, which 
confession to General R., the passage implies—again by invoking ellipsis—
cannot. That the specter of Lynd appears when another act of retributive 
violence is planned, the killing of Karanja, underscores the role of women 
through, and as, uncanny rhetoric in disrupting the compulsive repetitions 
of violence. Ngũgi’s rewriting of this scene and the one cited above demon-
strates his desire to link anticolonial violence to the oppression of women as 
well as elucidates that it repeats and strengthens a colonial legacy.
By fi nding a new idiom for the Emergency through uncanny rhetoric, A 
Grain of Wheat does not only pass through the impasse generated by the dif-
ferend by bearing witness to the Emergency; it also elaborates that in order 
for a postcolonial Kenya to emerge, the cycles of patriarchy and violence 
must be disrupted. Moreover, by detaching the uncanny from the colonial 
and heteronormative narratives of psychoanalysis the work references in its 
presentation of character, the text’s formal tactics bestow ethical and po-
litical value on a discourse of the unverifi able. Form highlights the value 
of testimony as an act discontinuous with proof. Uncanny rhetoric cannot 
capture the event in itself, a project the novel’s polylogic structure rejects 
from the outset, just as it suggests that the past attains value and mean-
ing through its multiple retellings.79 Instead, this spectral orchestration that 
suspends temporal, spatial, external, and internal indices instructs us that 
there is no event “in itself” that fi ts into a chronology. It preserves the un-
experienced experience of the trauma in its alterity. But most important, the 
novel procures the hazy, secluded, secretive scenes of this era without either 
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retreating from bearing witness and lapsing into silence, which the elisions 
of confession suggest it will, or capitulating to, even negotiating with, the 
colonial language of confession. The novel “institute[s] new addresses, new 
addressors, new signifi cations, and new referents in order for the wrong to 
fi nd an expression and for the plaintiff to cease being a victim.”80 Through 
formal tactics motivated toward restoring agency for those denied it under 
colonialism, insurgency, and counterinsurgency, A Grain of Wheat fi nds a 
way to give the differend its due.
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7. Ngũgi wa Thiong’o, Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in 
African Literature (Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 2005), 76.
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74. Ngũgi is sympathetic to Fanon’s critique of systemic violence infl icted 
by colonialism and understands anticolonialism as a structural violence of his-
tory that has the function of Bildung and therefore (national) independence. 
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179–180, 182, 184 –190, 202–210, 212, 
215–218, 221–222
conjure, 18–19, 25–26, 31. See also specter
Conrad, Joseph, 2, 8, 10, 13, 16, 23, 36, 
38, 39, 46; Achebe on, 37; Almayer’s 
Folly, 36; “Autocracy and War,” 57–59; 
and confession (see confession: in 
Conrad); as critic of globalization 
and cosmopolitanism, 10; father, as 
 revolutionary, 48; Heart of Darkness, 36, 
42, 194; and modernism, 9; Nostromo, 
36; A Personal Record, 36, 41 61; “Poland 
Revisited,” 10, 36, 38–50, 53, 65, 70, 
75; The Secret Agent, 37; testimony in, 
4, 11, 18; Under Western Eyes, 35–36, 
37, 38, 40, 43– 45, 50–51, 54, 64 –67, 
70, 75, 178–179, 178–180, 184, 209, 
235n47; witnessing as framing device 
in, 234
contact zones, 13, 37, 225n26
cosmopolitanism, 10, 13, 15, 38, 57, 73, 
182, 227n36, 231n10, 234n39, 236n60
counterinsurgency, 19, 137, 153, 166, 
171–172, 190, 197, 202; British, 11–12, 
110–111, 129, 132–133, 143, 146, 148, 
151, 153, 166, 170–172, 176, 179, 183, 
195–197, 202–203, 257; and Enlight-
enment thought, 159; Russian, 68; 
U.S., 200
Cover, Robert, 104, 121
Craps, Stef, 16
de Lisser, H. G., 2, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 
128–133, 136, 155, 165, 166, 169, 
178; Revenge, A Tale of Old Jamaica, 
130–133, 137–153
de Man, Paul, 47, 85, 211, 233n26
Deer, Patrick, 101
Derrida, Jacques, 16–18, 107–108, 
237n68
Dershowitz, Alan, 123
detention, 18, 178, 202; colonial, 12–13; 
indefi nite, 1, 33, 189, 196; in the Ken-
yan Emergency, 189–190, 195–196, 
197–198, 202–203, 206–207, 209–210; 
without trial, 20; in U.S. war on terror, 
12, 200
dialectical image, 7–8, 33. See also Benja-
min, Walter
Diaz, Porfi rio, 95
Dickens, Charles, 3, 129
differend, 207–209, 221–222. See also 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois; Ngũgi Wa 
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